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In discussion with the literature on the treatment of veterans in the United States and the 
nature of American citizenship ideology, the following dissertation asks how post-9/11 veterans 
are defining, (re)creating, and contesting citizenship in the contemporary U.S. By studying a 
localized community of post-9/11 veterans, my dissertation highlights the dilemmas of U.S. 
citizenship at a time when the U.S. is engaged in a global War on Terror using less than 1% of 
the U.S. population as paid volunteers. Soldiers and veterans occupy states and spaces of 
exception, marking military citizens as distinct from civilians. Military citizenship benefits the 
nation by creating a pool of potential citizens willing to serve the nation-state and it helps service 
members by allowing them to demand social rights, inclusion and recognition they believe are 
owed to them as a result of their service. Yet military citizenship is unstable. Not all veterans can 
access the benefits and privileges of military service.  
By documenting veterans accessing entitlements and services, like the Post-9/11 G.I. Bill, 
while they reintegrate and readjust to “civilian” life, my research highlights how military 
citizenship is constructed.  I explore veteran interactions with institutions and individuals on a 
college campus and consider the ways that interests, access, and needs differ between veterans 
and civilians. Through accessing their educational benefits, veterans and civilians were brought 
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together, revealing how members of a local community understand and experience the military-
civilian divide and shape notions of post-9/11 era citizenship. By analyzing the tension between 
military citizenship and the lived experiences of U.S. veterans, I highlight how military citizens 
experience effaced social rights, inclusion and recognition on the post-9/11 home front.  
Chapter one frames the return of post-9/11 veterans to the homefront by analyzing the 
central federal benefits program created to assist with veterans’ reintegration and readjustment to 
civilian life: the Post-9/11 G.I. Bill. By analyzing the material benefits and privileges granted to 
College of Staten Island (CSI) student veterans through the Post 9/11 G.I. Bill, I highlight how 
veterans are an exception to the neoliberal status quo experienced by other college students given 
they have greater choice over their education, finances, and ultimately their future, reinforcing 
veteran’s military citizenship. Yet, unlike their civilian counterparts, student veterans remain 
financially constrained in spite of their access to ample federal funding due to their 
socioeconomic status. 
Chapters two and three address CSI veterans struggling with civilian life in spite of their 
exceptional access to material benefits and privileges. By analyzing veterans’ effaced social 
inclusion and recognition during Veterans Day events and debates centered on establishing a 
Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) program, it became clear that veteran identity is 
socially constituted throughout the individual’s lifetime in military and non-military institutional 
and social contexts.  When lacking the structure and meaning provided by the military that 
espouses military citizens as supercitizens, CSI veterans were confronting reintegration and 
readjustment within a civilian world whose institutions and ideologies did not uphold the special 
status of veterans as supercitizens. Thus, CSI veterans were navigating a liminal space despite 
living in a militarized United States. As a result, it became clear that the social context marks 
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veteran-ness as privileged other or a marginalized other in spite of whether a veteran or a civilian 
believes in the valuing of former members as supercitizens. 
Chapter four is a discussion of how liminality varies within the veteran population, 
focusing on women veterans’ strategies in veteran and civilian spaces as well as the university’s 
“empowerment” initiatives. Building on experiences with soldiering as well as military and non-
military institutional and social contexts, the gendered hierarchy produced in the military and 
reproduced in veteran and civilian contexts also shapes veteran identity. As a result, the hyper-
masculine supercitizen is the norm, subordinating women veterans through a hierarchy of valor 
and a fraternity of service.  
Anthropologists have documented the cross-cultural experiences of soldiers and veterans, 
highlighting their relationship to the nation-state and within their national and local communities, 
to reveal the ways bodies, ideals, practices, and subjectivities are being configured via bodily 
experience, trauma and illness (Young 1995; MacLeish 2013; Hautzinger and Scandlyn 2014; 
Wool 2015) as well as historical memory and acts of resistance to war (Carbonella 2003; 
Gutmann and Lutz 2010; Leitz 2014; Masco 2014). My ethnographic fieldwork moves this 
discourse forward by studying veterans’ status on the homefront, specifically their status as 
citizens. Anthropological research on veterans and citizenship has primarily focused on how 
undocumented migrants and legally marginalized groups access rights through military service 
(Plascencia 2009; Gutmann and Lutz 2010). By asking how are post-9/11 veterans are defining, 
(re)creating, and contesting citizenship in the contemporary U.S., my ethnographic project 
explains the dilemmas of citizenship through the study of post-9/11 veterans within a localized 
community as they access entitlements and services while confronting reintegration and 
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In recent years, anthropologists have documented the cross-cultural experiences of 
soldiers and veterans, highlighting their relationship to the nation-state and within their national 
and local communities, to reveal the ways bodies, ideals, practices, and subjectivities are being 
configured. Within this body of work, many studies of U.S. veterans focus on bodily experience, 
trauma and illness grounded in phenomenology and embodiment (Young 1995; MacLeish 2013; 
Hautzinger and Scandlyn 2014; Wool 2015). Anthropologists also study historical memory and 
acts of resistance to war in order to understand the processes of U.S. imperialism and 
militarization (Carbonella 2003; Gutmann and Lutz 2010; Leitz 2014; Masco 2014). Yet, there is 
a lack of research on U.S. veterans’ status on the homefront, specifically their status as citizens. 
Anthropological research on veterans and citizenship has primarily focused on how 
undocumented migrants and legally marginalized groups access rights through military service 
(Plascencia 2009; Gutmann and Lutz 2010). Toward that end, this dissertation asks: how are 
post-9/11 veterans defining, (re)creating, and contesting citizenship in the contemporary U.S.? 
This ethnographic project seeks to explain the dilemmas of citizenship through the study of post-
9/11 veterans within a localized community as they access entitlements and services while 
confronting reintegration and readjustment to civilian life.  
From the country’s founding in 1776 until 1973, military service was linked to 
participatory citizenship in the United States, with citizen-soldiers making up the foundation of 
the military. Since the burden of national defense lay on its (male) citizens, Americans would 
curb the misuse of power and defend civic ideals by actively participating in the process of 
deciding when to engage in war (Snyder 1999, 2003). To rally against drafts perceived to be a 
federal abuse of power, citizens used powerful tools such as protests, draft dodging and voting 
2 
 
officials out of office during unpopular or divisive conflicts, such as the Civil War and the 
Vietnam War. Given the potential political and social repercussions of enacting a federal draft, 
the U.S. federal government has enacted conscription four times since the implementation of the 
Constitution in 1789: during the Civil War (1863), World War I (1917-1918), World War II 
(1940-1945) and the Cold War (1946-1973).  Along with limiting how and when to engage in 
war, the drafting of citizens in times of war to join the existing volunteers and militiamen under 
the orders of officers (see: Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution) would avoid the creation 
of a professional standing military. Samuel Adams warned: “A standing Army, however 
necessary it may be at some times, is always dangerous to the Liberties of the People. Soldiers 
are apt to consider themselves as a Body distinct from the rest of the Citizens… Men who have 
been long subject to military laws and inured to military Customs and Habits, may lose the Spirit 
and feeling of Citizens” (Adams 1776: 1). While avoiding the creation of a military class and 
thus a sharp civilian-military divide, conscription did create a class of career officers who 
managed conscripts, a temporary pool of forced labor. 
The U.S. conscription system ultimately lost legitimacy during the Vietnam War due to 
extensive deferment and exemption policies under the Selective Service System, an agency of 
the U.S. federal government responsible for implementing a military draft and maintaining 
information on potential military conscripts. Given the calls for the end of conscription, the 
Johnson administration and Congress established various commissions and panels, such as the 
National Advisory Commission on Selective Service (1966), the Clark Panel (1966), and the 
Marshall Commission (1967), which concluded that ending conscription and establishing a force 
composed of paid “volunteers” was feasible without damaging national security. The Johnson 
administration and Congress failed to reform the draft system, making the end of conscription a 
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central issue in the 1968 presidential campaign. Richard Nixon, the Republican presidential 
candidate, promised to end military conscription if elected. He stated: “…a system of 
compulsory service that arbitrarily selects some and not others simply cannot be squared with 
our whole concept of liberty, justice, and equality under the law… Some say we should tinker 
with the present system, patching up an inequity here and there. I favor this too, but only for the 
short term. But in the long run, the only way to stop the inequities is to stop using the system” 
(Nixon 1968).  
Upon winning the presidency in 1969, President Nixon established the Gates 
Commission to investigate the possibility of ending conscription and establishing an All-
Volunteer Force (AVF), meaning the military would be composed of paid volunteers while 
having a standby draft to fulfill wartime defense needs. The Commission recommended: “We 
unanimously believe that the nation’s interest will be better served by an all-volunteer force, 
supported by an effective standby draft, than by a mixed force of volunteers and conscripts” 
(Gates Commission 1970: 5-6). To establish an effective AVF, the Commission recommended 
raising military pay, establishing a standby draft, and improving recruitment and the conditions 
of military service. Along with its recommendation, the Commission identified possible negative 
outcomes: the potential isolation of the military from society, a perceived threat to civilian 
control; an erosion of civilian respect for the military; the disproportionate representation of 
minorities and low-income Americans in the ranks; a decline in civilian interest in foreign 
policy; and an increase in military adventurism (Gates Commission 1970: 129). As we will see, 
these concerns were well founded. In spite of the Commission’s warnings given widespread 
support to end conscription, President Nixon signed into law the Military Service Act of 1971 on 
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September 28, 1971. Implemented in the summer of 1973, this law created a new era of 
volunteer military service in the United States.  
Despite having a professional class of military officers throughout U.S. history, military 
service became an occupation for all service members in times of peace and war with the 
establishment of the AVF. Experts in military studies, political science, and sociology have 
discussed the effects of professionalization, analyzing the military’s shift from an institution into 
a workplace and the effects of volunteerism on national security, manpower, and the economy 
(See: Moskos 1977; Moskos and Wood 1988; Moskos, Williams, and Segal 2000). With regards 
to its effects on service members, Moskos (2001: 33) argues that the transformation of military 
service from a civic obligation to an employment opportunity that is outside of the capitalist 
labor market affects who in America becomes a service member. Specifically, low and middle-
income earners and minorities disproportionally enlist because military service provides access 
to a full spectrum of benefits, including educational opportunities, health benefits, and career 
advancement (Pérez 2006, 2009; Mariscal 2004; Lutz 2008; Murray 2008). Furthermore, 
minorities serving in the military disproportionally serve as enlisted service members, and do not 
receive the financial and professional benefits of commissioned officers (MLDC 2011). The 
Gates Commission’s warning was justified: minorities and low and middle-income Americans, 
lacking the social and economic capital to pursue alternative civilian careers, assume the burden 
of military service.  
Along with burdening those with limited social and economic capital, the establishment 
of a military composed of volunteers placed great strain on a small percentage of the U.S. 
population. In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the George W. Bush and Obama 
administrations employed a security strategy called the War on Terror. This strategy entailed 
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increased surveillance, expansion of government powers, and restrictions on individual freedom. 
It also involved coalition-based military operations, drone warfare, and most importantly, ground 
and counterinsurgency wars in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) to maintain U.S. sovereignty, 
security, and an “American way of life” (Goldstein 2010; Masco 2010). Despite large-scale 
military operations, only one-half of one percent of the U.S. population served on active duty 
during the post-9/11 era, the longest period of conflict in U.S. history (Pew 2011). The military 
was able to engage in prolonged military operations without enacting a force of conscripts by 
utilizing the reserve components and retaining existing personnel beyond their contractual 
separation date. This resulted in multiple deployments for U.S. service members as well as less 
time between deployments when compared to previous conflicts (Dortch 2012; Eikenberry 2013; 
Sayer, Carlson, and Frazier 2014); Around 40% of troops deployed more than once due to 
sustained military operations using a smaller number of troops (Sayer, Carlson, and Frazier 
2014).  
By studying a localized community of post-9/11 veterans, my dissertation looks to 
understand dilemmas of U.S. citizenship at a time when the U.S. is engaged in a global War on 
Terror using less than 1% of the U.S. population as paid volunteers, not citizen-soldiers. In my 
experience working with the veteran community as an anthropologist and policy analyst, I have 
seen first-hand the struggle over citizenship present within this community. Service members 
take on a unique set of duties and obligations upon enlistment. Their basic rights, including the 
rights to life, independent thought, and bodily safety, are abrogated upon signing their enlistment 
contract. Additionally, service members do not have the same workplace protections as civilian 
employees, such as protections against workplace discrimination based on race, religion, sex, and 
national origin under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Yet, military service also conveys 
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privileges and benefits that are not offered to civilians. For example, the U.S. federal government 
through the Department of Veterans Affairs and other non-governmental organizations within 
local communities provides veterans with medical care, educational benefits, vocational 
rehabilitation and employment services, disability compensation, home loans, life insurance, and 
pensions upon completing their military service. 
Service members sacrifice their rights and in return, upon becoming veterans, receive 
privileges and benefits that are not offered to civilians, creating a distinct experience of 
citizenship called “military citizenship” (Trundle 2012: 2015). Yet, military citizenship is 
unstable. Veterans often encounter obstacles to receiving privileges and benefits, infringing on 
the “rights” they earned through military service. By analyzing the tension between military 
citizenship and the lived experiences of U.S. veterans, my project looks to illustrate how 
citizenship is defined, (re)created, and contested. Specifically, I will analyze how veterans 
experience the confluence of discourses, rules, and practices stemming from the U.S. military, 
the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, and institutions within local communities as they 
access entitlements and services while confronting problems of reintegration and readjustment. 
In the following chapters, I argue that, in spite of military citizenship, post-9/11 veterans 
experience diminished social rights, inclusion and recognition.  
 
Literature Review 
Citizenship is a membership category (Brubaker 1992) that “distinguishes belongers from 
the excluded, and it ties the former to the state as the guarantor of their rights, thus incorporating 
them as subjects” (Verdery 1998: 293). Anthropologists look beyond a juridical and legal study 
of citizenship in order to understand the everyday meaning of belonging for a range of subjects, 
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including citizens, dual-citizens, non-citizens, migrants, refugees, business travelers, 
international students, ex-patriots, prisoners, etc. Notably, anthropologists studying 
multiculturalism and transnationalism, such as Renato Rosaldo and Aihwa Ong, challenge the 
assumptions behind incorporation, assimilation, and marginalization to reveal the complexities of 
citizenship, rejecting the notion that citizens are managed by an omnipotent “state.”  
Through studying U.S. Latina/os (Rosaldo 1994, 1997), Rosaldo focuses on the extra-
legal elements of citizenship to understand cultural citizenship or “the notion of belonging [, 
which] means full membership in a group and the ability to influence one’s destiny by having a 
significant voice in basic decisions (Rosaldo 1994: 402).” He argues that notions of nationhood 
and inclusion are defined, attained, and negotiated through everyday relations among citizens in 
schools, hospitals, workplaces, places of worship, etc. In discussing how race and gender are 
barriers to cultural citizenship, Rosaldo highlights how the struggle to gain access to resources 
and recognition occurs despite having full legal rights (1997: 28-30). Notably, Ong (1999) 
studied wealthy Asian business elites’ flexible citizenship within a lucrative and unstable 
transnational economy, buying homes in North America and sending their children to prestigious 
U.S. universities while conducting their businesses primarily in Southeast Asia. Yet, despite their 
economic capital, these business elites often lacked social capital due to racial hierarchies in the 
West demanded that “recent arrivals from non-Western countries are expected to enter at the 
bottom of the socioeconomic ladder and wait their proper turn to reach middle-class status” (Ong 
1999: 100). 
Given that the “state” is not a unitary concept, how do anthropologists understand this 
concept as it relates to the study of citizenship? The state is a cultural construction, with no 
institutional or geographic fixity, that is primarily recognizable through its effects (Foucault 
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1977, 1978, 1991; Brown 1995; Trouillot 2001; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Aretxaga 2003; 
Sharma and Gupta 2006). What we understand to be the “state” is in fact an ensemble of 
governmental discourses, rules, techniques, and practices that often are in tension and contradict 
one another while competing with non-governmental organizations, corporations, aid 
organizations, refugees, migrants, local movements and communities (Foucault 1977, 1978, 
1991; Brown 1995; Trouillot 2001; Aretxaga 2003). As a result, citizenship is also shaped by this 
same ensemble of competing and contradictory discourses, rules, techniques, and practices, 
resulting in an ever-evolving hierarchy in which certain citizens are valued above others, given 
differences in civil, political, and social rights based on social identities and categories, such as 
gender, sexuality, race, class, ethnicity, etc. (Marshall 1950; Verdery 1998).  
In the United States, the ever-evolving hierarchy of citizens is rooted in imagining the 
nation as “a racial, class, and gender formation governed by Anglo-Saxon hegemony that 
projected (white) racial and class interests as universal for the entire nation” (Ong 2004: 62). In 
other words, there is a homogenous ideal of the nation in which all citizens are compared against, 
shaping their inclusion or exclusion. For example, under the U.S. Constitution, the civil and 
political rights of U.S. citizens are outlined and include the right to participate in the political 
system, due process, freedom of religion, speech, press, assembly and petition, and freedom from 
unreasonable searches and seizures, excessive bail, cruel and unusual punishments, self-
incrimination and double jeopardy. Amendments have been added to safeguard the civil and 
political rights of African Americans, women, and low-income Americans, highlighting how 
historically these particular groups did not enjoy the same rights as other citizens or were 
considered non-citizens. Through the efforts and sacrifices of individuals participating in the 
abolitionist, suffrage, and civil rights movements, slavery was abolished (1865) and former 
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slaves granted citizenship (1868) by the 13th and 14th amendments; the use of race, color or 
previous condition of servitude in determining which citizens may vote was prohibited by the 
15th amendment (1870); women were granted the right to vote by the 19th amendment (1920); 
and a voting poll tax was prohibited by the 24th amendment (1964). Yet, when one considers the 
perspective of the historically marginal and excluded, inclusion and recognition go beyond the 
process of gaining civil and political rights.  
Along with civil and political rights, citizens’ social rights include the right “to a 
modicum of economic welfare and security” and “to live the life of a civilized being according to 
the standards prevailing in the society” (Marshall 1950: 8). The clearest examples of social rights 
in the United States are entitlements, life-sustaining resources that include employment, 
healthcare, education, housing, etc., which are obtained through federal, state, and local 
government agencies by demonstrating need, earned through service, and/or providing 
contributions. In the United States, entitlement programs are funded through an annual 
Congressional appropriations process, providing access to social services by redistributing 
resources. Along with providing a degree of protection from social and economic exclusions that 
civil and political rights alone cannot protect, entitlement programs serve to ameliorate the 
negative effects of capitalism without changing its foundations (Marshall 1950; Giddens 1981). 
For example, by creating and implementing policies based on Keynesian principles, the federal 
government under Franklin Delano Roosevelt established its role in managing the economy to 
protect its citizens from the effects of the Great Depression, particularly from unstable business 
cycles, recessions and unemployment (Harvey 2007). This greater role included creating policies 
under the New Deal that served to stabilize and regulate financial markets and banks, use 
government spending and regulation to encourage economic growth, establish a progressive tax 
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system, and invest in infrastructure, public works employment, and public services (Harvey 
2007; Abramovitz and Morgen 2006; Morgen 2009).  
Yet, the entitlement programs created during the New Deal did not equally benefit all 
citizens in need. Specifically, the New Deal disproportionally benefited low to middle-income 
white working-class men struggling to earn a family wage. With the creation of unemployment 
insurance and Social Security, the goal was to partially replace the white workingman's family 
wage by offering aid without stigma or supervision, creating “the misleading appearance that 
beneficiaries merely got back what they put in” through wage deductions (Fraser and Gordon 
1994, 321).  These programs excluded minorities and women, particularly families maintained 
by women who were not in the paid labor force, funneling them into public assistance programs 
(Orloff 1993; Fraser and Gordon 1994). Recipients of public assistance appeared to be getting 
something for nothing since funding for these programs came from general tax revenues instead 
of wage deductions (Fraser and Gordon 1992: 321). Additionally, unlike social security and 
unemployment insurance, conditions for receiving public assistance entailed means-testing, 
morals-testing and household supervision and visits, stigmatizing aid recipients (Fraser and 
Gordon 1994: 322). Today, the stigma attached to public assistance continues, framing 
recipients, who are disproportionally minorities and women, as dependent on the federal 
government for economic support while recipients of social security, unemployment insurance, 
agricultural loans, and home mortgage assistance are excluded from the stigma of welfare 
dependency (Orloff 1993; Fraser and Gordon 1994; Morgen and Maskovsky 2003).  
The 1944 G.I. Bill is another example of an entitlement program created during FDR’s 
presidency that looked to protect citizens, specifically citizen-soldiers, to mitigate the negative 
effects of capitalism as well as military service by providing social rights. By creating an 
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expansive entitlement program, the FDR administration and Congress looked to ensure postwar 
economic and political stability, providing educational and vocational training to millions of 
returning war veterans to avoid high rates of poverty and unemployment (Humes 2006; Murray 
2008; Wright 2012). The Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, commonly known as the G.I. 
Bill of Rights, became law in 1944 to ameliorate the social and political costs of poverty and 
unemployment for millions of returning veterans. Given the lobbying efforts of Veterans of 
Foreign Wars and the American Legion, congressionally chartered Veterans Service 
Organizations, this legislation looked to ensure a smooth demobilization effort by providing a 
comprehensive collection of readjustment and reintegration opportunities to secure economic 
growth as well as veteran development (Ortiz 2009; Altschuler and Blumin 2009). The G.I. Bill 
provided education and training provisions, job counseling, employment placement, 
readjustment allowance, and loans to purchase homes, farms and business property, which 
increased homeownership and opened up higher education in the United States to a more diverse 
segment of the population.  
For veterans who served in conflicts since World War II, federal veteran benefits 
continue while other federal entitlement programs have been restructured and dismantled 
through neoliberal policies. Beginning in the 1970s, conservative business interests, 
organizations, and think-tanks began to pursue neoliberalism, a political economic theory that 
posits “human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms 
and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free 
markets, and free trade” (Harvey 2007: 2). Beginning with the Reagan Administration, the 
United States federal government has aligned its policies with neoliberal theory, transferring to 
state governments the administration and funding of social services while cutting spending 
12 
 
(Morgen 2009; Harvey 2007). By dismantling the role of the federal government in funding and 
providing education, healthcare and other social services become private sector markets (Goode 
and Maskovsky 2001). Neoliberal policies have resulted in a shift away from social 
responsibility to personal responsibility; local community organizations, non-profits, and the 
private sector, not the federal government, serve as a “safety net” for Americans (Harvey 2007: 
76). This dismantling of funding and social services has disproportionately affected people of 
color, immigrants, women, children, and students, damaging the safety net and thus the social 
rights of millions of Americans (Goode and Maskovsky 2001; Morgen 2009; Giroux 2014).  
Why do veterans maintain access to federal entitlements while other citizens have lost 
their social rights? Veteran entitlements are configured through a set of relational ties rooted in 
the notion of sacrifice through service to the nation-state, serving to offset the costs of military 
service for former service members while maintaining the manpower needs of an all-volunteer 
military. Social scientists have labeled this relationship as military citizenship, highlighting the 
unique set of obligations, duties, privileges and benefits that stem from military service.  
With the rise of Western nation-states and nationalism in the 19th and 20th centuries, a 
distinction between civilian and military citizens served to redefine the social contract between 
citizens and the nation-state, outlining the duties and obligations of military citizens (Janowitz 
1976; Moskos 1988; Gutmann and Lutz 2010; Trundle 2012). For example, military service 
entails the abrogation of service members’ rights for whatever causes government officials and 
military commanders require. During the Iraq War, U.S. service members’ enlistment contracts 
were extended or “stop lossed” to fulfill the military’s manpower needs. Despite several legal 
challenges to this policy, including Qualls v. Rumsfeld (2006); Doe v. Rumsfeld (2004), Santiago 
v. Rumsfeld (2005), U.S. courts have determined that stop losses are legal since “... the President 
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may suspend any provision of law relating to promotion, retirement, or separation applicable to 
any member of the armed forces who the President determines is essential to the national 
security of the United States” (see: United States Code Title 10, Section 12305). Additionally, 
unlike other citizens, service members cannot sue their employer for negligence. Under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act,1 the federal government is not liable for service members’ injuries 
while on active duty, barring service members and their families from collecting damages for 
injuries that “arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service,” including personal 
injuries, wrongful death, and sexual assault (Klay v. Panetta 2014: 5).  
Along with obligations and duties, military service also entails material privileges and 
benefits. Upon completing military service, national and state governments as well as non-
governmental organizations within local communities provide veterans with social rights, 
including access to health care, educational benefits, vocational rehabilitation, employment 
services, disability compensation, home and business loans, life insurance, pensions, and/or 
preferential hiring and enrollment. In addition to the G.I. Bill (discussed above and in detail in 
Chapter 1), U.S. veterans have access to healthcare and compensation due to illnesses and 
injuries incurred during military service that do not have any parallels within civilian 
employment. The VA has identified certain medical conditions as presumptive conditions for 
disability compensation, meaning a veteran does not need to prove that the condition was related 
to his or her military service (CBO August 2014: 5). For example, the VA will approve a 
veteran’s disability claim if they served in or around Vietnam and have certain medical 
conditions, including neuropathy, leukemia, Hodgkin's disease, heart disease, myeloma, non-
Hodgkin's lymphoma, Parkinson's disease, and/or respiratory cancers, due to links to exposure to 
Agent Orange and other herbicides (CBO August 2014: 13). If the VA denies the disability claim 
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of a veteran who meets the criteria for a presumptive condition, the VA “bears the burden of 
proof that some behavior or some circumstance other than military service is the cause of the 
disability” (CBO August 2014: 5). 
Citizenship also entails cultural and symbolic privileges and benefits (Rosaldo 1997; Ong 
1996), particularly among military citizens, providing social inclusion and recognition. Given the 
moral and symbolic relationship within the nation-state that distinguishes military citizens from 
all other citizens, service members and veterans experience national and local rituals of 
veneration and memorialization due to their service to the nation-state (Anderson 1991). For 
example, organized by national and local governments as well as non-governmental 
organizations, awards, monuments and parades recognize service members’ sacrifices and 
bravery in the name of the nation-state. Funded by the non-profit Vietnam Veterans Memorial 
Fund, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall is etched with the names of U.S. service members 
killed or missing in action, acknowledging the ultimate sacrifice of military service. Along with 
war memorials, the President in the name of the U.S. Congress can award the Medal of Honor, 
the highest and most prestigious personal military decoration awarded for acts of valor. For 
Veterans Day, a U.S. public holiday, large parades within local communities feature veterans and 
current service members marching alongside bands and politicians to honor the service of all 
U.S. military veterans. Collectively, awards, monuments and parades establish a sense of social 
recognition and inclusion, providing cultural and symbolic privileges and benefits for veterans. 
Military citizenship’s material and symbolic benefits and privileges are reinforced and 
(re)produced via militarization. Through state, corporate and local interests, militarization 
processually establishes the military’s discursive and material dominance in organizing social 
reality for the production of violence (Geyer 1989; Lutz 2001, 2004). This process includes “an 
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intensification of the labor and resources allocated to military purposes, including the shaping of 
other institutions in synchrony with military goals,” shifting "general societal beliefs and values 
in ways necessary to legitimate the use of force, the organization of large standing armies and 
their leaders, and the higher taxes or tribute used to pay for them” (2002: 723). Such processes 
are not new but they are not always easy to see, prompting anthropologists to go beyond the 
visible events of war by focusing on less visible processes of war preparation and its implications 
(Ben-Ari 2004). As argued by McCaffrey (2002), Bacevich (2013), and Pérez (2006, 2009, 
2015), having citizens serving in the armed forces is naturalized and valued when the media, 
government (at all levels: local, state, and federal), businesses, and educational institutions share 
the interests of the military. Specifically, alongside war-making that safeguards individual 
freedoms and rights and preserves national security, greatness and strength, there are material 
and symbolic effects that shape social relations, particularly the social contract within the nation-
state (Lutz 2004; Bacevich 2005). By studying how militarization unfolds in communities 
throughout the U.S., including communities that house military bases and military training 
programs in public education, it becomes clearer how future enlistees, families, friends, and 
communities are discursively and materially militarized to reinforce and (re)produce military 
citizenship.  
Since its inception, the U.S. has been made by violence, shaping the social lives of 
Americans. Through the enslavement of African people, westward expansion, and acquiring 
territories in the Caribbean, Pacific and the Philippines, U.S. empire building began shortly after 
independence in the early 19th century. To maintain its empire, the United States has held to its 
superpower status since the end of WWII through coercive power and transnational economic 
and legal institutions, such as the World Bank, United Nations, World Economic Forum, human 
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rights community and non-governmental organizations. By creating a climate that is good for 
business in the context of an industrial and technology-driven mode of warfare since the late 20th 
century, the U.S. has enacted neoliberal policies to ensure labor and resources are allocated to all 
things military (Giroux 2004; Harvey 2005; Lutz 2004; Pérez 2010).  As a result, federal 
spending is disproportionally funneled to industries and institutions that support and contribute to 
any and all aspects of war-making rather than to the needs and wellbeing of the U.S. populace. 
The division between civilians and current or former service members is the clearest example of 
how resources are disproportionally allocated towards war-making, since those who serve in the 
military receive material and symbolic benefits and privileges not granted to civilians. 
As a path to social mobility and opportunity, particularly among the economically 
marginal and minorities, military service is said to impart respect and resources, assert loyalty, 
and attain legal and social entitlements for service members and veterans. For example, 
programs funded by the U.S. military, like the Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC) 
program, flourish in poor urban school districts with large numbers of Latina/o and African 
American students by promoting structure, discipline, personal responsibility, and sacrifice as 
“military values” as well as the promise of socioeconomic capital and social rights through 
enlistment (Pérez 2006, 2009, 2015).  Upon enlisting, African Americans, Native Americans, 
and Latina/os have gained access to patriotic identities that provide social recognition and 
inclusion (Plascencia 2009; Gutmann and Lutz 2010), highlighting how military service is both 
an avenue for material and symbolic benefits and privileges. Yet, in practice, access to the 
symbolic and material benefits and privileges derived from military service varies, highlighting a 
hierarchy in which only certain experiences are normalized and valued. 
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 Access to symbolic benefits and privileges among U.S. veterans is highly policed via a 
hierarchy of valor based on specific military operational specialties, times and places of service 
and levels of sacrifice (Lomsky-Feder 2004; Gardiner 2013).  Gardiner (2013) discusses how 
within Veteran Service Organizations (VSOs) “real” veterans are compared to those who did not 
deploy to a war zone, served in non-combat roles, were not drafted, and/or did not experience 
loss and injury. As a result, “real” veterans garner respect and bragging rights due to their 
elevated status within the community. Similarly, medical gatekeepers working in cumbersome 
bureaucratic institutions determine who is a “real” veteran worthy of access to material benefits 
and privileges, including access to care, services and compensation, due to assumptions about a 
veteran’s deployment, bodily risk, military injuries, etc. (Trundle 2015; Bryers-Brown and 
Trundle 2017). Unlike Vietnam veterans exposed to Agent Orange, Gulf War veterans’ disability 
claims for radiation exposure are reviewed on a case-by-case basis without the presumption that 
specific illnesses are caused by their military service (CBO August 2014). Despite the military’s 
negligence and medical evidence, the federal government’s material responsibility is limited 
towards Gulf War military citizens exposed to radiation. Since access to the benefits and 
privileges derived from military service varies based on a hierarchy in which only certain 
experiences are normalized and valued, military citizenship is not only relational but also 
negotiated and contested.  
Given the stakes in successfully negotiating and contesting who is a military citizen, 
service members and veterans navigate a politics of recognition. As argued by Taylor (1992), 
Povinelli (1998, 1999, 2002), and Fraser (2001), the demand for recognition requires individuals 
to join together and create a collective identity, producing a “self-affirming culture of their own” 
(Fraser 2001: 25) in response to juridical, governmental, and public discourses, policies, and 
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laws affecting members of their community. Yet, in doing so, they engage in “the elaboration 
and display of an authentic, self-affirming and self-generated collective identity” (Fraser 2001: 
24), enforcing the view of a homogenous collectivity that hardens the boundaries between 
communities and within the community. Similar to biosocial communities (Petryna 2003) and 
indigenous groups (Povinelli 2002), military citizens are a collectivity who share bodily, 
symbolic, and material experiences due to their service. By employing medical, legal, and 
militarized discourses, service members and veterans demand resources, responsibility, 
accountability, and forms of social inclusion from government institutions, private and public 
entities, corporate business, and civilians. To be “authentic” military citizen, service members 
and veterans subsume other aspects of personhood to increase social and political visibility, 
recognition, and entitlements. In other words, through reifying military citizens, not only are 
only certain experiences normalized and valued but also reintegration, readjustment, and their 
lives are at stake given that access to symbolic benefits and privileges are on the line.  
As discussed above, soldiers and veterans occupy states and spaces of exception, marking 
military citizens as distinct from civilians. Yet, military citizenship is unstable. Not all veterans 
can access the benefits and privileges of military service, including its social rights, inclusion and 
recognition. Despite its volatility, military citizenship ultimately serves to not only create a pool 
of potential citizens willing to serve the nation-state but also allows veterans to demand social 
rights, inclusion and recognition they believe are owed to them. With my ethnographic research, 
I look to contribute to the literature on citizenship by investigating how military citizenship is 
understood, (re)shaped, and challenged through the study of post-9/11 veterans within a local 
community. Specifically, my ethnographic fieldwork interrogates the discourses, rules, and 
practices that veterans must navigate when accessing entitlements and services while confronting 
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reintegration and readjustment in an era in which the burden of service is placed on those with 
limited social and economic capital. By analyzing the tension between military citizenship and 
the lived experiences of U.S. veterans, I highlight how military citizens experience effaced social 
rights, inclusion and recognition in the post-9/11 home front.  
 
Ethnographic Study 
Through participant observation and interviews, I examine the social world of veterans in 
a localized community to interrogate citizenship in a post-9/11 U.S. Drawing on ethnographic 
data to detail the tension between military citizenship and the lived experiences of veterans, I 
highlight how veterans experience limits on their social rights as well as on their inclusion and 
recognition in the home front. By documenting veterans accessing entitlements and services 
while reintegrating and readjusting to “civilian” life, my research highlights how subjectivities, 
ideals, and practices regarding citizenship are being ideologically configured, experienced, and 
challenged. I also show differences in interests, access, power, needs, and desires among 
veterans and civilians. This serves to highlight how the ensemble of discourses, rules and 
practices that mediate military citizens’ social rights, inclusion and recognition in the home front 
is defined and (re)created.  
The U.S. Congress passed the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008, 
providing up to 36 months of educational benefits and parity of benefits for reservists and active 
duty service members, as well allowing for the transferability of benefits to a dependent (Dortch 
2012). The passing of the G.I. Bill overlapped with a withdrawal of troops in Iraq, beginning in 
2007 until 2011, and Afghanistan, beginning in 2011 until 2014. This influx of veterans 
returning to the U.S. coincided with the Great Recession, the worst financial crisis since 
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the Great Depression of the 1930s. The recession lasted from December 2007 until June 2009 
and featured high unemployment rates and a decline in consumer spending and productivity 
(BLS 2012). During the recession and the years following, veteran unemployment rates were 
high: 11.5% of post-9/11 veterans were unemployed (Pew 2011: 18). Given a dismal climate in 
the home front, post-9/11 veterans utilized their federal educational benefits at high rates; the VA 
paid over $41 billion in Post-9/11 G.I. Bill benefits to fund the education of 1.2 million 
beneficiaries (DVA June 2014: 2). In response to the influx of veterans and millions in federal 
funding through the Post-9/11 G.I. Bill, universities across the nation established veteran 
programming and services.  As a result, a college campus was the ideal field site to conduct my 
ethnography of citizenship in the post-9/11 era. At the City University of New York (CUNY), 
where my fieldwork took place, offices were established within the senior and community 
colleges to respond to the needs of incoming student veterans. With its proximity to the Brooklyn 
VA Hospital and Forts Wadsworth and Hamilton as well as the plethora of Veteran Service 
Organizations (VSOs) on Staten Island, CUNY’s College of Staten Island (CSI) experienced a 
dramatic surge in their student veteran population as the drawdown of troops began in 2007. That 
same year, the college administration created the Veterans Office by hiring a coordinator to 
assist with veterans’ adjustment to college life, supplementing the existing services provided by 
the Veterans Benefits and Registration Office, a one-stop shop established for veterans in 2003 
to facilitate admissions, registration, and the certification of veteran educational benefits. 
Coinciding with the Great Recession and its aftermath, the CSI veteran population doubled 
between 2011 and 2013, driving the Veterans Office to expand, providing services and 
programming to fulfill the needs of the growing veteran population. During my fieldwork from 
2013 to 2014, the college allotted space for a veterans’ lounge to be opened in 2014 and 
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promoted the veteran coordinator to director. With only a director, two part-time employees, and 
a handful of federal work study employees, the CSI Veterans Office was understaffed, assisting 
over 250 student veterans with earning a college degree, obtaining employment, and addressing 
needs that went beyond education and campus life. To compensate for their small staff, the 
director worked closely with other departments to provide wellness evaluations, mental health 
counseling, housing, and career advisement. Serving as the Veterans Office intern while 
conducting my fieldwork, I gained close familiarity with staff, volunteers, and student veterans 
through intensive involvement in their programs, services, and lives. 
Fieldsite 
For two years, I cultivated a field site within a national veteran’s organization while I 
prepared to defend my dissertation proposal. At the time, my research asked how the remaking 
of gender roles in the military reshapes the idea of citizenship, specifically a militarized and 
gendered citizen, in a post-9/11 United States. A month before my fieldwork began, it became 
clear that I would be unable to conduct my research with this organization and its extensive 
network. Its leadership reproduced military culture within the organization. Specifically, they 
encouraged and often demanded their staff eschew individual needs for the greater good (i.e. the 
organization’s policy agenda), rejected dissenting opinions and critiques, and created a climate in 
which harassment was pervasive. 
While struggling to find a fieldsite that would address my research question, I received an 
email from one of my anthropology professors, providing details of an upcoming event being 
held at the College of Staten Island that aligned with my research interests. Titled “In Our Own 
Voice,” this two-part program featured a series of monologues discussing the realities facing 
service women in the post 9/11 era and a question and answer session led by veterans. I had 
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taught within the anthropology department since 2011 but was unaware of veteran centered 
events on campus. Unfortunately, I could not attend the event; I had to teach my introduction to 
cultural anthropology course that night. But I took this thoughtful email from my professor as a 
sign to pursue the College of Staten Island as a possible field site. 
I immediately contacted Marie, the Veterans Office director, requesting a meeting given 
my doctoral and policy research on women veterans. Four days later I found myself sitting across 
from Marie, describing my research and its contributions to anthropology and the study of 
veterans. I also emphasized how anthropology's main methodological approach, participant 
observation, not only served to answer my research question but could also benefit the 
understaffed and underfunded Veterans Office. Within the upcoming academic year, the 
Veterans Office looked to extend its network beyond the campus and collaborate with local posts 
of national veteran organizations, such as American Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars, to 
identify additional resources and foster a sense of community among student veterans and the 
local veteran population.  
By serving as their intern while conducting my ethnography, I could aid the Veterans 
Office staff with creating and running education programs, campus events, recruitment 
campaigns, and organizational and educational materials. With my extensive administrative, 
academic, and advisement experience as well as my familiarity with CUNY and veteran issues2, 
Marie quickly agreed to have me on board after receiving approval from the college 
administration. Less than two months later, I began my fieldwork on a quiet campus in the 
summer of 2013. With very few students around, Marie and I began to shape the programming 
and services offered to veterans and their dependents as well as events for the campus and Staten 
Islanders for the upcoming academic year. In between planning, Marie also explained the 
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intricacies of federal and state veteran benefits and laid out the strengths and struggles of 
returning veterans pursuing an education within this CUNY campus while attempting to adjust to 
civilian life. These first two months were pivotal in shaping the trajectory of my fieldwork 
because of Marie. As my main interlocutor,3 Marie introduced me to her vast network of post-
9/11 veterans, generously revealing her professional and personal self.  
Hailing from New York, Marie grew up in an almost all white working-class suburb. 
Upon graduating from a well-funded public high school, Marie moved out of her mother’s home, 
working as a waitress to pay for her costly private university education. After accruing more than 
$50,000 in loans in her first two years of college, Marie enlisted in the Army Reserve, receiving 
a generous enlistment bonus. Soon after completing boot camp, the events of 9/11 unfolded and 
the Bush administration began its War on Terror. Struggling to maintain her GPA and her 
finances, Marie chose to go on active duty, deploying twice to Iraq. Upon completing her 
military contract, Marie enrolled in a state university full time. With the Montgomery G.I. Bill’s 
modest monthly stipend and living in her father’s home rent free, Marie worked as a waitress to 
make ends meet. Upon graduating and unable to find a full-time job, she continued to work as a 
waitress for two years. Frustrated by the limited job prospects, Marie enrolled in the College of 
Staten Island’s Masters History program, using the Post 9/11 G.I. Bill to pay for her education. 
While earning her degree, Marie began her career in veteran educational services, serving as an 
assistant to the coordinator, then coordinator, and eventually becoming the director of the 
Veterans Office. Marie took her role as director beyond her professional responsibilities, 
spending nights and weekends serving the veterans on campus at great cost to her emotional self 
and at times her personal life. As the only full-time staff member in the Veterans Office, Marie 
was the campus point person, helping veterans access their educational benefits as well as 
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providing guidance with personal, financial, and employment problems through linking veterans 
to campus and community resources.  
Interlocutors 
Before the start of the 2013-2014 academic year, Marie described the average CSI 
student veteran4 as a single, childless, unemployed, white male active duty Army veteran under 
30 years old, attending college full-time using the Post-9/11 G.I. Bill. As my fieldwork 
progressed, it became clear that like Marie, the student veterans on campus were predominantly 
enlisted men and women who came from diverse and modest backgrounds, lacking the social 
and economic capital to pursue other opportunities beyond military service after graduating from 
high school. Through enlistment, they sought to escape difficult living situations, such as 
unstable family lives and financial hardships, as well as to receive an education, healthcare, 
housing, and travel that would otherwise be impossible. As they entered college using federal 
educational benefits, my interlocutors shared not only their status as veterans but also lives 
characterized by continued economic precarity and limited social capital.  
Hailing from an Italian-American working-class family in Brooklyn, Greg graduated 
from high school and looked to enroll in college. Unfortunately, his parents’ separation 
negatively affected the amount of financial aid he could receive, making college financially out 
of reach.  After years of working in construction, Greg realized that at best he could become a 
foreman. Wanting more out of life, Greg enlisted in the Navy at the age of 23, hoping to change 
his life circumstances. While in the military, Greg married, started a family and a business, and 
forged an interesting military career, serving as a communications specialist attached to SEAL 
teams. Soon after completing his military service, Greg’s personal and professional life fell 
apart; he divorced his wife and closed his business. Looking to rebuild his life, Greg returned to 
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Staten Island to live with his mother and enrolled in the College of Staten Island, utilizing the 
Post 9/11 GI Bill to fund his education and day-to-day expenses.  He supplemented his benefits 
by working in the VA work study program. Ultimately, Greg hopes to pursue law school and 
secure a career that could bring financial stability.   
Also raised in a working-class family, Brian was born to Italian-American parents in 
upstate New York. After his cousin’s death on 9/11 and the start of the Iraq War, Brian left 
community college at 21 years old to become a Marine. He served in Iraq and Afghanistan as an 
ordinance technician, maintaining aircraft weapon systems, as well as a police officer, providing 
security for airbases and convoys. Given the high stress and danger of combat deployments, 
Brian developed Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and sustained a Traumatic Brain Injury. After 
his second deployment and a contentious divorce and custody battle, Brian sought help for his 
PTSD. Despite wanting a military career, Brian did not reenlist since his PTSD diagnosis limited 
career opportunities. Seeking a low tuition rate and “veteran-friendly” campus, Brian enrolled at 
the College of Staten Island. After losing his housing at the start of the semester, Brian lived in 
his car for three months in the winter. Despite collecting his G.I. Bill and VA disability stipends, 
he lacked the funds to pay the first month’s rent and a security deposit. After visiting the 
Veterans Office, Brian found housing through a local nonprofit organization and began working 
as a federal work study student. With new found stability, he looks to finish his college degree 
and pursue a career in law enforcement to provide a better life for his children.  
Born into a working-class Italian-Irish American family in upstate New York, Gwen and 
her two brothers followed in a long line of family members who served in the military. Her great 
grandfathers, grandfathers, father, and uncle all served in major U.S. conflicts, from World War I 
through the Gulf War. To afford her private university education, Gwen worked as a bartender 
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and took out thousands of dollars in loans. She also struggled with severe depression due to 
coming to terms with her sexuality. Raised in a Catholic household, she found solace and 
comfort in the church. After coming out to her family and friends, Gwen felt she needed an 
escape. During her time in the Army as a reservist and active duty service member, Gwen served 
two tours in Iraq during Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell. Upon returning home, Gwen continued to 
struggle with depression as well as post-traumatic stress due to her combat experiences in the 
Iraq War. She also looked to improve her finances, using her veteran educational benefits to 
pursue higher education with the hopes of securing a career and the stability necessary to start a 
family with her new wife.  
Will was raised by a single mother in the Bronx and Staten Island with his 4 siblings. 
While in high school, he received a call from a recruiter, asking him to consider enlistment. At 
17 years old, he did not feel mentally and emotionally ready to attend college and wanted to 
leave the poverty and violence of the housing projects. Becoming a Marine seemed to be the 
perfect escape, providing him with a purpose, a quick and funded exit from the projects, and the 
promise of educational benefits.  Will served two tours in Operation Enduring Freedom, 
primarily patrolling Afghani villages in Helmand province. Upon completing his service, Will 
felt depressed after returning to the life he’d left behind. Using the money saved while in the 
military, he left his mother’s home and stayed in hotels while looking for cheap housing in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Sandy. After a three-month search, Will found a roommate and enrolled 
in the College of Staten Island. He applied to and won scholarships for veterans and Latinos, and 
used this funding and his income from a part-time job to pay for school. Will chose to save his 
post-9/11 G.I. Bill status, hoping to use it towards transferring to another four-year institution in 
order to have the traditional college experience of going away to college, living in the dorms and 
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taking advantage of special programs and scholarships for traditional students. Despite his 
optimism about his post-military life plan, after more than a year at home, Will still misses the 
military’s structure. By earning an education, he hopes to achieve the freedom and independence 
that comes from a secure income.  
Also raised by a single mother, Ed moved often, living primarily in Texas and Virginia. 
After graduating high school, he earned a scholarship to attended college. Failing to earn a 
degree due to five years of excessive partying, Ed looked for a fresh start in 2004. Seeking 
discipline and structure, Ed was inspired by his uncle and junior high ROTC officer to become a 
Marine. As an infantry assaultman, Ed served in a counter-terrorism battalion in Iraq. After 
tearing his Anterior Cruciate Ligament (ACL) in 2007, Ed did not re-enlist, leaving the Marines 
in 2008. Using his educational and disability benefits, Ed pursued vocational training in 
computer science and worked for a financial software company in New York City. After a 
second ACL surgery, he worked at the College of Staten Island in order to supplement his 
educational and disability benefits while earning a degree in economics. Along with managing 
the pain and loss of motion in his knee, Ed struggled with his mental health, specifically the 
effects of bipolar disorder that were aggravated by his military service. Ed dreams of pursuing a 
degree in kinesiology to help injured veterans but the cost, time, and potential negative effects on 
his marriage made this goal seem out of reach.  
At the age of 5, after living with three different foster families, Brittany was adopted by a 
couple from Arkansas and enjoyed a comfortable life due to her parents’ employment at the local 
grocery store and chemical plant. Finishing high school after the 11th grade, she wanted to leave 
her town of 450 people to see the world. Despite wanting to enlist in the Air Force, Brittany 
spoke with the available Navy recruiter and enlisted. In boot camp, her goal of traveling the 
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world vanished when the 9/11 terrorist attacks resulted in the subsequent War on Terror. She was 
stationed in Japan and deployed to Iraq, serving as a military police officer as well as an 
operations specialist, monitoring air traffic in the northern Arabian Gulf. As her re-enlistment 
date approached, the Navy offered Guam as her next station, prompting Brittany to leave the 
Navy and join the Coast Guard. She served as an operation specialist in Staten Island’s Fort 
Wadsworth, monitoring New York harbor ship traffic. After re-marrying and having a child, 
Brittany chose to leave the military and applied to the College of Staten Island, using her Post-
9/11 G.I. Bill. Ultimately, her goal is to earn her Bachelor’s degree and enlist in the Air Force 
reserves since she missed the structure and efficiency of military life. Ultimately, Brittany seeks 
to earn a Master’s degree in Homeland Security to work for a federal agency, using the skills she 
learned in military operations and communications.  
My active participation with this diverse community of post-9/11 veterans and my long-
term study within the College of Staten Island has allowed me to gain insights into how the 
college understands, constructs, employs and interacts with “veteran identity and community,” 
issues confronting veterans, and the rights and access of veterans vis-à-vis governmental and 
non-governmental institutions as well as the local community. Such insights came about through 
analyzing the data for emergent themes (Weber 1990) and using situational analysis (Clarke 
2005), revealing practices and relationships. Furthermore, a discourse analysis of internal and 
public materials, such as activity reports, educational material, project presentations, etc., 
supplemented my participant observation and allowed for the identification of tensions and 
discrepancies between what participants say and what happens, bringing to light conflicts 
between conscious representations and behavior.  
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Lastly, I conducted one-on-one interviews with veterans at the end of my fieldwork using 
a life history framework. Using a biographical approach, life histories contextualize veterans’ 
experiences while revealing their worldview, assumptions, and thought processes. I also gained 
insights into their subjectivities, making meaning out of their experiences in service in the 
military, their return to civilian life, and participation and/or interaction with the military, state 
and civil institutions. Specifically, I gained a deeper understanding of their self-perception, life 
trajectory, and relationship to social surroundings, in light of both their experiences as veterans 
and their relationships with other veterans and civilians.  
By observing returning veterans’ daily experiences of readjustment and reintegration to 
civilian life, my ethnographic study reveals how military citizenship is defined, (re)created, and 
contested in a post-9/11 United States. Through conducting my research on a college campus 
with veterans utilizing federal benefits, I gained an understanding of how veterans interact with 
each other and civilians by interrogating the discourses, rules, and practices that veterans 
navigate when engaging with local communities as well as national and state governments and 
non-governmental institutions. By analyzing the tension between military citizenship and the 
lived experiences of U.S. veterans, the following chapters highlight how military citizens 
experience effaced social rights, inclusion and recognition in a post-9/11 United States.  
 
Limitations 
The ethnographic data presented and analyzed in this dissertation reflects the limits in 
access I experienced as a Latina woman, civilian, academic, and first-time ethnographer studying 
military citizenship. At the outset of my fieldwork, I had difficulty establishing trust among 
military veterans due to my initial Institutional Review Board requirements. Veterans often had 
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experiences in which signing a consent form caused skepticism and suspicion. When I described 
the informed consent process, veterans jokingly asked if I was a ‘narc’ or a Criminal 
Investigation Division (CID) agent. CIDs are military or civilian personnel who investigate 
allegations and turn official findings over to the appropriate command and legal authority for 
disposition and adjudication. As a result of these negative implications, I modified my IRB 
protocols to provide study participants with an informed consent form without requiring their 
signature as well as allowing the use of pseudonyms, facilitating the establishment of rapport 
among veterans. This paragraph should go earlier—the next paragraph too 
Throughout my fieldwork, I heard conversations in which the men spoke down to and 
made fun of women as well as the use of overtly sexual and sexist language when speaking to 
and about women, which is outlined in detail in chapter four. For example, on the first day of my 
fieldwork, Brittany came into the office and re-introduced herself despite having met me on two 
separate occasions. To lessen her embarrassment, I joked that when I pull my wild curly hair into 
a ballerina bun, as I did that day, I go unrecognized. She pointed to how women are often judged 
by how they look since women’s bodies, like their breasts, are distracting. A student veteran 
sitting in the common area complained (while winking) that he now was unable to compliment 
the floral pattern on my blouse because of Brittany’s comment. As a result of the veteran culture 
on campus, Anne held a mandatory sensitivity training for student veterans employed by the 
office to help create an inclusive and respectful space for all former servicemembers. Given this 
environment, I often had to address the ways in which my interlocutors spoke to me and about 
me, establishing boundaries of mutual respect early on as well as reinforcing these boundaries 
often with several interlocutors. On a daily basis, I had to decide which interlocutors and spaces 
were not only essential for my research but also safe. Unfortunately, many activities and events 
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off campus, such as heavy drinking while playing videogames in private residencies, were 
accessible, but I felt it unwise to attend given the environment on campus.  
Lastly, because I was a civilian and academic, veterans often made assumptions about my 
politics as well as my opinions regarding the military and veterans. As discussed in chapters two 
and three, veterans understood civilians and academics as ill-informed and overly critical of the 
military, service members, and veterans given the militarization debates on campus. One would 
assume that being an academic and civilian in this context would be a serious obstacle in 
conducting fieldwork. Yet, my positionality as a civilian and academic opened up the 
opportunity to discuss the experiences and opinions of veterans in light of the anti-militarization 
climate on campus. I was able to establish a healthy rapport with veterans on campus given that I 
was one of the few civilians and academics they knew personally and I was knowledgeable about 
veterans’ issues given my years of advocacy, non-profit, and academic work. As a result, 
veterans sought me out to interpret the viewpoints of civilians and academics since I was viewed 
as an informed civilian and academic who had deep ties to the veteran community. I often served 
as a translator, explaining what civilians and academics meant when they spoke of the dangers of 
U.S. foreign policy, empire, and militarization in the home front and abroad. Additionally, I was 
able to provide personal accounts of the negative effects of U.S. foreign policy, empire, and 
militarization due to my positionality as a Latina. As the daughter of Argentine immigrants, I 
provided a nuanced historical and personal account of U.S foreign policy, discussing the role of 
the U.S. in training and funding Latin American militaries to topple democratically elected 
governments and establishing dictators and military juntas, which destabilized the regions and 





Chapter one frames the return of post-9/11 veterans to the homefront by analyzing the 
central federal benefits program created to assist with veterans’ reintegration and readjustment to 
civilian life: the Post-9/11 G.I. Bill. Through analyzing the evolution of federal veterans’ benefits 
from 1944 to 2013, this chapter highlights how the federal government minimized the significant 
sacrifices resulting from military service. Over time, the U.S. federal government sought to 
reduce financial benefits and impose new restrictions to limit the cost of such an expensive 
entitlement program. By limiting the cost and scope of veterans’ benefits, the federal government 
looked to highlight that a citizen’s service is an obligation but that veterans’ benefits are not a 
right. Despite the rise of neoliberalism in the 1970s and 1980s, costly federal veteran benefits 
continued and were supplemented by other federal and state veteran programs to offset the cost 
of military service as well as maintain the manpower needs of an all-volunteer military in the 
post-Cold War and post-9/11 eras. By analyzing the material benefits and privileges granted to 
CSI student veterans through the Post 9/11 G.I. Bill, federal veteran educational guidelines, and 
university veteran initiatives highlight how veterans are an exception to the neoliberal status quo 
experienced by other college students. In other words, veteran exceptionalism is built into 
military citizenship. Thus, when compared to their civilian counterparts, veterans appear to be 
less affected by neoliberalism; they have greater choice over their education, finances, and 
ultimately their future, reinforcing veteran’s military citizenship. Yet, unlike their civilian 
counterparts, student veterans remain financially constrained in spite of their access to ample 
federal funding due to their socioeconomic status. In chapters two and three, I address CSI 
veterans’ struggles with civilian life. In spite of their exceptional access to material benefits and 
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privileges when compared to their peers, they experienced effaced social inclusion and 
recognition. 
In chapter two, I was able to trace the various ways in which New York City’s 
socioeconomic and political context shaped how veterans, students, faculty members, and staff 
understood the ROTC and, by extension the U.S. military, empire, and citizenship through 
analyzing the arguments for and against establishing a CSI ROTC program. I conducted 
confidential interviews with CSI students to better understand why faculty members’ critiques of 
the ROTC and U.S. military were understood and experienced as an attack on current and former 
service members. As hyper-militarized citizens, CSI veterans used tropes of American 
exceptionalism to defend U.S. foreign policy in spite of their personal negative and often 
traumatic experiences in the military. By believing the United States is worth defending because 
of its founding principles and institutions, CSI veterans were also defending their military 
service; their service not only provided personal benefits and opportunities but also preserved 
national and global freedom, security, peace, and democracy. Thus, the nation-state is worth 
defending: its founding principles, institutions, and citizens, particularly military citizens, are 
exceptional. By representing themselves as hyper militarized citizens, CSI veterans made visible 
the differences they believed existed between themselves and civilians. 
This difference between military citizens and civilians was also evident in chapter three 
by analyzing CSI’s Flags for the Fallen event, which appeared to celebrate supercitizens and 
military values. Yet, events like Flags for the Fallen exemplify the ways that public visibility of 
military citizens’ supercitizenship is limited to ceremonies and celebratory events. As a result, 
CSI veterans questioned their role and value in a militarized society due to their limited 
visibility, the anti-militarization climate on campus that highlighted the negative aspects of 
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American foreign policy, as well as experiences with poor separation, readjustment, and 
reintegration services. Rituals can create feelings of belonging that serve to strengthen 
communities or can serve to set parts of the community apart from the wider collective.  
Whether a veteran or a civilian believes in the valuing of former members as 
supercitizens, Veterans Day events set veterans apart from the wider community, marking 
veterans as liminal. Depending on the social context, veteran-ness marks either a privileged other 
or a marginalized other. Given the limited spatial and temporal occurrences that frame veterans 
as a privileged other, events like Flags for the Fallen exacerbate CSI veterans’ differences from 
civilians, highlighting the tension between nationalist ideology and the lived experiences of 
former service members. By analyzing veterans’ effaced social inclusion and recognition during 
debates around the ROTC and the Flags for the Fallen event at the CSI campus, I show that 
veteran identity is socially constituted throughout the individual’s lifetime in military and non-
military institutional and social contexts. When lacking the structure and meaning provided by 
the military that espouses military citizens as supercitizens, CSI student veterans were 
confronting reintegration and readjustment within a civilian world whose institutions and 
ideologies did not uphold the special status of veterans as supercitizens. Thus, they were 
navigating a liminal space despite living in a militarized United States that predominately 
upholds military citizens as supercitizens.  
Chapter four is a discussion of how liminality varies within the veteran population, 
focusing on women veterans’ strategies in veteran and civilian spaces. Building on experiences 
with soldiering as well as military and non-military institutional and social contexts, veteran 
identity is also shaped by the gendered hierarchy produced in the military and reproduced in 
veteran and civilian contexts. As a result, the hyper-masculine supercitizen is the norm, 
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subordinating women veterans through a hierarchy of valor and a fraternity of service. By 
analyzing their strategies in veteran and civilian spaces, I saw that CSI women veterans lacked 
the ability to shape the norms, values, and practices within and outside the veteran community. 
Furthermore, investigating the university’s “empowerment” initiatives showed that CUNY did 
not create tailored services and programming to assist women veterans with building community 
but instead focused on employment opportunities, ensuring the university’s fiscal interests. 
Given the climate in veteran and civilian spaces and initiatives, CSI women veterans lacked a 




Post 9/11 Military Citizens’ Social Rights in a Neoliberal United States 
[The G.I. Bill] gives emphatic notice to the men and women in our Armed Forces that the 
American people do not intend to let them down... This bill therefore […] provide(s) the special 
benefits which are due to the members of our Armed Forces -- for they have been compelled to 
make greater economic sacrifice and every other kind of sacrifice than the rest of us, and are 
entitled to definite action to help take care of their special problems.  
- President Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
Statement on the signing of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 
 
The United States has a proud history of offering educational assistance to millions of veterans, 
as demonstrated by the many “G.I. Bills” enacted since World War II. Educational assistance for 
veterans helps reduce the costs of war, assist veterans in readjusting to civilian life after wartime 
service, and boost the United States economy, and has a positive effect on recruitment for the 
Armed Forces.  
- 110th U.S. Congress,  
The Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008 
 
Veteran Social Rights: The Evolution of the G.I. Bill (1940s-1970s)  
 Since the revolutionary war, the U.S. federal government has provided returning service 
members material benefits and privileges to offset the significant costs that result from military 
service. Veterans of the Revolutionary War received military pensions and land grants (Wright 
2012). After the Civil War, Union and Confederate service members received pensions (Mettler 
2005). With the millions of veterans returning from World War I, the government provided a 
package of veterans’ benefits, which included disability payments, pensions, rehabilitation, and 
vocational training. Yet, the benefits given to World War II veterans were a first in our nation’s 
history, in terms of their inclusiveness and scope (Mettler 2005; Wright 2012). 
Twelve years before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States was in a serious 
economic depression. At the height of the Great Depression in 1933, the unemployment rate 
reached 25 percent (Bernstein 2016). Through the New Deal, President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
introduced governmental programs that generated employment opportunities and stabilized the 
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economy, extending the federal government’s involvement into everyday life (Mettler 2005; 
Murray 2008). The United States experienced growth in industrial output stemming from its role 
in the production of equipment and munitions for the United Kingdom, but it was the U.S.’s 
engagement in the war in 1941 that ultimately led to the boom in industrial production that 
reduced unemployment and strengthened the economy (Murray 2008).  
As the Allies gained ground, there were concerns about the postwar economy as well as 
political stability, given the return of millions of WWII veterans. In the 1944 State of the Union 
address, President Franklin D. Roosevelt warned, “people who are hungry and out of a job are 
the stuff of which dictatorships are made” (Roosevelt January 1944: 5). Recent history showed 
the social and political costs of poverty and unemployment, specifically among WWI veterans. 
Many recalled the 1932 Bonus March, in which 20,000 WWI veterans demanded the bonuses 
promised in the World War Adjusted Compensation Act of 1924 and, in response, President 
Hoover sent in the Army to dismantle veteran encampments and injured hundreds (Humes 2006; 
Murray 2008; Wright 2012). With the lessons of WWI in mind, President Roosevelt argued that 
WWII demobilization should entail effective veteran reintegration and readjustment into civilian 
life, stating: “We must replenish our supply of persons qualified to discharge the heavy 
responsibilities of the postwar world. We have taught our youth how to wage war; we must also 
teach them how to live useful and happy lives in freedom, justice, and decency” (Roosevelt 
1943: 2).  
The Veterans of Foreign Wars and the American Legion, congressionally chartered 
Veterans Service Organizations, began lobbying the federal government to produce legislation 
that would ensure a smooth demobilization effort by providing benefits to aid with reintegration 
and readjustment (Ortiz 2009; Altschuler and Blumin 2009). Specifically, Harry W. Colmery, the 
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National Commander of the American Legion and former Republican National Chairman, 
believed the reintegration of veterans was pivotal: “They [veterans] can make our country, or 
break it. They can restore our democracy, or scrap it. They can promote World Order, or World 
War III. The answer lies in [Congress’s] leadership” (Colmery 1944: 26). With the support and 
advocacy of Veterans Service Organizations, the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, 
commonly known as the G.I. Bill of Rights, became law on June 22, 1944, days before the Allies 
headed to Normandy. It provided a comprehensive collection of readjustment and reintegration 
opportunities to help veterans secure economic growth, development and educational 
opportunities.  The bill established a precedent for military citizens gaining social rights via a 
federal entitlement program.  
Along with providing job counseling, employment placement, a living allowance5, and 
loans to purchase homes, farms, and business property, the G.I. Bill provided education and 
training provisions. Any veteran with an honorable discharge who had served at least ninety days 
of active duty or been released for a service-connected injury or disability, and whose education 
or training was impeded, delayed, interrupted, or interfered with because of their service was 
eligible to pursue college, graduate school, or vocational training for up to four years (Dortch 
2012: 31). There were no provisions that required a veteran to demonstrate need and no 
preference for military rank or service experiences (e.g., whether a veteran engaged in combat) 
(Dortch 2012: 1). After going through a simple application process, tuition benefits were paid 
directly to the university or vocational school by the Veterans Administration (now known as the 
Department of Veterans Affairs), while living allowances were paid directly to the veteran 
(Dortch 2012: 32). By the end of the G.I. Bill’s eligibility period in 1956, of the 15 million 
eligible veterans a little over 50% had used their education benefits, and among those veterans 
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doing so roughly 28% had attended college or graduate school (Dortch 2012: 31). 
Although transformative, the 1944 G.I. Bill’s success has been exaggerated particularly 
for the working class and African American veterans. Graduation rates were on the rise before 
the war; between 1920 and 1940, the number of bachelor's degrees conferred by institutions of 
higher education almost quadrupled (DOE 1993: 7). Additionally, middle-class veterans used the 
bill to attend four-year institutions while working-class veterans enrolled in technical or trade 
schools (Field 2008). Lastly, the G.I. Bill’s positive educational outcomes were not as sweeping 
for African Americans who served in a segregated military.6 Many colleges and universities 
throughout the U.S. either did not admit African American students or maintained informal 
quotas (DOE 1991: 1). As a result, African American veterans were mostly restricted to 
attending historically black colleges and universities, which saw their enrollment numbers almost 
double, from 43,000 in 1940 to 76,600 in 1950 (DOE 1991: 2). Though the 1944 G.I. Bill was 
not successful in ensuring the social rights of all military citizens, it did manage to open up 
higher education in the United States to a more diverse segment of the population. During 
WWII, 23% of American service members were high school graduates and about 3.6% had 
earned a college degree (Altschuler and Blumin 2009: 78). By 1947, veterans represented “half 
of enrolled college students, doubling the number of males registered in prewar times, and 
increasing overall enrollment by 75 percent” (Mettler 2005: 67). 
Subsequent Cold War G.I. Bills, the Veterans’ Adjustment Act of 1952 and the Veterans 
Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966, reduced financial benefits and imposed new restrictions, 
particularly concerning eligibility requirements, for Korean and Vietnam War veterans. Both the 
Eisenhower and Johnson administrations argued for more restrictive G.I. Bills. In 1956, 
following the Korean War, President Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed the 1956 Bradley 
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Commission to study the different types of benefits that had been granted to veterans. It 
concluded that “veterans’ benefits are a means of equalizing significant sacrifices that result 
directly from wartime military service” but that “military service in time of war or peace is an 
obligation of citizenship and should not be considered inherently a basis for future government 
benefits” (Bradley Commission 1956: 10).  Facing the imminent withdrawal from Vietnam and 
the recession at home, the Johnson administration argued that there was no need for a broad 
benefits program for Vietnam veterans in President Johnson’s Great Society, the most far-
reaching domestic reform agenda since FDR’s New Deal (Johnson 1966: 2). Under the Great 
Society, legislation such as the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, the Higher Education Act of 
1965, the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, and the Social Security Amendments of 
1965, created wide ranging programs, including Job Corps, Head Start, Medicare, Medicaid, and 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development, in order to end poverty, promote racial 
equality, and improve education and cities (Zelizer 2015). Ultimately, both the Eisenhower and 
Johnson administrations’ efforts to overhaul or end veteran entitlements failed. In the decades 
that followed, the social rights of military citizens via federal entitlements continued in spite of 
the rise of neoliberalism and the dismantling of the welfare state.  
` 
Erosion of Social Citizenship in the United States (1980s-Present) 
As discussed in the introduction, beginning with the FDR administration, the federal 
government managed the economy by creating and implementing policies based on Keynesian 
principles in order to protect its citizens from the effects of the Great Depression, unstable 
business cycles, recessions and unemployment (Harvey 2007). This created the U.S. “welfare 
state,” which refers to the federal government’s collection of social provisions focused 
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on modifying market and social forces in order to promote the welfare of citizens, specifically 
those citizens experiencing unemployment, industrial accident, retirement, disability, ill health, 
extreme poverty, etc. (Orloff 1993: 303-304). Since the 1930s, presidential administrations and 
Congress have created sweeping domestic programs, like the New Deal in the 1930s and the 
Great Society in the late 1960s, to stabilize and regulate financial markets and banks, use 
government spending and regulation to encourage economic growth, establish a progressive tax 
system, and invest in infrastructure, public works employment, and public services (Harvey 
2007; Abramovitz and Morgen 2006; Morgen 2009). These domestic programs looked to reduce 
poverty, promote equality, and improve infrastructure, healthcare, education, and employment 
opportunities by establishing entitlement programs, including unemployment and disability 
insurance, public assistance, agricultural and home loans, Social Security, Medicare and 
Medicaid (Zelizer 2015). 
Beginning with the Reagan Administration, the United States federal government has 
moved away from Keynesian principles, aligning its policies with neoliberal theory. Under 
neoliberalism, the role of the federal government is to create an institutional framework in which 
private property rights, free markets, and free trade thrive, utilizing deregulation and 
privatization while limiting market interventions (Harvey 2007: 2). According to David Harvey, 
market interventions must be minimal because “the state cannot possibly possess enough 
information to second-guess market signals (prices) and because powerful interest groups will 
inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for their own benefit” 
(Harvey 2007: 2). In other words, government involvement is necessary to protect capital and 
markets, not citizens.  
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By creating policies that reflect neoliberal theory, the U.S. federal government not only 
reduced government regulation of industry and trade but also provided tax cuts for higher income 
households and corporations, beginning with the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and most 
recently with the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012. By moving away from a progressive 
tax code, the government has made individuals take on a higher proportion of tax revenue than 
corporations, shifting taxation away from wealth (i.e., gains, dividends, and inherited estates) to 
work (i.e., wages and salaries) and favoring capital accumulation over income redistribution 
(Abramovitz and Morgen 2006; Morgen 2009). Furthermore, the U.S. welfare state was 
restructured using neoliberal principles, specifically using market-oriented assumptions about 
social value, productivity, and investment (Morgen and Maskovsky 2003). As a result, the 
federal government transferred the administration and funding of social services to the states in 
order to cut federal spending (Harvey 2007; Morgen 2009). In 1981, Congress approved over 70 
billion dollars in reductions for social programs that provided food, cash assistance, low-cost 
housing, and healthcare assistance to the poor and shifted responsibility to the states (Herrick and 
Midgley 2002). Looking to emphasize education, child support, and job training to avoid 
“dependency,” the Family Support Act (1988) amended Title IV of the Social Security Act to 
revise the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, the federal assistance 
program that since 1935 has provided financial assistance to children whose families had low or 
no income (Fraser and Gordon 1994). Lastly, with the passing of the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act in 1996, AFDC was replaced with Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families (TANF), with the goal of ending “dependency” on governmental assistance 
by mandating work and encouraging two-parent families (Morgen and Maskovsky 2003). With 
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the dismantling of the welfare state, public services, like education and healthcare, have become 
private sector markets (Goode and Maskovsky 2001). 
The healthcare system is a clear example of this shift from the welfare state to private 
market.  Without single-payer healthcare, the U.S. working poor and their families do not have 
access to medical coverage. Employers do not provide health insurance for low-wage workers, 
and welfare reform has limited Medicaid coverage (Morgen and Maskovsky 2003). With 
Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010, states that wished to 
participate in the Medicaid program were required to allow people with income up to 138% of 
the poverty level to qualify for coverage, including adults without disabilities or dependent 
children (APHA 2014).  The federal government would pay 100% of the cost of Medicaid 
eligibility expansion in 2014, 2015, and 2016, and beginning in 2020 and thereafter would pay 
90% (APHA 2014). However, the Supreme Court ruled in NFIB v. Sebelius (2012) that the 
federal government must allow states to continue at pre-ACA levels of funding and eligibility if 
they chose. As a result, millions of families in the U.S. face the challenge of retraining or coping 
without Medicaid or private insurance. Researchers have shown that “many poor breadwinners 
are forced to turn down modest pay raises, increases in work hours, or promotions because they 
would otherwise lose Medicaid but be unable to afford private coverage” (Morgen and 
Maskovsky 2003: 327). As the changes in the U.S. healthcare system clearly show, neoliberal 
policies have resulted in a shift away from social responsibility to personal responsibility; the 
private sector, local community organizations, and non-profits, not the federal government, now 
serve as a “safety net” for Americans (Harvey 2007). This dismantling of funding and social 
services, along with the lack of a progressive tax code, has disproportionately affected the 
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working poor, people of color, immigrants, women, children, and students (Goode and 
Maskovsky 2001; Morgen 2009; Giroux 2014).  
Social scientists have shown that the shrinking of the welfare state and its pivotal 
resources leads those most affected by neoliberalism to seek refuge in an unlikely institution: the 
U.S. military. Since 1973, the military has served as a form of public assistance to those in need 
of housing, healthcare, and employment (Pérez 2006, 2009; Mariscal 2004; Lutz 2008; Murray 
2008). For example, through the Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC) program, the 
U.S. Armed Forces provides funding for public schools that have experienced debilitating budget 
cuts, creating a pool of potential service members among high school students (Pérez 2006; 
Pérez 2009). Almost 40% of the roughly half a million JROTC graduates join the military, 
making the program an effective recruitment tool (Goodman 2002: 5). Essential to effective 
recruitment is the promise of veterans’ benefits, which are promoted by the military as a means 
to improve the social and economic capital of returning GIs and their families. Consequently, it 
is individuals from low-income rural, suburban, and urban households who disproportionately 
enlist because upward mobility is limited via civilian social programs and employment 
opportunities under neoliberal policies (Lutz and Bartlett 1995; Pérez 2006; Pérez 2009; Morgen 
2009).  Unlike other entitlement programs, federal veterans’ benefits have not been dismantled. 
Military citizens have maintained material benefits and privileges in the face of the neoliberal 
status quo and the disassembling of the welfare state. By continuing a robust veteran entitlement 
program, the federal government looked not only to offset the cost of military service but also to 





Protecting Military Citizens’ Social Rights in the Post-Cold War and Post-9/11 Eras 
The rise of neoliberalism overlapped with a Post-Cold War United States, allowing for 
extensive cuts in defense spending. After the establishment of the AVF in 1973, and throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s the military did not engage in lengthy conflicts but instead, in short 
coalition, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations, such as the Gulf War, the Bosnian and 
Kosovo Wars, and Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. Both the G.H.W. Bush and Clinton 
administrations created policies, such as Base Force and Bottom Up Review, that projected 
future conflicts in a post-Cold War climate to feature cross-border hostility, not non-state threats 
and asymmetric warfare (Larson, Orletsky, and Leuschner 2001; Rostker 2006). For example, 
G.H.W. Bush reduced manpower needs, specifically by reducing the number of active duty 
service members in 1989 and 1990. Despite defense cuts, the federal government continued to 
fund veterans’ benefits. 
In 1984, Congress passed the Montgomery G.I. Bill (MGIB), the first AVF era G.I. Bill.  
The MGIB was the first G.I. Bill created to accommodate the needs of an all-volunteer force, 
featuring cost saving reforms to the entitlement program that emphasized recruitment and 
retention. Current and former active duty military personnel could qualify for educational and 
training benefits if they served a minimum of two continuous years, regardless if their service 
occurred during peacetime or conflict (Murray 2008: 997). However, to be eligible, service 
members were required to contribute to their education by accepting a salary reduction of $100 
per month for twelve months (Smole and Loane 2008: 8). By conferring benefits based on a 
salary reduction, the MGIB was the first G.I. Bill to mirror employment benefits, such as health 
insurance and Social Security. Additionally, the MGIB became an effective retention tool by 
extending benefits to reservists and offering supplemental assistance, called a “kicker.” With a 
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kicker, individuals could be eligible to receive supplemental assistance if they agreed to re-enlist 
or extend their service. Kickers were also offered to new recruits as an enlistment bonus to aid 
with recruitment.7  
Despite the widespread implementation of neoliberal reforms since the 1980s, defense 
budgets soared in response to the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks. The U.S. federal 
government developed a security strategy called the War on Terror, which not only entailed 
increased surveillance, expansion of government powers, and restrictions on individual freedom 
but also involved coalition based military operations, drone warfare, and most importantly 
ground and counterinsurgency wars in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) to maintain American 
sovereignty, security, and our “way of life” (Goldstein 2010; Masco 2010). Given the wide scope 
of military operations in the post-9/11 era, U.S. defense spending increased by 54%, from $287 
billion to $530 billion (Frohlich and Kent 2014: 2). Spending on military personnel (e.g., pay, 
housing allowance, health insurance, etc.) had the largest rate of growth, a 46% increase, in the 
DOD’s Budget from 2000 to 2014 (CBO November 2014). To cut costs as well as fulfill the 
demands of sustaining a global War on Terror, the military actively sought to retain existing 
personnel by utilizing the reserve components. Through implementing the Total Force Concept 
(TFC), the military treated all active and reserve military as a single force, ensuring all 
components were operational and ready for national defense while reducing military spending by 
using the Reserves and National Guard in an increased active duty role (Dortch 2012: 8; 
Eikenberry 2013: 11). Additionally, by creating a Stop Loss policy, the heads of military 
departments were able to keep individuals on active duty 12 months beyond their contractual 
separation date (Dortch 2012). Policies such as Stop Loss and TFC resulted in multiple 
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deployments for American service members; roughly 40% of troops deployed more than once 
due to sustained military operations using a smaller force (Sayer, Carlson, and Frazier 2014). 
Along with an increase in defense spending, the costs associated with veteran benefits 
also rose. Virginia Senator Jim Webb (D-VA) proposed a Post-9/11 G.I. Bill that was as 
comprehensive as the original 1944 bill (Buckley and Cleary 2010). Despite over 20 years of 
neoliberal policies, the Republican opposition, including Senators Lindsey Graham (R-SC), John 
McCain (R-AZ), and Richard Burr (R-NC) as well as the G.W. Bush administration, sponsored 
an alternative bill that would also create an expensive entitlement program. Additionally, the 
Republican bill looked to improve recruitment and reenlistment in order to provide relief to an 
overexerted AVF engaged in an expansive and expensive War on Terror. On June 26, 2008, the 
Senate voted 92 to 6 in favor of the Republican sponsored bill, now known as the Post-9/11 
Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008, which provided an increase in education benefits 
tied to how much time they spent in the service, permitted parity of benefits for reservists and 
active duty service members, and allowed for the transferability of benefits to a dependent 
(Dortch 2012).  Financed by the federal government at a cost in the billions of dollars and 
supplemented by other federal and state veteran programs,8 the Post-9/11 G.I. Bill highlights 
how the neoliberal shift did not affect the funding of veteran entitlement programs. Compared to 
their civilian counterparts veterans are less affected by neoliberalism; they have greater choice 
over their education, finances, and ultimately their future, reinforcing veteran’s military 
citizenship. Yet, unlike their civilian counterparts, student veterans are constrained by financial 





Recession, Unemployment, and Veteran Choice  
With the creation of the Post-9/11 G.I. Bill, universities across the country experienced 
an influx of student veterans and federal funding. The passing of the G.I. Bill overlapped with a 
withdrawal of troops in Iraq, beginning in 2007 until 2011, and Afghanistan, beginning in 2011 
until 2014. This influx of returning veterans coincided with the Great Recession. The recession 
lasted from December 2007 until June 2009 and featured high unemployment rates and a decline 
in consumer spending and productivity, due to a nationwide banking emergency brought about 
by a subprime mortgage crisis (BLS 2012). During the recession and the years following the 
recession, veteran unemployment rates were high; at the end of 2010, 11.5% of post-9/11 
veterans were unemployed (Pew 2011: 18).  Facing a dismal job market, post-9/11 veterans 
utilized their federal educational benefits at high rates. As of June 2014, the VA paid over $41 
billion in Post-9/11 G.I. Bill benefits to fund the education of 1.2 million beneficiaries (DVA 
2014). In 2014 alone, the Post-9/11 G.I. Bill program had 790,000 participants and made $10.8 
billion in payments for tuition, fees, housing, and books (GAO 2015: 3).  
Universities and colleges scrambled to accommodate this influx of student veterans. For 
example, the City University of New York (CUNY) established veteran services within senior 
and community colleges to manage admissions, registration, and the certification of veteran 
educational benefits, as well as provide veterans’ services. At the College of Staten Island (CSI), 
the campus experienced a dramatic increase in student veteran enrollment following the creation 
of the Post-9/11 G.I. Bill (Table 1). In 2003, the college administration created the Veterans 
Benefits and Registration Office, a one stop shop for veterans, located in the Registrar’s office, 
to facilitate admissions, registration, and the certification of veteran educational benefits. By 
2007, the college administration created a veterans’ office, hiring a veterans’ coordinator to 
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assist with adjustment to college life. During my fieldwork in the 2013-2014 academic year, the 
college allotted space for a veterans’ lounge to be opened in 2014 and promoted the veterans’ 
coordinator to director.  
For Marie, the director of the CSI Veterans Office and an Army veteran who utilized 
federal veteran educational benefits herself, the Post-9/11 G.I. Bill offered veterans the chance to 
transform their lives by receiving an education that would improve their employment potential 
post college, especially given the unfavorable economy and job market. Based on the length of 
time on active duty and regardless of need, rank, or service experience, the Post-9/11 G.I. Bill 
paid a percentage of tuition and fees (Table 2) directly to universities and provided a monthly 
allowance and stipend for books and supplies for up to 36 months (Dortch 2014). Similarly to 
other CUNY students9, CSI student veterans came from modest backgrounds. Yet, unlike their 
CUNY peers, the generous funding offered by the Post-9/11 G.I. Bill could have the potential to 
transform veterans’ lives, improving their social and economic capital through higher education 
without incurring thousands of dollars in student loans.   
As I observed and participated in activities on the CSI campus, student veterans 
expressed that they had enlisted to escape difficult living situations, such as an unstable family 
life, poverty, and/or rural isolation, in order to receive an education as well as healthcare, 
housing, and travel that would otherwise be impossible (discussed in the Introduction and 
Chapter 2). Upon graduating from high school, many post-9/11 veterans attempted to pursue a 
college degree by either taking out a loan or receiving assistance from family, but they did not 
earn a degree because they were not prepared for college. Veteran educational benefits offered 
the opportunity to earn a degree after concluding military service. Upon applying for admissions, 
veterans submit their Certificate of Eligibility, a form provided by the VA that outlines what 
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educational benefits the individual is qualified for based on their military service. Once the 
veteran is admitted as a student, the school’s trained Certifying Official verifies that the veteran 
is registered for classes each semester, notifying the VA to process tuition and fee payments to 
the institution as well as send the veteran’s stipend and allowance. Most service members are 
under contract to serve four years on active duty10 followed by service in a reserve component 
for the remainder of the eight-year military contract (DOD 2007)   As a result, the majority of 
CSI veterans received 36 months of fully paid tuition, a monthly living allowance, and book and 
supply stipend because they had served active duty for at least three years (Table 2). The 
Veterans Office conducted a veteran population survey in the spring of 2013, revealing that in a 
sample of 108 student veterans over 50% of student veterans served four or more years and about 
76% utilized the Post-9/11 G.I. Bill. 
In 2013, the year I began my fieldwork, I noted that student veterans at CSI, even those 
who qualified for maximum benefits, made their educational decisions largely based on financial 
need due to the Post-9/11 G.I. Bill’s structure for dispensing tuition and monthly allowance. The 
VA makes tuition payments based on the most expensive public university within the state 
(Dortch 2014: 15). For example, in 2014, New York State tuition and fees under the G.I. Bill 
were capped at $21,085, making public universities like CUNY affordable, and private 
universities where tuition rates can cost up to $50,000 a year for in state tuition financially out of 
reach.11 Given that the majority of CSI student veterans originated from middle to low income 
households with limited social and economic capital, they chose to attend the CUNY university 
system not by choice but out of economic necessity. Additionally, the Post-9/11 G.I. Bill’s 
monthly allowance, called the Military Housing Allowance (MHA), 12 also limited veterans’ 
educational options due to financial constraints. A veteran’s MHA is calculated based on a 
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university’s location, not where the veteran lives. For example, in 2014, the MHA for 
universities located in Manhattan, Bronx, Queens, and Brooklyn totaled $3,744 while the MHA 
for Staten Island was $2,397, a difference of $1,347. Student veterans employed various 
strategies to supplement the MHA. Along with applying for federal and state grant and loan 
programs13, many CSI student veterans also worked as VA federal work-study students, earning 
an untaxable hourly wage equal to the Federal minimum wage or the State minimum wage, 
whichever was greater (DVA December 2015). Additionally, student veterans could elect to be 
paid in advance for 40% of the number of hours in their work-study agreement, or for 50 hours, 
whichever was less (DVA December 2015). Yet, many CSI student veterans ultimately 
transferred to other universities due to the lower Staten Island MHA. By the end of spring 
semester of 2014, when the MHA difference between CSI and other local universities increased 
from $1,173 in 2013 to $1,347 in 2014, the retention rate was at roughly 50%. 
Unlike their CUNY peers who accrued thousands of dollars in student loan debt to access 
higher education, student veterans’ access to the Post-9/11 G.I. Bill underscores the privileges 
and benefits of military citizenship. When coupled with other federal and state aid, the Post-9/11 
G.I. Bill’s robust funding provides veterans control over their education, finances, and ultimately 
their future. Yet, in spite of federal funding, student veterans’ choices were severely constrained 
by financial need. The exorbitant costs of higher education coupled with the dismal economic 
climate, forced students to strategically employ their tuition benefits and living allowances as 
well as to navigate other federal and state financial aid programs to make ends meet. CSI may 
not have been student veterans’ first choice but they enrolled out of economic necessity given 
that the majority of CSI student veterans, like their CUNY peers, originated from middle to low 
income households. CSI student veterans employed various strategies to supplement their federal 
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veteran benefits while others transferred to other universities to maximize their benefits. Thus, 
post-9/11 veterans were tasked with shopping around for the best education at the best price. Yet, 
unlike other college students, the federal government looked to empower student veterans as 
consumers, utilizing their G.I. Bill as consumers in an open higher education market. By not only 
providing ample funding but also tasking federal agencies to create consumer tools that would 
maximize veterans’ educational benefits, the federal government reinforced military citizenship’s 
material benefits and privileges. 
 
Student Veteran as Consumer in a Higher Education Market 
Within four years of its passing into law, veterans faced serious obstacles when utilizing 
the Post-9/11 G.I. Bill. On April 27th 2012, President Obama issued Executive Order (EO) 13607 
Establishing Principles of Excellence for Educational Institutions Serving Service Members, 
Veterans, Spouses, and Other Family Members to strengthen Federal service members and 
veterans’ educational benefits oversight, enforcement, and accountability in order to provide 
current and former service members “the opportunity to pursue a high-quality education and gain 
the skills and training they need to fill the jobs of tomorrow” (EO 13607: 248). With this order, 
the executive branch also looked to respond to “reports of aggressive and deceptive targeting of 
service members, veterans, and their families by some educational institutions” (EO 13607: 248). 
This targeting included the predatory recruitment of veterans with brain injuries by institutions 
that did not provide appropriate academic support and counseling.  It also involved schools that 
failed to provide information about retention and graduation rates for service members and 
veterans (EO 13607).  
The principles outlined in EO 13607 created regulations and policies within federal 
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departments, including the Departments of Veterans Affairs, Education, Justice, and Defense as 
well as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Federal Trade Commission, and Securities 
and Exchange Commission, to govern service members and veterans’ federal educational 
benefits (EO 13607). Less than a month after the release of EO 13607, the VA contacted 
educational institutions in order to begin implementing President Obama’s Principles of 
Excellence, setting the tone for how the VA looked to implement EO 13067. In its 
correspondence with educational institutions, the VA stated: “These principles were developed to 
strengthen the consumer protection for our Service members, Veterans, and their families, as 
well as ensure they have access to information they need to make informed decisions concerning 
the use of their well-earned educational benefits” (DVA May 2012: 1). By creating the G.I. Bill 
Comparison Tool and the G.I. Bill Feedback System, the VA developed consumer tools to 
implement President Obama’s Principles of Excellence, protecting veterans’ earned privileges 
and benefits. 
Launched in February 2014 to “ensure beneficiaries are informed education consumers” 
(DVA August 2014: 1), the G.I. Bill Comparison Tool allows veterans to compare up to three 
schools, estimate the amount of Post-9/11 G.I. Bill funding, and research median borrowing 
amounts, graduation rates, loan-default rates, complaints, accreditation status, in-state tuition 
policies, and totals paid to schools for tuition and fees by fiscal year (Figure 1). As of February 
2016, the Comparison Tool had over 1 million users and over 2 million unique page views 
(Worley 2016). In spite of its popularity, the G.I. Bill Comparison Tool lacked essential 
information that would positively impact veteran educational and financial choices. In June 
2015, a coalition of 13 Democratic Senators sent a letter to Veterans Affairs Secretary Bob 
McDonald petitioning to update his department's comparison tool with a risk index (U.S. Senate 
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June 2015). This coalition argued that “while the present version of the G.I. Bill Comparison 
Tool does provide some consumer protection information, it does not provide a complete picture 
and does not highlight the unscrupulous bad actors of the for-profit industry14” (U.S. Senate June 
2015: 1). As of July 2016, a committee of Senate Democrats argued, “The usefulness of the (G.I. 
Bill Comparison) Tool continues to be impaired by overly broad definitions of completion of 
non-degree programs, by schools’ failure to report complete and accurate information, by 
inconsistency in the caution flags, and by a lack of options for user feedback” (U.S. Senate July 
2016: 2). 
The VA also created the G.I. Bill Feedback System, available through the benefits section 
of the VA website, as a centralized online system for veterans to report negative experiences 
with educational institutions (Figure 2). In a 2014 letter to educational institutions, the VA 
created this system to “empower students and their families” to ensure “they have the best 
information needed to make the most informed educational choice, while holding institutions of 
higher learning to the highest standards” (DVA January 2014: 1). Once a complaint is filed 
through this centralized system, the VA acts on behalf of the veteran, “contact(ing) the School 
Certifying Official (SCO) on record to resolve a complaint” or “another appropriate office other 
than the SCO to handle complaints” (DVA January 2014: 1). Both complaints and their 
resolutions are forwarded to the Federal Trade Commission’s Consumer Sentinel Network, 
which provides access to any federal, state or local law enforcement agency to consumer 
complaints (FTC 2016; Field 2015). During its first year, the VA received 2,711 complaints, the 
majority of which “centered on financial problems, such as tuition and fee charges and refunds, 
and the quality of the education received;” of those 2,711 complaints only 42 percent of the 
complaints were resolved (Field 2015: 1).  
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Additionally, the VA, in partnership with state approving agencies (SAAs), oversees 
roughly 5,000 compliance reviews each year but these reviews often fail to reveal serious 
violations (Hefling 2016). In 2016, the U.S. Senate called for fewer but more detailed 
examinations by calling on the VA to establish an “index of risk factors,” including increases in 
veteran enrollment, deficiencies identified by accreditors and state agencies, deficiencies in VA 
program administration compliance, and high rates of student complaints, loan defaults, and 
dropouts (U.S. Senate July 2016). Despite understaffing and a stagnant budget, SAAs have 
acted15 to save veterans’ benefits but ultimately the VA has argued that it is not an investigative 
agency, meaning they can only “reprimand” institutions by placing a caution flag on its G.I. Bill 
Comparison Tool and suspend an institution’s status as a Principles of Excellence participant 
(Hefling 2016; DVA March 2016). Nevertheless, the Yale Law School’s Veterans Legal 
Services Clinic and twenty-eight Senate Democrats have argued that the VA and SAAs have the 
authority under U.S. Code to approve, disapprove, and suspend G.I. Bill funds for educational 
institutions engaged in erroneous, deceptive or misleading advertising, sales, or enrollment 
practices as well as in the misrepresentation of job prospects, transferability of credits, and 
accreditation status (Baldwin, Meyer, and Tuchman 2016; Hefling 2016; U.S. Senate July 2016). 
The Senate has called on the VA to strengthen oversight, enforcement, and accountability to 
protect veteran benefits and stop taxes from being spent unchecked (Baldwin, Meyer, and 
Tuchman 2016). 
With ample funding provided by the Post-9/11 G.I. Bill and the VA’s G.I. Bill 
Comparison Tool and G.I. Bill Feedback System, the federal government looked to empower 
student veterans as consumers in order to maximize their educational benefits, highlighting 
veterans’ material benefits and privileges in the face of the neoliberalism. As argued by Brown 
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(2016), neoliberalism negatively affects citizens by defunding and deregulating public services 
and goods, instituting a regressive tax policy, removing protections against recessions, predatory 
lending, and outsourcing. Yet, military citizens’ educational benefits and consumer protections 
contradict the neoliberal status quo. Instead of experiencing defunding, military citizens enjoy a 
robust entitlement program, which also funnels millions of dollars to educational institutions 
across the United States. Instead of experiencing deregulation, military citizens’ educational 
benefits have a clear eligibility and distribution structure outlined through federal law and 
enforced and regulated by the VA.  Additionally, consumer tools, like the G.I. Bill Comparison 
Tool and the G.I. Bill Feedback System, are created via federal policies and regulations to 
provide oversight, enforcement, and accountability over educational benefits, assisting veterans 
with making informed decisions regarding their finances and education. When the VA has been 
unsuccessful, either in its failure to hold educational institutions accountable for providing 
inaccurate and incomplete information or in its inability to improve user reporting options and 
response to user feedback, Congress has stepped in to protect military citizens’ benefits.  They 
have publicly exposed the VA’s failures and recommended improvements in their oversight over 
veterans’ educational benefits. Unlike other citizens receiving federal benefits and services, 
military citizens are not framed as dependent or entitled citizens. At the CSI, the need to protect, 
inform, and empower veterans to maximize their benefits was clear. By applying the Principles 
of Excellence outlined in EO 13607 as well as CUNY Task Force on Veterans Affairs’ 
recommendations, military citizenship’s material benefits and privileges framed veterans as 





Protecting the Social Rights of CUNY Student Veterans 
With the increase in students and funding resulting from the Post-9/11 G.I. Bill, 
educational institutions across the United States strove to comply with EO 13607. Under EO 
13607, the Principles of Excellence called on educational institutions to “ensure that educational 
institutions provide high-quality academic and student support services to active-duty service 
members, reservists, members of the National Guard, veterans, and military families,” to the 
extent permitted by law (EO 13607 2012: 249). Specifically, the Principles of Excellence 
required educational institutions to “provide educational plans for all individuals using Federal 
military and veterans educational benefits that detail how they will fulfill all the requirements 
necessary to graduate and the expected timeline of completion” as well as “designate a point of 
contact for academic and financial advising (including access to disability counseling) to assist 
service member and veteran students and their families with the successful completion of their 
studies and with their job searches” (EO 13607: 249-250). Yet, educational institutions receiving 
federal veteran educational benefits were not legally bound to comply with the Principles of 
Excellence outlined in Executive Order 13607. As explained by the VA, “you (the institutions) 
are strongly encouraged to commit to the Principles of Excellence, thus publicly recognizing the 
importance of transparency and providing students with appropriate information,” but ultimately 
they can decide not to comply (DVA May 2012: 1). Despite a lack of legal pressure to comply, 
the Department of Veterans Affairs would “notify all institutions participating in the Post-9/11 
GI Bill program that they are strongly encouraged to comply with the Principles and shall post 
on the Department’s website those that do” (EO 13607: 250).  
A year before President Obama’s EO 13607, CUNY Chancellor Matthew Goldstein 
convened a Task Force on Veterans Affairs. The CUNY student veteran population had more 
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than tripled from 2008 to 2012, and the Task Force sought to assess the needs of the student 
veteran population, examine current practices, review national best practices, and recommend 
what policies and procedures the University must enact to meet student veterans’ needs.  In April 
2013, the task force published a report identifying areas in need of improvement (CUNY April 
2013). By reviewing national best practices for recruitment and retention, CUNY decided to 
create a new student veteran orientation, specialized student services, a Military Cultural 
Competency training for CUNY staff and instructors, as well as a veteran specific space, a 
veteran coordinator, a campus veteran task force, and a veteran’s point of contact in the 
counseling, advisement, and career services offices (CUNY April 2013). Additionally, the Task 
Force looked to provide state tuition for veterans, establish a University-wide definition of the 
term veteran to ensure an accurate assessment of the veteran population, provide ease of 
transferability of earned military credits, and forge relationships with community organizations 
and the corporate sector to provide services and career opportunities (CUNY April 2013). Lastly, 
to ensure recruitment and retention, the Task Force outlined how each campus should provide 
tailored educational plans for all individuals utilizing benefits, listing requirements necessary to 
graduate and expected timeline of completion, as well as update their veterans’ websites, place 
them visibly on their home page, and include any resources applicable to veterans (CUNY April 
2013). 
During my fieldwork from 2013-2014, the CUNY campuses were in the midst of 
overhauling their veterans’ services based on the CUNY Task Force’s recommendations, which 
also addressed the goals within President Obama’s EO 13607. On the CSI campus, the veteran 
population on campus doubled between 2011 and 2013 given the winding down of large-scale 
military operations, the close proximity of Forts Wadsworth and Hamilton and the Brooklyn VA 
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Hospital, and the College of Staten Island’s policy of transferring up to 90 military service 
credits. By implementing President Obama’s Principles of Excellence and the CUNY Task 
Force’s recommendations, the CSI Veterans Office focused on assisting over 250 student 
veterans with earning a college degree, obtaining employment, and addressing needs that went 
beyond education and campus life. The director, two part-time employees, and a handful of 
federal work study employees were stretched thin. Despite such a small staff, the CSI Veterans 
Office was able to meet, or at least set in motion, all the Principles of Excellence listed in EO 
13607 and the Task force recommendations. By June of 2015, less than two years after the start 
of my fieldwork, CSI reached almost 100% compliance with the Task Force recommendations 
and Principles of Excellence. The only outstanding tasks, given the federal and CUNY 
recommendations, were to establish a veteran task force on campus and leverage corporate 
opportunities to connect veterans with internship and career opportunities.  
To ensure that veterans quickly acclimate to campus and civilian life, the CSI Veterans 
Office created a Veterans Orientation, a standard “how to” for new students but tailored to 
veterans’ concerns and needs. Additionally, the CSI Veterans Office hosted a Veteran Welcome 
Week, featuring the Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran Benefit Administration and the 
Veteran Health Administration, to inform student veterans of the benefits available to them as 
well as enroll them in the VA system.  To ensure veterans were aware of all federal and state 
benefits, the CSI Veterans Office held a series of “Meet and Greet” featuring the Veterans 
Service Representative, Military Services Coordinator, and the Minority Veterans Program 
Coordinator for the Department of Veterans Affairs’ New York Regional Office. It also 
cosponsored a Veterans Resource Fair with local political officials and the Department of 
Veteran Affairs that offered health screenings, health and education benefit information, and 
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employment assistance. The CSI Veterans Office organized volunteering opportunities with the 
Wounded Warriors Project, Staten Island’s Project Homefront, and the Marine Corps League to 
provide an opportunity for veterans to participate in their community. For those veterans 
approaching graduation, the CSI Veterans Office cosponsored a Veteran’s Job Fair with New 
York State Senators, Workforce1, AMVETS, Hearing Our Heroes and CSI’s Career and 
Scholarship Center, featuring representatives from the New York Police Department, New York 
City Fire Department, New York State Department of Corrections, and local companies with 
immediate positions available.  
The CSI Veterans Office staff also acted as advocates and liaisons for student veterans 
and their dependents on and off campus. To improve communication and understanding among 
veterans, staff, and faculty members, Marie worked hard to establish formal points of contact 
throughout the campus, including the offices of Academic Advisement, Health and Wellness, 
Financial Aid, Counseling, and Career and Scholarship, to provide wellness evaluations, mental 
health counseling, housing, and career advisement. These points of contact were given military 
cultural competency training, which overviewed military organizational structure, rank, branches 
of services, core values, and demographics with the goal of improving understanding, 
communication, and interactions with former service members. To extend its network beyond the 
campus, the CSI Veterans Office collaborated with local posts of national Veteran Service 
Organizations, such as the American Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Brooklyn VA 
Hospital, and the local Vets Center16 to identify additional resources and foster a sense of 
community among veterans beyond the CSI campus.  
Along with acclimating veterans to academic and civilian life, the CSI Veterans Office 
developed programs to educate the campus and the local community about issues facing post-
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9/11 veterans to assist with veteran reintegration and readjustment. In order to strategically 
improve awareness of veterans’ issues, the CSI Veterans Office established “Veterans 
Appreciation Month,” held in the month of November to coincide with Veterans’ Day. Along 
with attending the Annual NYC Veterans Day Parade with other CUNY veterans, the CSI 
Veterans Office hosted a series of student veteran panels, allowing students, faculty, and staff to 
ask student veterans about their experiences during and post military service. Additionally, the 
exhibit Aesthetic History: Interpretations of Veteran Experience through Art paired veterans 
with artists to create pieces to broaden civilian understanding of the effects of military service. 
Lastly, the CSI Veterans Office created a poster campaign titled “Do You Know…,” 
highlighting the role of veteran students, staff and faculty on campus.  The CSI Veterans Office 
also strove to highlight those within the veteran community who were often overlooked, 
particularly women veterans. During Women’s History Month, the CSI Veterans Office created a 
campaign and held a film screening in March highlighting the contributions of service women. 
The CSI Veterans Office created a poster campaign “She Served,” highlighting that women are 
veterans and performed a wide range of roles while in the military. Additionally, with the 
support of CSI’s Women’s Center, the Veterans Office held a screening of The Invisible War, an 
investigative documentary on the epidemic of military sexual assault among service members. 
Following the screening, the CSI Veterans Office held a discussion facilitated by Veterans Office 
staff and social workers to educate the CSI community about both women’s roles in the service 
and the effects of sexual assault on service men and women. 
With my fieldwork at the College of Staten Island, it became clear that aspects of veteran 
reintegration and readjustment are funded by the federal government via the Post 9/11 G.I. Bill. 
With this funding, educational institutions across the country experienced a surge in student 
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veterans and federal dollars. To comply with federal policies and recommendations around 
veterans’ educational benefits, educational institutions not only offered tailored educational and 
career services but also assisted with the complex process of reintegrating and readjustment by 
offering veteran-specific programming and opportunities. As a result, educational institutions 
could ensure a steady stream of federal dollars by effectively recruiting and retaining student 
veterans with their extensive veteran programming and services. Despite the rise of 
neoliberalism and the dismantling of the U.S. welfare state, veterans’ social rights are secure 
with the Post-9/11 G.I. Bill, as well other services and resources provided by the VA and 
governmental and non-governmental institutions within local communities, highlighting veteran 
exceptionalism is built into military citizenship.  
In spite of this exceptionalism, I witnessed veterans struggle. When compared to their 
civilian counterparts, CSI veterans appeared to be less effected by neoliberalism. Yet even with 
access to robust federal funding, there was still a financial gap given CSI veterans’ 
socioeconomic status. As my fieldwork progressed, it became clear that acclimating to civilian 
life could not be shaped solely by the material benefits and privileges of military citizenship. In 
chapter two, I argue that upon their return home, the institutions and ideologies that uphold the 
veteran as the “military citizen” are revealed to be unstable and incoherent despite a militarized 
United States. Veterans do not share a coherent experience of military citizenship, particularly 





As discussed in the introduction and chapter one, soldiers and veterans occupy states and 
spaces of exception, in which military citizens are distinct from civilians. Service members 
sacrifice their rights and as a result have a unique set of obligations, duties, privileges and 
benefits that are different from civilians, creating a distinct experience of citizenship called 
“military citizenship” (Trundle 2012, 2015). For example, the federal government created 
entitlement programs, like the Post-9/11 G.I. Bill, to offset the negative costs of military service 
and to encourage participation in an all-volunteer military. In practice, there is not a coherent 
experience of military citizenship for service members and veterans. Access to the material and 
symbolic benefits and privileges derived from military service varies, highlighting how military 
citizenship is unstable, relational, negotiated, and contested. Despite its limits, military 
citizenship serves to create a pool of potential service members willing to serve the nation-state 
and allows veterans to demand social rights, inclusion and recognition they believe are owed to 
them. In this chapter, I highlight how military citizenship is predicated on American 
exceptionalism: the nation-state is worth defending given the belief that in the United States, its 
founding principles, institutions, and citizens, particularly military citizens, are exceptional.  
Accounts claiming exceptionalism date as far back as the 17th century. John Winthrop 
(1630) claimed the purpose of Puritan settlement in the New World was to “be as a city upon a 
hill” as the “eyes of all people are upon us.” U.S. presidents have invoked the image of the 
United States as a city upon a hill, declaring “more than any other people on Earth, we bear 
burdens and accept risks unprecedented in their size and their duration, not for ourselves alone 
but for all who wish to be free” (Kennedy 1961: 3). In Democracy in America (1835-1840), 
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French political scientist and historian Alexis de Tocqueville forwarded the notion that the 
United States, a democracy with a national ideology based on liberty, egalitarianism, 
individualism, and laissez-faire economics, was an exceptional nation (Lipset 1996). Since the 
19th century, American exceptionalism refers to the idea that the U.S. is a singular and superior 
nation in the international community due to its founding principles and unique form of 
government (Lipset 1996). These assumptions are the foundation of U.S. nationalism and central 
to national discourse: “without uniform ethnicity, without shared religious beliefs, or without a 
common fund of stories, only a shared act of rebellion, America had to invent what Europeans 
inherited: a sense of solidarity, a repertoire of national symbols, a quickening of political 
passions” (Ryan 2000: 13).  
A majority of Americans feel immense national pride, believing that the U.S. is the 
greatest country in the world given its uniqueness among nations (Huddy and Khatib 2007; Jones 
2010; Lipset 1996; Saito 2010; Gilmore 2015). In 2010, 73% of Americans polled agreed that 
the United States has a unique character because of its history and that the Constitution sets it 
apart from other nations as the greatest in the world, while 66% say the United States has a 
special responsibility to be the leading nation in world affairs (Jones 2010). In 2014, 28% of 
Americans polled thought the U.S. stands above all other countries in the world while 58% said 
it is one of the greatest countries in the world, along with some others (Pew 2014). More 
recently, roughly 63% of Americans polled agreed that there has never been a time in their life 
when they have not felt proud about being American and more than 80% found it was important 
to publicly show support for the U.S. (Jones and Cox 2015). 
Politicians frame U.S. national mythology on American exceptionalism, arguing that the 
U.S. is a model for other nations given its founding principles (Lockhart 2003; Bacevich 2008; 
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Hodgson 2009; Domke and Coe 2010; Neumann and Coe 2011; Gilmore 2014, 2015).  
Revolutionary political activist and theorist Thomas Paine argued that since “freedom hath been 
hunted round the globe…,” America would “receive the fugitive freedom, and prepare, in time, 
an asylum for humankind” (Paine 1945 [1776]: 30-31). Over two hundred years later, President 
Obama also claimed the U.S. was a bastion for freedom, stating that “the true strength of our 
nation comes not from the might of our arms or the scale of our wealth, but from the enduring 
power of our ideals: democracy, liberty, opportunity and unyielding hope” (Obama 2008: 4). 
Furthermore, these principles are believed to be the foundation of democratic institutions and 
traditions. President Obama argued that “we have a core set of values that are enshrined in our 
Constitution, in our body of law, in our democratic practices, in our belief in free speech and 
equality that, though imperfect, are exceptional...” (Obama 2009: 437).  
Yet, this vision of the United States as exceptional is often questioned by Americans who 
doubt or do not accept the authority or legitimacy of U.S. institutions and politicians. For 
example, there were some who asserted that President Obama was not a natural-born citizen of 
the United States, making him ineligible under Article Two of the United States Constitution to 
be President. Political opponents from both the Republican and Democratic parties, most notably 
current President Donald J. Trump, openly questioned Obama's birthplace and his legitimacy as 
president. State and federal lawsuits were filed, including Berg v. Obama (2009), Essek v. 
Obama (2009), Ankeny v. Governor of the State of Indiana (2010), etc., seeking either to have 
Obama disqualified from running or being confirmed as President or compelling him to release 
additional documentation as evidence of his U.S. citizenship. The majority of these cases were 
rejected in lower court. In response to the widespread attention, Obama released his official 
Hawaiian birth certificate; it was confirmed to be accurate by the Hawaii Department of Health 
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in 2008 as well as a certified copy of his original Certificate of Live Birth in 2011 (Pfeiffer 
2011). Despite government inquiries and President Obama’s efforts, a 2011 poll showed that 
13% of Americans doubt Obama’s U.S. birth (Morales 2011).  
Additionally, American exceptionalism entails the belief that the United States will 
“stand up not only for our own narrow self-interest, but for the interest of all” (Obama 2013: 9). 
As a result, U.S. foreign policy is “exempt” from the laws and rules governing other nations 
since the United States engages in military conflicts to secure global peace (Pease 2009; Koh 
2003; Ignatieff 2005; Holsti 2010; Robinson 2014; McCrisken 2003; Madsen 1998). Yet, 
American national interest often trumps the wider goals of global peace, freedom, and safety. For 
example, in the immediate aftermath of September 11th, President Bush clarified that “our war on 
terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of 
global reach has been found, stopped and defeated. Every nation, in every region, now has a 
decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (Bush 2001: 2). Less than 
two years later, with the invasion of Iraq committed under a false pretext and well-documented 
prisoner abuse scandals at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, it became clear that the War on Terror 
would not bring global order and security, nor spread democracy in the Middle East. On the 
homefront, the War on Terror also eroded the civil liberties of U.S. citizens with the creation of 
the Patriot Act of 2001, which limited U.S. citizens’ privacy due to the expansion of government 
surveillance. As a result, the contradictions, inconsistencies, and abuses of American 
exceptionalism were in plain view.  
Nationally, service members and veterans question U.S. foreign policy given their 
experiences while serving in the military. In 2011, the Pew Research Center found that post-9/11 
veterans “are more supportive than the general public of U.S. military efforts in Afghanistan and 
67 
 
Iraq. Even so, they are ambivalent” (2011: 8). Half of post-9/11 veterans surveyed said that, 
given the costs and benefits to the U.S., the war in Afghanistan has been worth fighting while 
44% said the war in Iraq was worth it (Pew 2011: 8). Only 34% said both wars have been worth 
fighting while 33% said neither have been worth the costs (Pew 2011: 9). Additionally, of the 
post-9/11 veterans polled, 51% believe that “relying too much on military force creates hatred 
that leads to more terrorism,” mirroring 52% of civilians who agree that military interventions do 
not reduce terrorism (Pew 2011: 9). More recently, a survey of active-duty troops found 55% of 
respondents said they strongly oppose or somewhat oppose the U.S. government’s continued 
involvement in nation-building efforts using U.S. military and financial support (Tilghman 2016: 
1). The majority of respondent believed the U.S. should be more engaged in direct counter-
terrorism activities (62%), homeland defense (68%), cyber security (81%) and nuclear deterrence 
(51%) instead of distributing foreign aid, conducting “stability operations” and participating in 
conventional oversees military missions (Tilghman 2016: 1). Given such sentiments among 
current and former service members, it is not surprising that since the War on Terror began, 
organizations like Iraq Veterans against the War (IVAW), Gold Star Families for Peace, and 
Military Families Speak Out express concerns with America’s role in the world, how it uses its 
military and its service members to achieve its desired ends, and the negative effects military 
intervention has abroad and on the homefront. Recent literary works, such as Ben Fountain’s 
Billy Lynn’s Long Halftime Walk and Phil Klay’s Redeployment, echo these concerns.   
During my fieldwork, post-9/11 veterans expressed ambivalence toward the role of the 
United States as a global leader of freedom and peace. In discussing the differences between the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Gwen stated, “I just don’t want to believe it [the Iraq War] was for 
nothing. I wasn’t in Afghanistan and that was a totally different animal. But at the same time, 
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women do go to school now. Isn’t that a good thing?  We obviously didn’t bring them [Afghanis] 
any freedom.” Often, justifications for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan stemmed from the 
trauma of participating in and witnessing the loss of life on a mass scale and coping with mental 
and physical injuries. Gwen commented on the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 
and the capturing of Iraqi cities in 2014:  
I was in Mosul [Iraq] for a year of my life and Mosul’s gone. Why was I even 
there? You know that kid I told you that got shot in the head? Like, who is 
probably still a vegetable or completely incapacitated…for that. And now it’s 
gone. It’s upsetting if you admit that it [the Iraq War] was for absolutely no 
reason. I think the reasons we ended up going in [Iraqi government possessed 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs)] were wrong, but to say it’s pointless 
means that everyone who got killed in Iraq died for nothing. And I find it very 
difficult to say that. Or to agree, to think that that’s the case. I have to believe that 
there was some good that came out of it. 
 
What could justify such sacrifices? Gwen was unable to find a suitable explanation, particularly 
when comparing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan with previous conflicts that were widely 
supported. She argued:  
It [the Iraq War] isn’t like WWII where people really backed—there was a sense 
of patriotic duty to get involved in WWII. But [today] they romanticize the image 
of America’s involvement in these conflicts despite the fact that we obviously 
have ulterior motives for everything we do. You know, we let genocide happen in 
one place, but we want to stop it in another, the media’s used for this. But 
compared to a civilian—yeah, I was there. It’s easy to just condemn it—to 
condemn our involvement when you weren’t actually there to see some of the 
positive that came out of it. 
 
Similarly, Greg questioned the objectives of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
He highlighted how the military, the U.S. government, and the media manipulate Americans to 
believe in the value of war-making. Specifically, he spoke to the ways military training, which is 
rife with nationalist rhetoric, shapes how service members think and behave. It ensures that they 
uncritically follow orders established by the chain of command and obey and defend the military, 
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and by extension, the nation. Greg described Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE), 
a program that provides U.S. military personnel with training in evading capture, survival skills, 
and the military code of conduct. He discussed how military training ensures acquiring the skills 
necessary to complete missions as well as linking what occurs during missions to protecting the 
nation: He stated:  
One of the trainings I went through was called SERE. God forbid, I’m captured, I 
need to know how to handle myself. Once you’re turned into like a slave or 
worker, the training’s winding down. These guys line you up and they’re yelling 
at you in broken English, ‘Salute the flag. You salute our flag. Not America’s 
flag.’ Right? Everyone’s refusing—you know, all the crap. And at the very end 
(when you’ve successfully resisted), they drop the American flag and they start 
playing the Star-Spangled Banner. You know what I mean? So, it’s like this kind 
of atmosphere—they just want you to believe that whatever you do is the right 
thing for the country. 
 
Greg concludes that the purpose of military training is to control service members’ behaviors as 
well as their emotions while in the field, making sure to get back home. He argued:  
Don’t forget that that training is laced in with all the killing and how you knife 
somebody. ‘This is how you put somebody down.’ So, when you’re leaving—I 
mean, you kiss the wife and kids goodbye. I’m going to go kill 30 people. You 
know? You’re fighting for your wife. You’re fighting for America. You’re 
fighting for the cornerstone of what is democracy. I’m protecting you, which 
sometimes I go to McDonald’s and I’m like, ‘I protected you?’ It’s just for 
control. That’s all it is. There’s some smart, psychological people working for the 
military.  
 
Despite national trends, Greg and Gwen were the only veterans at the College of Staten 
Island (CSI) who expressed any doubts in America’s exceptionalism, which they did privately 
during their confidential interviews with me at the end of fieldwork. The existing literature 
suggests that there are negative social, financial, and psychological consequences when veterans 
question the military, war-making, and the role of service members in U.S. conflicts. 
Specifically, they experience legal and career-associated risks and alienation from fellow 
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veterans, family members, and friends that often results in questioning their self-image and 
identity (Leitz 2014: 5). For example, Leitz (2014) argues that the stigma associated with anti-
war activism among veterans is rooted in the shared belief among former service members that if 
a veteran actively questions and rejects the military and U.S. foreign policy, they become 
traitors, betraying the nation they swore to defend upon enlistment. During my fieldwork, the 
debates around the establishment of the Army Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) on the 
CSI campus highlighted how CSI student veterans did not privately or publicly share their 
experiences of U.S. foreign intervention and its complex and problematic effects abroad and on 
the homefront. Instead, by defending the nation-state as exceptional in spite of it all, CSI 
veterans were ultimately defending their military service in an era in which the United States’ 
foreign policy and its affects abroad and in the homefront are questioned and contested. 
 
ROTC Debate in Context: Income Inequality and Anti-Militarization Activism in New York City 
On September 24, 2013, I attended the ROTC Town Hall with student veterans and the 
Veterans’ Office staff. This event was organized by the college administration to provide a 
platform for members of the community to debate whether the ROTC should be established at 
the CSI campus, which is part of the City University of New York (CUNY). Before we entered 
the auditorium, the tone for the event was set. Security guards stood by the entrance of the 
auditorium, indicating to community members that they needed to sign up to speak either in 
favor of or against the ROTC program.  Once inside, the panelists17 took their places on the dais, 
three panelists in favor of the ROTC and three against it. The CSI Provost began the event, 
calling on panelists and audience members to participate in the discussion with the hope of 
exchanging ideas. Panelists were given five minutes while audience members were given two 
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minutes to speak, alternating between opposing viewpoints on the ROTC program. 
Unfortunately, this structure created two positions, either pro or con, resulting in two parallel 
frameworks that left little room for discussion. CSI faculty argued that the ROTC program is an 
extension of the military, which is a predatory institution that not only negatively shapes U.S. 
society but also creates and maintains an expansive, powerful, and abusive empire.  Former 
ROTC students, veterans, and current ROTC cadets discussed the benefits of the ROTC program 
given student concerns with economic and social mobility. The opposing viewpoints present at 
the town hall reflected wider debates concerning income inequality and anti-militarization 
throughout New York City, particularly evident across CUNY campuses.  
Before starting my fieldwork, as a CUNY PhD graduate student, I was aware that student 
activists influenced by the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement founded their own 
organizations, such as Occupy CUNY, and organized in solidarity with OWS, echoing other 
conversations about inequity in the city. They sought to prevent university policies that went 
against student interests, such as planned tuition hikes as well as the return of military officer 
recruitment on campuses via the ROTC. Beginning in September 2011, the OWS movement’s 
slogan We are the 99% served to highlight economic inequality, specifically the wealth 
distribution between the wealthiest one percent and the rest of the U.S. population. This message 
resonated strongly with college students because of the crippling size of student loan debt in the 
United States. As of May 2013, outstanding student loan debt reached $1.2 trillion (Chopra 
2013). Along with staggering debt, the economic recession that began in 2008 greatly affected 
young adults, particularly in regards to gaining employment. The unemployment rate of workers 
under the age of 24 was 14.5%, compared to the overall unemployment rate of 6.7% (BLS 2014).  
Activism within New York City was not limited to economic inequality; it also tackled 
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the related process of militarization, the “step-by-step process by which a person or a thing 
gradually comes to be controlled by the military or comes to depend for its well-being on 
militaristic ideas” (Enloe 2000: 3). For those who identify with anti-militarization, the military is 
an institution that exploits the resources of the nation it claims to protect by convincing citizens 
that the military’s actions are valuable, necessary, and essential to the nation’s survival and 
security (Lutz 2001; Enloe 2000). Within New York City, the anti-militarization movement was 
most evident on college campuses. CUNY students protested the appointment of David Petraeus, 
former four-star Army general and director of the CIA, as Visiting Professor of Public Policy at 
Macaulay Honors College, CUNY. The Ad Hoc Committee Against the Militarization of CUNY, 
composed of both CUNY students and faculty members, held demonstrations, arguing that the 
university was endorsing militarization by hiring Petraeus, a war criminal owing to cases of 
torture and civilian deaths under his command (Hogness 2013; Gabbatt 2013; Peralta 2013). 
Student activism also centered on opposing the implementation of CUNY ROTC programs, 
arguing that the ROTC was a Department of Defense (DOD) recruitment program that serves to 
militarize colleges and universities and disproportionately targets low-income and working-class 
students (Petersen 2013).    
Despite its geographic and political isolation, Staten Island’s residents were also 
concerned with the rise of militarization and economic inequality. On the surface, the student-led 
CUNY anti-militarization organizing seemed distant from the CSI campus, since most of the 
protest and action was centered in Manhattan, the economic, political, and intellectual capital of 
New York City. Historically, Staten Island has been the outlier among the boroughs of New 
York City. Often called the “forgotten borough,” Staten Island is remembered particularly for the 
uproar over the Fresh Kills landfill, New York City's principal landfill from the 1960s until its 
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closing in 2001, and the delay it experienced in receiving aid and assistance during the 
devastating Superstorm Sandy in 2012. These are just two examples of the city government’s 
neglect. Anger toward city government reached its peak in a 1993 referendum in which 63% of 
voters sought secession from New York- an action blocked by the State Assembly (Kramer and 
Flanagan 2012). Staten Island is also the most conservative borough, which some explain by the 
fact that the majority of its residents, roughly 68%, are homeowners compared to residents of 
other New York City boroughs (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009-2013). Yet, through fieldwork, I 
discovered that the CSI campus community was also struggling with the realities of economic 
inequality and militarization. This was most evident in the polarizing debates I witnessed on the 
CSI campus around the possibility of establishing an ROTC program 
 
A Brief History of the ROTC 
The ROTC is a college-based program for training commissioned officers of the United 
States Armed Forces. Although officers in the military come from other avenues, such as the 
military service academies, Officer Candidate School (OCS), and direct commissions, the ROTC 
produces a considerable percentage of military officers. In 2011, 48% of officers in the Army, 
the largest branch of the military, were ROTC graduates (DMDC 2012). While pursuing a four-
year college degree program, ROTC cadets take 24 elective credits from coursework that focuses 
on leadership, critical thinking, and communication skills. Specifically, the coursework focuses 
on technical military skills, such as navigation, tactics and strategies, as well as cultural 
awareness and ethics. Students participating in the ROTC are eligible for scholarships that cover 
tuition, room and board, fees, and books as well as a monthly stipend. After graduation, students 
are commissioned as officers, specifically second lieutenants, for an eight-year period of service. 
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Most ROTC graduates serve three years on active duty and five years in a reserve component. 
For ROTC graduates who received an ROTC scholarship or completed the ROTC Advanced 
Course, their eight-year term can be fulfilled by serving four years on active duty and four years 
in the Individual Ready Reserve, a reserve component that allows the military to activate an 
individual to active duty anytime due to personnel shortages and/or conflicts.     
Although military training existed on college campuses, specifically among land grant 
universities since the early 1800s, with the passing of the National Defense Act (NDA) of 1916 
the federal government established the ROTC program. With the threat of entering World War I 
and fears of border insecurity, the ROTC program not only created a body of additional officers 
but was perceived to instill patriotism, encourage national service, and ensure that civilians could 
impact the staffing and operation of a professional military (Neiberg 2001). By the end of WWI, 
the ROTC program began to experience pushback by those who viewed the program as 
endorsing military ethics and values among civilians. In 1925, various secular and religious 
organizations formed the Committee on Militarism in Education in order to end compulsory 
military training among ROTC cadets at land grant university campuses. They argued that “If the 
habit [of warfare] were broken, humanity would make some other response besides violence 
when the causes of conflict appeared” (Neiberg 2001: 30). Academics argued, “Traditional 
higher education had more to offer toward [national security] than did military training” 
(Neiberg 2001: 36). Alternatively, other educators, such as the former president of Harvard 
University, Nathan Pusey, viewed the ROTC as a program that not only allowed students to 
discharge their military obligation without interrupting their education but also provided the 
military with educated citizens having leadership potential (Neiberg 2001: 36). 
With the outbreak of World War II and the rise of the Cold War, ROTC programs 
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became a staple at U.S. universities. Due to the nature of war in the atomic age, the military 
argued the need for college educated and technologically sophisticated service members. 
Universities not only received government funding but were also tapped to put the nation’s best 
scientific minds and their university training at the military’s disposal; in that period, 45% of all 
computer science graduate students received federal support from the Pentagon and 25% of 
scientists and engineers worked on military projects (Network of Concerned Anthropologists 
2009). Through ROTC programs, universities received DOD funding to prepare young men to 
become officers and future productive workers. By the start of the Korean War, the ROTC 
became the primary means of producing large numbers of active duty officers. Additionally, 
support was widespread because of the potential backlash and severe repercussions towards 
those who opposed or critiqued the military. At the height of the McCarthy era, the National 
Defense Education Act of 1958 required all federal grant winners to sign an oath of allegiance to 
the United States. Securing and/or endorsing a campus ROTC program gave “supporters a 
patriotic justification for their position and opponents an incentive to remain quiescent” (Neiberg 
2001: 42). Despite these pressures, university faculty and educators did critique the ROTC 
program; not only did they desire more oversight over the ROTC coursework, but they argued 
that the program’s emphasis on military training, skills, and values were in tension with 
universities’ policies and teaching methods. 
During the Vietnam War, as causalities mounted and U.S. war crimes came to light, 
opposition to the war increased, particularly on college campuses. However, ROTC enrollment 
grew at the beginning of the war, as college students sought to avoid conscription. As the war 
dragged on, drafting young Americans into an unpopular conflict, the ROTC would experience 
campus opposition. The ROTC came to represent the military on campus due to the visibility of 
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drill, military ceremony, and uniforms, making cadets and their officers targets of anti-war and 
anti-militarization activism on campuses across the U.S.  Along with critiquing the college-
military pipeline created by the ROTC, student activists highlighted the tension between the 
military’s goals and the purpose of a university education. For example, Students for a 
Democratic Society argued that the ROTC “is not only antithetical to the ultimate purposes of 
higher education, but contrary to basic pedagogical principles as well [because of] the 
unquestioning submissiveness endemic in the rigidly hierarchical structure of military education” 
(Neiberg 2001: 44). Despite the prevalence of activism on campuses, the majority of college 
students were not anti-military. The 1969 National College Poll found that “60 percent of the 
nation’s undergraduates believed that America was wrong in sending troops to Vietnam but that 
80 percent were at the same time in favor of voluntary ROTC programs” (Neiberg 2001: 122). 
Along with concerns about militarization and war, faculty and administrators questioned 
the role of the ROTC in higher education, specifically highlighting the tension between the 
structure and purpose of the ROTC program and university governance and objectives. The 
Benson Committee, created by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and chaired by the President 
of Claremont College, George Benson, concluded that the “ROTC is the only instructional 
program on campus whose curriculum and method of instruction is largely determined by an 
external body, whose instructional staff is furnished by one external source, and which prepares 
young men for a single employer” (Neiberg 2001: 94). As a result, universities, primarily in the 
northeast, such as the Ivy League universities as well as CUNY, sought to end the program. 
Queens College, Brooklyn College, and City College shut down their ROTC programs 
respectively in 1960, 1966, and 1972. Opposition to the ROTC continued throughout the 1980s 
until the early 2000s due to continued concerns over militarization as well as military policies 
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that were not in accordance with campus policies. For example, after the Clinton administration 
established Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT) in 1993, Ivy League universities continued to bar 
ROTC programs since DADT violated their anti-discrimination policies (Lewin and Hartocollis 
2010). Even with the ROTC’s absence, the military continued to exert influence at universities 
and colleges primarily through DOD research funding and grants (Giroux 2007; Network of 
Concerned Anthropologists 2009). After 40 years, universities, including CUNY and others in 
the Northeast such as Harvard, Yale, and Columbia, welcomed the ROTC with the end of DADT 
(Dao 2012; Gomez 2013).  
During my fieldwork, City College was the CUNY headquarters for the university-wide 
ROTC initiative, which included York College and Medgar Evers College as well as plans to 
establish a program at CSI. Major General Jeff Smith, commander of the U.S. Army Cadet 
Command, stated during the program announcement in May 2013 that implementing the ROTC 
within CUNY “could contribute significantly to the racial, ethnic and geographic diversity that 
makes our Army strong” (CUNY May 2013: 1). How would this strengthen the military? 
Colonel Scott Heintzelman, Brigade Commander of the U.S. Army Cadet Command, argued that 
ROTC programs must be present in urban areas since the majority of cadets are white men from 
the Midwest and the South. If officers come from a narrow segment of society, the military fails 
to reflect the diversity within the U.S. population and lacks the strategic insights of service 
members from countries where current U.S. military operations are taking place (Miller 2011). 
Given that the CUNY student population is mostly women and people of color and has high rates 
of foreign-born and working-class students (CUNY 2012 and 2016), CUNY, the largest urban 
public university in the country, was an ideal site to establish the ROTC. Retired four-star 
general Colin Powell, graduate of the City College ROTC program and former Chairman of the 
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Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of State, observed that “ROTC gave me structure and a 
passion to do my best and serve my country. City College started me off as a good second 
lieutenant. I just built on the great start I got here in Harlem at this marvelous citadel of 
education — The City College of New York. I am so pleased that ROTC has returned to prepare 
new generations of leaders” (CUNY May 2013: 1). Yet, not all praised the ROTC’s return to 
CUNY. Like their counterparts in past eras, a contingent of CUNY faculty members strongly 
opposed the ROTC program due to concerns with academic freedom and militarization.  
 
Anti-ROTC: Protecting Academic Freedom and Fighting Militarization   
According to David Price (2004), since the early 20th century, the principle of academic 
freedom18 protects individuals to “pursue academic enquiries independent of the political or 
economic controversies or consequences derived from their work” (18). Since 1915, academic 
freedom within the United States has been codified and promoted by the American Association 
of University Professors19 (AAUP) and reaffirmed by U’S courts. Unfortunately, academic 
freedom is not a right but a privilege that can be severely limited or taken away if faculty 
members fail to act or think responsibly. What is considered responsible is socially defined; this 
is particularly evident in moments of crisis when pacifist and/or activist faculty members are 
critiqued and their loyalties are questioned, silencing necessary debate. During WWII and the 
Cold War era, government research funds and Congressional hearings served to silence the 
“communist” and the “socialist” within academia (Price 2004, 2008). With the Vietnam War, 
conservative think tanks were established to oppose the influence of faculty members who began 
to question U.S. empire (e.g., Post-Colonial Studies) and write histories from below (e.g., 
Howard Zinn) (Schueller and Dawson 2009). In the post-9/11 era, a large number of well-funded 
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conservative think tanks have policed university policies and classroom content that conflict with 
the War on Terror created in response to the September 11th terrorist attacks (Giroux 2007; 
Schueller and Dawson 2009). When coupled with neoliberal educational reforms, such as a 
decrease in tenured appointments, an increase in hiring adjunct labor, and the establishment of 
programs funded and directly accountable to corporations and/or the federal government (e.g., 
STEM programs, ROTC), institutional governance and autonomy are constrained, limiting 
academic freedom (Schueller and Dawson 2009; Giroux 2014).  
During CSI’s ROTC Town Hall, faculty members questioned the role of the ROTC in 
higher education, specifically the tension between the structure and purpose of the ROTC 
program and university governance and objectives. Specifically, faculty members highlighted the 
university administration’s attempt to implement the ROTC without consulting the faculty, 
which they argued infringed on shared governance necessary for academic freedom. Upon 
hearing of the administration’s plan to implement the ROTC program on campus, CSI faculty 
requested a white paper in order to get a clearer picture of the program. Instead, the university 
administration directed them to read Underserved: A Case Study of ROTC in New York City, a 
report written by the conservative non-profit think tank American Enterprise Institute (AEI 
2011), whose mission is to “defend the principles and improve the institutions of American 
freedom and democratic capitalism—limited government, private enterprise, individual 
liberty and responsibility, vigilant and effective defense and foreign policies, political 
accountability, and open debate” (Cox 2010: 54). Despite acknowledging the limits of the 
ROTC’s one size fits all programming, AEI argued that due to the quantity and quality of 
JROTC programs within New York City high schools and the diversity among the city’s 
population, the military is not accessing the potential minority officers needed to reflect the 
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diversity within the U.S. population as well as to diversify the military’s senior level rank. Along 
with the AEI report, a fact sheet was provided in February 2013, outlining how New York City 
would serve as the pilot city for ROTC programs in urban centers. At the time of the distribution 
of the fact sheet, Staten Island had the most JROTC programs in New York City; of the 14 
JROTC programs within New York City public schools, five programs were in Staten Island 
(Lore 2014). If successful, the military planned to replicate the CUNY ROTC program in 
Chicago, which is home to over 35 JROTC programs.  
CSI faculty argued that the implementation of the ROTC program lacked consistency 
within CUNY campuses. At York College the administration followed university governance 
protocols to determine whether the ROTC program belonged on campus. Student veterans 
played an active role in getting the ROTC program approved by York College’s College Senate, 
discussing the benefits they experienced as ROTC cadets and service members in the Armed 
Forces. While some York College faculty members were against the program since they had 
come of age during the Vietnam War, others supported the program because many students 
interested in the ROTC were from traditionally underrepresented groups. As ROTC cadets, these 
students could socially and economically improve their lives. Given concerns that students may 
not read the fine print before committing to the ROTC and enlisting in the Armed Forces, a York 
College faculty member decided to participate in the curriculum committee to ensure that the 
ROTC curriculum, featuring military science and military history coursework, focused on critical 
thinking. Ultimately, the college curriculum committee approved the ROTC courses, which at 
the time of my fieldwork were taught in the history department by York College professors, not 
ROTC instructors. This type of collaboration between faculty, administration, students and 
veterans did not take place at CSI.  
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Additionally, during the ROTC Town Hall, faculty members argued the lack of 
collaboration and consultation surrounding the implementation of the ROTC was not an anomaly 
but symptomatic of a wider problem. They claimed that academic freedom was in danger at 
CUNY given that many faculty members felt they have been isolated from participating in 
decisions that affect their campuses and that their power to determine and shape curriculum was 
being limited. During the town hall, they did not provide the context for academic freedom 
within CUNY since the debate around academic freedom was well understood among faculty 
members and administrators. Since 2011, CUNY faculty members were engaged in a battle over 
academic freedom with the Chancellor and Board of Trustees over the implementation of 
Pathways20, a system of general education requirements and transfer guidelines. After a 
resolution passed by the CUNY Board of Trustees in June 2011, the CUNY central 
administration unilaterally developed Pathways without faculty governance and instead hand 
selected faculty members to participate in the process (Vitale 2014). Faculty senates across 
CUNY, as well as the Professional Staff Congress (PSC), the union that represents more than 
25,000 faculty and staff at CUNY, academic discipline councils, academic departments, and 
instructional staff called for a repeal or at a minimum a moratorium on Pathways21 (Vitale 2014). 
Along with the defense of academic freedom, anti-ROTC CSI faculty’s aim was to 
highlight how the goals of the university are at odds with the goals of the ROTC program and by 
extension the U.S. military. They argued that though the stated purpose of the military is national 
defense, throughout its history it has frequently acted beyond this capacity. Their arguments 
align with academics across disciplines who assert that the United States has employed its 
military for purposes other than protecting its borders and people against acts of aggression from 
other nation-states. It has expanded and annexed territories at the expense of indigenous 
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populations, established economic and foreign policies that support unpopular governments 
abroad while serving U.S. interests, and established a worldwide network of military bases that 
disrupt and displace life for local populations, creating an expansive and powerful American 
empire (Hardt and Negri 2001; McCaffrey 2002; Chomsky 2003; Harvey 2005; Wallerstein 
2003; Zinn 2003; Lutz 2006, 2009; Vine 2009). CSI faculty members discussed invasions and 
war crimes against Native Americans, Vietnamese, Panamanians, Iraqis, etc. They also pointed 
to discriminatory policies and practices that negatively impact the lives of U.S. service members, 
including the dishonorable discharge of transmen and transwomen (Palm Center 2014) and high 
rates of military sexual assaults that are under reported due to fear of retribution or inaction 
(USCCR 2013; Torreon 2013). Citing the victimization of those abroad and those within their 
ranks by the U.S. military, an English professor asked what the college would gain from having 
the ROTC program on campus. Another faculty member stated, “When CSI invites the U.S. 
military to be on our campus, we are basically endorsing what the U.S. military does.” An Army 
veteran and anti-ROTC Town Hall panelist emphasized that in order to change the military as an 
institution, we must abstain from participating in it.  
Faculty members made it very clear that all institutions look to impart values, but that 
unlike the military, the college looks to inform student values that ensure institutional goals as 
well as improve students’ lives and the well-being of the society. A professor in the Performing 
and Creative Arts Department argued that the aim of educational institutions is to prepare 
students to become capable leaders with critical thinking skills to solve problems via non-violent 
means, while the military produces “leaders” who follow orders. The two Army veterans on the 
panel echoed this point; they concluded that the military creates a mentality in which the 
individual must follow orders to achieve the military's number one goal, which is mission 
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success. Consequently, critical thinking is limited to the military brass while the officers and 
enlisted in the field must take orders without question. Although some faculty members did point 
out that ultimately students should have the choice to enlist, the consensus among CSI faculty 
was that the university’s obligation is to educate students so that they can make informed 
decisions, not facilitate the military enlistment process. By allowing the ROTC on campus, 
faculty members stated the college would be introducing military values that ultimately conflict 
with educational values, implying that CSI would be doing a disservice to students by 
militarizing the campus. 
The faculty’s critique of the ROTC as an extension of the military into civilian life 
coincides with the anti-militarization movement among CUNY activists discussed above as well 
as anthropologists’ analysis of militarization. According to Lutz (2001), militarization is a social 
process in which civil society is organized around preparations for war and war-making, shaping 
and synchronizing society’s ideological values and institutions with the military’s values and 
goals. She and McCaffrey (2002) contend that the media, government, and businesses sharing 
the interests of the military create a society in which military ideals become naturalized. In part, 
this is done by promoting structure, discipline, personal responsibility, and sacrifice as military 
values in civilian institutions, such as in public education through JROTC and ROTC programs 
(Pérez 2009). However, structure, discipline, personal responsibility, and sacrifice are also 
neoliberal values. As discussed above, along with infringing on academic freedom and university 
governance, neoliberal policies allocate investments and resources away from social welfare 
initiatives and services. Consequently, militarized programs that offer Federal investment and 
infrastructure, such as the JROTC and ROTC, serve to “address the social consequences of 
neoliberalism, which has severely circumscribed the economic livelihoods of working and 
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middle-class families,” by providing economic mobility (Pérez 2009). Additionally, they claim 
to provide opportunities for social mobility, equipping low income, women, and minority 
students with the skills and experiences necessary to transition to secondary education, the 
workforce, and/or the military (Pérez 2009). Thus, for the CSI faculty members at the Town 
Hall, their opposition to the ROTC program was rooted in defending CUNY students, who 
disproportionally come from low-income households and as a result may look to improve their 
social and economic capital through higher education and/or the military.  
 
Pro-ROTC: Training, Skills, and Opportunity for Struggling CUNY Students 
During the town hall, panelists in favor of the ROTC did not directly address the issues of 
militarization and academic freedom brought up by CSI faculty members, focusing instead on 
the “positives” of becoming an ROTC cadet. They noted that ROTC’s physical training and 
coursework teaches cadets skills, such as leadership, ethics, and critical thinking as well as 
instruction on military history, military science, and world cultures, which are valuable for 
military and civilian careers. They also highlighted how many ROTC cadets receive full or 
partial scholarships, a monthly stipend, and a book allowance. Upon enlistment, ROTC cadets 
graduate with little to no debt and can enlist to begin a career in the military as an officer (i.e., 
second lieutenant). Through participation in the ROTC, Colonel Scott Heintzelman, Brigade 
Commander of the U.S. Army Cadet Command, argued that “as an Army officer, you get 
upward career mobility, you get competitive skills for the future, and you’re really equipped to 
succeed in life.”  
Audience members in favor of the ROTC were CSI students who were former JROTC 
cadets from Staten Island and Brooklyn high schools. Through college prep courses and STEM 
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classes, JROTC cadets worked on self-esteem, leadership, and discipline, becoming high-
performing students. A student speaker, a freshman pre-nursing major at CSI who spent her four 
years in high school as Junior ROTC cadet, echoed the colonel’s argument that the ROTC 
programs produce leaders. She stated: “The leadership traits I learned, I can take them 
anywhere.” As a result of gaining confidence and learning structure through the JROTC 
program, she planned to enlist in the Navy after graduating college. While some students 
acknowledged being heavily bombarded with recruitment materials and speeches, they felt the 
JROTC was not an enlistment mill since they ultimately had the choice to join or continue on to 
college. Given their positive experiences, some questioned the patriotism of those who were 
against the ROTC, stating if they were against ROTC they were anti-war and as a result did not 
support the military, service members, and veterans. 
Not one CSI student veteran spoke during the two-hour town hall. The silent walk back to 
the Veterans’ Office was punctuated by the sound of restrained tears and retorts of “Why were 
they talking about us like that? Why don't civilians understand us?” Cramming into the 100 
square foot Veterans’ Office, they tried to calm down. Many felt blindsided by the tone of the 
event. Brittany, a veteran of the Navy and Coast Guard, and Gwen, an Army veteran, felt that the 
town hall became an anti-military forum. Other CSI student veterans in attendance felt faculty 
members dominated the discussion, pushing an anti-war stance that was informed by what they 
believed was an outdated paradigm of the Cold War, specifically the Vietnam War. By critiquing 
U.S. foreign policy and military conflicts, they felt faculty members were also attacking those 
who serve. It did not help that anti-war activists in attendance called service members and 
veterans’ baby killers and warmongers during the ROTC town hall.  
When I questioned why they felt faculty members were anti-service members, student 
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veterans pointed to faculty members claiming that service members are brainwashed. Gwen 
argued that service members are adults who chose to serve their country, whether out of a 
patriotic desire and/or socioeconomic need, and this decision should be respected. Brittany stated 
that attending the ROTC town hall left her feeling ambivalent about her service — that perhaps it 
was in vain if those who have not served do not value those who served in the Armed Forces.  
Unlike the student veterans, Marie, the Veterans Office director, believed that it was not faculty 
members’ intent to offend. She acknowledged that faculty concerns regarding academic freedom 
should be taken seriously. Yet, she asked why faculty members were not as passionate about the 
factors that ultimately lead students to join a program like ROTC. Although many young men 
and women want to serve their country out of a sense of patriotism, many who join the military 
often face serious economic and social difficulties. Losing sight of faculty members’ argument 
that the militarization of education via ROTC programs preys on the socioeconomically 
marginal, Marie felt faculty members were focusing their energies on an ethical concern, which 
seemed to be misplaced energy given that students must face predatory student loans and 
military recruitment. 
Marie and the CSI student veterans concluded that faculty members opposing the ROTC 
should have focused their talking point on the pros and cons of the ROTC program, ignoring the 
goal shared amongst faculty members present at the ROTC Town Hall: to block the 
implementation of the ROTC. Given their arguments against the ROTC in a public forum, CSI 
faculty members positioned themselves within the tradition of U.S. intellectuals engaging in anti-
war activism, looking to delegitimize the status quo (e.g., the university administration and the 
military) in order to inform and reshape subjectivities as well as official narratives about the 
nation and its citizens (Gramsci 1972; Foucault 1980; Bourdieu 1985; Verdery 1991; Said 1994, 
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2004). Many of the CSI faculty members explicitly stated during the ROTC Town Hall that they 
either came of age during the Vietnam War or were inspired by anti-war activists in that era, 
influencing how they understood the current militarization of CUNY campuses. By focusing on 
the militarization of education, faculty members pointed to limits on academic freedom and 
shared governance that negatively affects everyone on campus as well as the predatory nature of 
recruitment via the ROTC by funneling students with limited social and economic capital into a 
military that serves to maintain American empire.  Given the strong response to the Town Hall 
among student veterans, I suggested that veterans should engage with their campus community. 
Marie reached out to the CSI administration with the student veterans’ concerns and their desire 
to discuss the ROTC program with administrators, faculty, and other students. This dialogue 
never occurred: the administration did not follow up with Marie’s email and the student veterans 
did not take the initiative to make their views known individually or through the student veteran 
run Armed Forces Club.  
In the weeks and months following the Town Hall, the college administration attempted 
to determine campus interest in the ROTC. The Provost sent an administration-wide email 
stating that the ROTC Town Hall “was characterized by a civil discourse where divergent 
positions were exchanged. The feedback I have received to date is that those who attended felt 
all attendees were given the opportunity to express their views and that the afternoon was 
informative.” He not only encouraged feedback via email but also suggested that the issue be 
raised at the Faculty Senate in order to determine the needs and wants of the campus community. 
Additionally, student government sent a survey to gauge student interest in establishing an 
ROTC program on campus. Only three out of eighty-three students who participated in the 
survey expressed interest in joining an ROTC program. By the end of the Fall 2013 semester, the 
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Provost updated the campus community on issues pertaining to Academic Affairs. He noted that 
one of the most controversial issues confronted by the college was the ROTC. Despite the “very 
thorough campus-wide discussion on ROTC, where input was received from all campus sectors,” 
the President of the college “has not received a specific request from any department or program 
to house ROTC and therefore, at this time, no decision need be made on this issue.” By 
representing a united front at the ROTC town hall debate, anti-militarization and pro-academic 
freedom faculty members were successful in blocking the creation of the ROTC via targeted 
political action.  
 In seeking to better understand why faculty members’ critique of the U.S. military at the 
ROTC Town Hall was understood and experienced as an attack on current and former service 
members, I conducted one-on-one confidential interviews with CSI students.  In these 
confidential interviews, I explored the possible contradictory and confusing views about military 
service and American foreign policy among CSI veterans without the possible negative 
consequences of expressing these views among their peers. In spite of the tension between the 
realities of U.S. foreign policy and the nationalist rhetoric that exalts the nation-state, the CSI 
student veterans I interviewed held strongly to American exceptionalism. 
 
Serving the Exceptional Nation-State in the Post-9/11 Era 
When describing military service, CSI veterans shared the same viewpoints as CSI 
faculty members and scholars studying militarization: the military emphasizes structure, 
discipline, and sacrifice to produce soldiers who follow orders and think critically within the 
parameters outlined by their commanders. CSI veterans described service members as ‘GIs’ or 
‘Government Issued’; since the 1940s this term has been used to refer to anyone in the military, 
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but CSI student veterans employed its pejorative connotation to describe themselves as property 
of the U.S. military. Not only does this term imply that they felt as disposable as equipment, but 
it also highlights the lack of agency former service members experienced in the service. Once in 
the military, service members cannot simply leave or quit, unless formally discharged from the 
military due to health issues or a law breaking offense. Military service requires signing a 
contract and taking an oath22, which legally obligates service members to complete the terms of 
the contract and obey the orders of the officers appointed over them or their chain of command. 
The military’s chain of command is a complex hierarchy of joint command and control functions 
with many units reporting to various commanding officers, beginning with the President through 
the Secretary of Defense down to the lowest military rank (i.e. Private, Airman basic, or Seaman 
recruit) (DOD 2010).  
For many of the veterans I interviewed during my fieldwork, the chain of command was 
an imposing structure. Greg, a veteran of the U.S. Navy, stated that, “The only bad stuff, 
honestly, was the structure. I hated having to do things when I knew they weren’t right. Not in a 
moral sense because I wasn’t put in a situation such as that, but just listening to people that don’t 
have the best intent in mind. And that bothered me like no other. That was the worst thing to 
cope with.” Greg further pointed out that if he was in a civilian workplace he could “go put a 
gripe in the suggestion box and be on my way,” but in the military, there was no room for 
complaints and suggestions. Because of this imposing command structure, orders shape service 
member’s actions. For example, veterans explained how regardless of a service member’s 
military occupational specialty, whether an infantry soldier, technician, human resources 
personnel, or a networking specialist, deployment to a war zone was a command decision. Marie, 
a veteran of the U.S. Army, explained, “You have no choice, you know? Some people volunteer 
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for active duty to be deployed but most people don’t. Like, you just end up deployed.”  
Others explained the frustrating and life changing effects of their commanding officers’ 
whims. Gwen, who rarely spoke ill of her commanders and peers, described how her first 
sergeant punished the entire company a few months before a yearlong deployment because a few 
soldiers were caught driving under the influence of alcohol. She described, “In between our 
deployments, some soldiers got a DUI and he made everyone do deployment in garrison, 
meaning we were working from 5am until 9 at night. We’re about to deploy again to Iraq in a 
few months. To take time away from people’s families when they’re about to go away for 
another year was really heartless.” One of Gwen’s fellow service members, who was pregnant at 
the time, dared to complain to the first sergeant about not seeing her children during the 
deployment in garrison. His response: “[the first sergeant] wiggs out on her and she runs out 
crying. He slams his hand into a glass case and ends up with stitches.” Of course, there were no 
consequences for the first sergeant’s behavior or his decision to punish an entire company about 
to deploy due to the actions of a few soldiers.  
Along with complaining about chickenshit23, CSI student veterans described the realities 
of soldiering in a war zone as unpredictable, requiring service members to be on high alert to 
ensure mission success while avoiding serious injury and death. Will, who deployed to 
Afghanistan in a combat unit in 2010, argued that the infantryman’s life was extremely 
monotonous: “You patrol two times a day or maybe more depending how big our squad [is]. A 
lot of security, like, walk[ing] around. And that’s it really. That’s how it’s a job really. I guess 
it’s just like a cop. It’s like a dangerous neighborhood of New York.” However, the day-to-day 
routine during a deployment is punctuated by intense and often traumatic experiences. After 
particularly dangerous patrols, Will stated,  
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I guess it doesn’t hit us until we actually are walking back. We still try to stay 
focused. Don’t get lazy at the last hundred yards to the base because that’s when 
the worst stuff happens. So, we try to keep that in our heads. And then when we 
get back in, it’s like, ‘Hey, remember that guy—remember that thing we saw?’ 
‘Yeah! I wanted to tell you that for like two hours, man.’ There’s no time to 
mourn or anything like that because the enemy’s right there. He could take 
advantage of any moment that you’re not focused. 
 
Accompanying the constant fear of the “enemy” capitalizing on service members’ 
moments of “weakness,” CSI veterans also discussed the long-term effects of fear, violence, 
mourning, and death. During her deployment to Iraq, Gwen painfully described the day her unit 
experienced their first Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attack, which killed a fellow service 
member. Along with the shock of experiencing an IED attack and the sadness of losing a 
coworker and friend, Gwen and her fellow service members were tasked with the post-IED clean 
up. She stated, “His Kevlar was in the truck. And it had some of his head in it. So, I stare at it 
and it’s like, ‘Well, someone’s got to clean it,’ because they use it for the memorial where you 
put the helmet on top of the gun. So, we have to use his because the rest of us need ours. And 
that was it. And then we did his memorial the next day.” How does one move on from such an 
experience? Gwen explained, “I don’t remember a lot of it after that. I mean the rest of the time I 
was in Iraq is like a blur to me and that’s actually what it’s like though going forward. I started 
compartmentalizing everything after that, which makes life easier. You get very logical. Like, 
you store things and you continue on because you have to complete something, you know?” 
Despite their negative and traumatic experiences as well as living with continued 
economic precarity and limited social capital (as outlined in the introduction), many CSI veterans 
I interviewed stated that they did not regret their service and would do it all over again. The 
military gave their life direction and a purpose where they escaped poverty, unstable family 
lives, and the bad choices they had made as young adults, while gaining employment and an 
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education. For Ed, a veteran of the U.S. Marine Corps, the choices he made as a young adult, 
such as not taking advantage of a college scholarship, getting into trouble with the law, and 
excessive partying, led him to pursue military service in order to begin a new life, to start from 
scratch. He explained, “There was a lot of fucked up shit I was doing, so I had to get away from 
it, so I went in the military. Growing up, I was in junior ROTC in high school, which helped me 
kind of fix some of the problems I was having in junior high, so I figured, why not give it a shot 
again?” Similarly, Will learned that the military was an opportunity to leave a life of poverty and 
violence in the New York City projects. He explained: “I didn’t have money for school, so when 
the [military] recruiter came to me and told me all the benefits it appealed to me because it was 
like an escape route. You know, I had nothing growing up. At that time, I was kind of like 
defeated in myself. ‘What am I supposed to do with myself?’ And then the job [military service] 
itself gave me an option to get out. And gave me a purpose.” Another veteran, Greg, stated 
simply the heartbreaking logic behind enlistment as an escape: “…the reason why I joined. I had 
to leave. I mean, let’s just say the people I knew were disappearing! (Laughs). Who the hell 
wants to go and put their life—like, risk dying? Like, how bad does your life have to be if you’re 
okay with dying? Like, if I could do it with the American flag behind me, I’ll take a bullet. You 
know?” 
CSI veterans also argued that their military service contributed to aiding and supporting 
United States foreign policy, ensuring global security and peace while protecting U.S. national 
interests. After serving in the military, Greg concluded that the United States, with the support of 
its allies, uses its military to protect the globe. When asked why the United States needs 
hundreds of bases overseas, Greg explained, “They’re setting up bases to stake a claim, you 
know? Kind of like planting the flag and saying, ‘Hey, we’re here and don’t start shit.’” Given 
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their experiences in the military, CSI student veterans argued that U.S. military operations are 
often interpreted as serving only U.S. interests but elected officials and the military brass make 
decisions based on information that relates to national and global security, which citizens are not 
privy to.  In discussing how civilians perceive the Iraq War, Ed stated: 
What people don’t realize is that some things that are going on behind the scenes, 
especially at an international level, nobody else needs to know about. Normal, 
everyday people — not that they don’t deserve to — would not handle nor should 
they be forced to deal with some of the decisions that people have to make. If they 
were to announce the real reason, we would have to show our hand as to what 
intel we have. I mean, there’s Americans all over the world that have probably 
been there ten plus years to accomplish one task. 
 
In order to protect the U.S. and the globe, Greg argued that the U.S. must have “one of 
the biggest forces” to defend and control global affairs by “always strategically setting itself up 
to survive and to survive on top, in control. That’s what we do. What piece of property can we 
obtain, or can we monitor, or can we control that’s going to better suit us later on?” This is 
achieved by establishing a network of bases worldwide as well as improving our intelligence 
capabilities. For example, Greg discussed the advanced monitoring systems developed by the 
U.S. military in the Atlantic Ocean. He stated: 
Talk about having a [U.S.] base everywhere? I mean, for one of my jobs [before] I 
left [the military], we went to England and there’s a hub in one of the beachfront 
areas down on the southwestern tip of England. Imagine like cables—like 
telephone wire with all these smaller cables in there spread, spread out all the way 
over to the Virginia area. Those cables come out in the bottom of the ocean—they 
spread out and nest back in the Virginia area, right? We can monitor all the subs 
in the Atlantic Ocean. 
Gwen also pointed to weapons technology, specifically drones, as a means to “be the biggest kid 
on the block” and continue to be the “the strongest and most elite military in the world.” She 
argued that drones are also more efficient than boots on the ground since drones “make it so less 
people end up getting killed,” both civilians and combatants on both sides. Gwen accepted that 
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those who have not served in the military see things differently but “having been in the service, I 
know that there’s going to be people that are going to die because of these things. I’ve accepted 
that as part of going to war, that’s happening. So yes, I think I’ve become more pragmatic.” 
When questioned or pressed about the problems with U.S. foreign policy, CSI student 
veterans agreed that there are occasions when the United States should limit its role as the 
protector of freedom, liberty, and democracy. Ed acknowledged feeling bad for people living in 
countries with widespread abuses but that “we [Americans] have enough problems at home that 
we should be figuring out first before we spread ourselves thin” and that by having “opinions on 
what they do [Afghanis and Iraqis] and try[ing] to tell them how they should live their lives is 
why they hate us.” Gwen also pointed out that at times the U.S. should limit how it intervenes in 
“volatile” regions. She argued, “I don’t think America should necessarily say, ‘Oh yeah, we want 
democracy everywhere.’ We don’t want democracy everywhere… Using the Kurds as an 
example— we love that the Kurds rebel in Iran because Iran’s our enemy. But Turkey’s our ally, 
so we don’t want the Kurds rebelling there even though the Kurds are in both of those areas.” 
Ultimately, the United States acts to defend and protect its interests. 
Despite these concerns, CSI student veterans showed great faith in U.S. institutions and 
traditions. When discussing whether the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were “just” wars, CSI 
student veterans argued that it did not matter why the United States went to war because 
ultimately the decision is in the hands of elected officials. Ed, a former Marine, argued that the 
only tool service members have to change the direction of American foreign policy is to vote. He 
stated:  
All these people complaining about the wars is ridiculous because you elected 
[President G.W.] Bush. You have to know what people’s policies are, you have to 
ask the questions. Then you have to be willing to take whatever comes with that. 
You elected him. It is what it is. Did the wars continue on when Obama got in 
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office? Yes. And why is that? Because we elected him to make the decisions. 
 
Thus, voting, a central pillar of U.S. democracy, gives citizens the power to elect the officials 
who will shape domestic and foreign policy. Once Americans have elected a member of 
Congress or the President, the decision is final. “A pure patriot,” as argued by Ed, supports 
elected officials until it is time to choose new leadership in the next election cycle. Like 
President Obama, who argued “our union can be perfected,” CSI student veterans felt that when 
leadership fails to live up to our founding principles the U.S. system of government allows 
citizens to steer the nation back on course to guarantee democracy, liberty, and opportunity.  
When CSI student veterans did discuss military operations that were questionable, like 
invading Iraq based on false intelligence regarding the possession of WMDs, they justified U.S. 
foreign policy, believing elected officials and military commanders will ultimately do what is 
best for the nation and the world. Ed asked, “Was that [WMDs] the reason that somebody 
justified it [the Iraq War] to Congress and sold it to the American people? Was there another 
agenda that maybe got accomplished that nobody knows about or that didn’t get accomplished 
and they’re still working towards? It’s possible.” Americans elect officials to make difficult 
decisions on behalf of all citizens based on confidential data that if publicly disclosed would 
thwart the efforts of the U.S. military and intelligence community working to ensure national and 
global security.  
Through conducting one-on-one interviews, I gained insights into how CSI veterans 
represent themselves as hyper militarized citizens, making visible the differences they believed 
existed amongst themselves and “non-veterans.” They agreed with CSI faculty members and 
scholars studying U.S. militarization that nationalist rhetoric is the foundation of military 
training, shaping how service members think and behave to ensure they follow orders established 
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by the chain of command and defend the military, the nation, and its citizens. CSI veterans often 
described how the imposing command structure created a lack of agency and often made them 
feel disposable given they were at the mercy of the commanders’ whims. They also described 
soldiering as unpredictable, intense, and traumatic, highlighting the long-term effects of fear, 
violence, mourning, and death that comes with military deployments. Despite discussing how the 
military, the government, and the media manipulate Americans to believe in the value of war-
making to justify U.S. empire, CSI veterans ultimately defend the U.S. military’s adventurism in 
the post-9/11 era. As hyper-militarized citizens, CSI veterans used tropes of American 
exceptionalism to defend U.S. foreign policy, a problematic consensus view among CSI veterans 
that also served as a defense of their military service. By believing the United States is worth 
defending because of its founding principles and institutions, CSI veterans were also defending 
their military service; their service not only provided personal benefits and opportunities but also 
served to maintain national and global freedom, security, peace, democracy, etc. through the U.S. 
military. Thus, the nation-state is worth defending: its founding principles, institutions, and its 
citizens, particularly military citizens, are exceptional.  
In the following chapter, I discuss how CSI veterans managed and negotiated their 
militarized identities by analyzing campus celebrations centered around Veterans’ Day, a federal 
holiday observed annually on November 11 to honor military veterans. When forced to confront 
the contradictions, inconsistencies, and abuses of American foreign policy two months after the 
ROTC town hall during Veterans’ Day celebrations, CSI veterans felt they were living in a 
“civilian world.” By lacking the structure and meaning provided by the military, CSI veterans 
were confronting reintegration and readjustment within a “civilian world” whose institutions and 
ideologies questioned the nature of U.S. foreign policy and did not uphold the special status of 
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military citizens as supercitizens. Feeling misunderstood and out of place, CSI veterans 
navigated a liminal space despite living in a militarized United States, highlighting that U.S. 






 Over a three year period, from 2011-2013, the veteran population at the College of Staten 
Island (CSI) doubled.  To accommodate the needs of this growing veteran population, the CSI 
Veterans Office provided services and programs to facilitate the transition from military to 
student life for veterans and their families, as well as to educate the campus community about 
veterans’ issues. November was the most important month in the academic calendar for the 
office because of the annual celebration of veterans on November 11th. In order to educate the 
campus and the local community, the office organized a poster campaign, a student veteran art 
show, and a panel discussion of veterans sharing their deployment experiences. The highlight of 
the 2013 programming was the Flags for the Fallen event, which entailed placing 
6,746 flags (Figure 3) on the campus Great Lawn, each representing a service member who died 
since September 11, 2001 in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, specifically in support of 
Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation New Dawn. 
 Veterans Day and the public ceremonies that accompany this federal holiday are spaces 
in which former service members are able to publicly grieve and communally honor their fallen 
brothers and sisters in their local communities. Events like Flags for the Fallen also highlight 
how service members, veterans, and civilians are part of a wider narrative regarding citizenship. 
As argued by Benedict Anderson (1991), national holidays, war monuments, and military 
cemeteries celebrating military service are meant to bond all citizens to an imagined political 
community. Along with employing symbols (e.g., American flag) and traditions (e.g., the Star-
Spangled Banner, Taps, and the retreat ceremony) that stem from the past (Anderson 1991; 
Halbwachs 1992; Winter 1995, 2006), events and public memorials dedicated to military service 
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reinforce and reproduce the belief that those who make up a small fraction of the citizenry who 
are willing to sacrifice their personal freedom and possibly their lives do so on behalf of all 
citizens (Anderson 1991). As argued by Bacevich (2013), celebrating military service during 
national holidays, like Independence Day, highlights how “a civil-military relationship founded 
on the principle that a few fight while the rest watch” while engaging in a global War on Terror 
creates a relationship between the military and society that is “heavy on symbolism and light on 
substance, with assurances of admiration for soldiers displacing serious consideration of what 
they are sent to do or what consequences ensue” (14). 
 In this chapter I discuss how CSI veterans managed and negotiated their militarized 
identities by analyzing campus celebrations centered on Veterans’ Day. Despite living in a 
militarized United States, the CSI veterans felt misunderstood and out of place on campus after 
being forced to confront the contradictions, inconsistencies, and abuses of American foreign 
policy during the contentious ROTC town hall that occurred two months prior. Lacking the 
structure and meaning provided by the military, CSI veterans were confronting reintegration and 
readjustment within a civilian world whose institutions and ideologies did not uphold the special 
status of veterans as supercitizens. CSI veterans’ experiences highlight how U.S. veterans do not 




As discussed in previous chapters, the rise of Western nation-states and nationalism in the 
19th and 20th centuries redefined the social contract between citizens and the nation-state, 
creating a distinction between civilian and military citizens. Military citizenship entails duties 
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and obligations, but it also provides material and symbolic privileges and benefits, including 
social rights, social inclusion, and recognition. The foundation of military citizenship is rooted in 
a belief in American exceptionalism and in the moral and symbolic relationship within the 
nation-state that distinguishes military citizens from civilians. This moral and symbolic 
relationship is based on nationalist rhetoric that frames all citizens as kin and thus committed to 
one another. The military take this commitment one step further: they are supercitizens willing to 
kill and possibly die to defend the nation. In exchange, their fellow citizens must value military 
citizens as supercitizens.  The ubiquity of the supercitizen construct relies on the processes of 
soldiering and militarization. 
With soldiering or the cultural production of service members, “the military apparatus 
explores and studies the soldier’s body to break it down and rearrange it according to its needs” 
(Foucault 1977: 138), but these needs go beyond preparing the soldier’s physical body and mind 
for ‘mission success.’ Soldiering prepares young men and women to become supercitizens, 
risking life and limb for the nation and its citizens (Lutz 2001; MacLeish 2013). As a military 
rite of passage, basic training is said to prepare service members to be emotionally disciplined, 
self-sacrificing, vigorous, and hardworking. This is achieved by establishing group membership 
and cohesion with matching uniforms, group punishments, and the denial of privacy to 
emphasize depersonalization and deindividuation, stripping the individual of all previous self-
definition (Snyder 1999, 2003; Herbert 1998; Burke 2004). The traits learned in basic training 
are framed as necessary in combat, which is the most valued military experience. Given a 
hierarchy of valor that exists among service members and veterans, “real” service members are 
those who have specific military operational specialties, times and places of service, and levels 
of sacrifice, devaluing those who did not deploy to a war zone, served in non-combat roles, were 
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not drafted, and/or did not experience loss and injury (Lomsky-Feder 2004; Gardiner 2013). 
Outside the military, this hierarchy of valor is also recognized, showing reverence for those 
supercitizens who engaged in combat and gave the ultimate sacrifice. For example, on Veterans 
Day and Memorial Day, the President of the United States honors the war dead by laying a 
wreath at the Tomb of the Unknowns, a monument in Arlington National Cemetery dedicated to 
U.S. service members who have died without their remains being identified.  
Supercitizenship is also reinforced by militarization, a social process in which civil 
society is organized around preparations for war and war-making (Lutz 2001). Lutz (2001) 
argues that in shaping and synchronizing society’s ideological values and institutions with the 
military’s values and goals, the U.S. military drastically alters social life. McCaffrey (2002) and 
Bacevich (2013) contend that the media, government, and businesses at all levels share the 
interests of the military, creating a society in which military ideals become naturalized. In part, 
this is done by promoting structure, uplift, discipline, personal responsibility, and sacrifice as 
military values in civilian institutions (Mariscal 2004; Berlowitz and Long 2011), such as in 
public education, which Pérez (2006; 2009) argues prepares young adults, particularly low 
income, minorities, and women, for the U.S. military. Dávila (2004: 13), argues that structure, 
uplift, discipline, personal responsibility, and sacrifice are also neoliberal values. Both military 
and neoliberal policies are associated with choice and upward mobility, in particular the 
aspirations for upward mobility of the working class and communities of color. With the end of 
military conscription and the creation of an all-volunteer force in 1973, military service is a 
choice that is understood “as an important vehicle of social and economic mobility for the 
working class and communities of color” (Pérez 2009: 33). Upon completing military service, 
federal preferential hiring practices reinforce the notion that veterans are supercitizens. For 
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example, in Executive Order 13518, the Obama administration stated: “Veterans have served and 
sacrificed in defense of our Nation... Our veterans, who have benefited from training and 
development during their military service, possess a wide variety of skills and experiences, as 
well as the motivation for public service, that will help fulfill Federal agencies’ staffing needs” 
(2009: 1). With this executive order, an interagency Council on Veterans Employment created a 
Veterans Employment Initiative, improving opportunities for transitioning and disabled veterans 
within the Federal Government. By 2016, nearly one-third of new federal hires are veterans and 
the overall number of veterans in the federal workforce is roughly 43 percent (Rein 2016). 
Despite the ubiquity of the supercitizen construct, there are counter narratives that frame service 
members and veterans as dangerous and damaged.  
Historically, service members were often portrayed as public nuisances, disrupting 
communities at military forts in the U.S. by engaging in drinking, gambling, and womanizing. In 
a discussion of the portrayal of service members during World War II, Lutz (2001: 230) 
described a soldier’s experience: “The soldier is a barbarian with a club, witlessly pursuing war. 
Said one soldier, ‘I came here in 1947 for two weeks’ training. And there were signs on the 
streets downtown: Soldiers and Dogs Not Allowed…’ In the Cold War era and beyond, social 
scientists (Enloe 1990; Lutz 2009; Vine 2015) have documented that communities that house 
military bases, both in the United States and abroad, view service members as a menace. Once a 
military base is established, it often brings high rates of sexual violence and the establishment of 
a lucrative and exploitative sex industry. Service members are also often portrayed as heroic but 
damaged because the nature of their work involves the constant risk of being killed or injured, 
witnessing loss of life, and potentially killing others during their service. Historically, cultures 
have “...explicitly and often ritually worked at ‘cleansing’ and reintegrating them (warriors) into 
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the social home they left for war” (Lutz 2001: 230). Wool (2015) highlights the complexities and 
contradictions inherent in the lives of recovering combat-wounded soldiers who have lost limbs, 
have traumatic brain injuries, and often suffer from PTSD. She frames the idea of the soldier’s 
body as representing a historically, politically, and morally loaded national ideal. By discussing 
the realities of living with disabilities and attempting to recover, Wool shows how their bodies 
have been broken in the realization of the patriotic ideal, disrupting the narrative of the heroic 
wounded veteran (as well as those service members killed in action) as the embodiment of 
patriotic self-sacrifice. In popular culture, veterans injured by their service are portrayed as 
needing care to manage the long-lasting effects of war-making. Following in the tradition of The 
Deer Hunter (1978) and Born on the Fourth of July (1989), the film American Sniper (2014) 
depicts the negative effects of untreated Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), a psychiatric 
disorder that can occur following the experience or witnessing a life-threatening event.  In its 
portrayal of the life of Chris Kyle, a highly decorated Navy SEAL veteran who was murdered by 
an Iraq War veteran with PTSD, the film depicts veterans with PTSD as being a danger to 
themselves and others, contradicting the idealized view of service members and veterans as 
supercitizens.  
Furthermore, the realities of service reveal that service members are not immune to 
mistreatment despite being framed as supercitizens. While in the military, there are high rates of 
military sexual assault (USCCR 2013; Darehshori and Rhoad 2015; Darehshori 2016), LGBTQ 
discrimination (Miller and Cray 2013; Torreon 2013), and troop exposure to hazardous 
chemicals and weapons, including burn pits, depleted uranium, mustard gas and nerve gas (VHA 
2016).There are countless examples of the U.S. federal government’s tenuous and inconsistent 
commitment to veterans, failing to provide all eligible former service members with access to 
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medical care, educational assistance, and disability compensation, which are understood to be 
earned rights stemming from military service (See Chapter 1). For example, during my 
fieldwork, Congress failed to pass legislation appropriating funds for 2014 due to political 
debates centered on defunding the Patient Protection and the Affordable Care Act, a federal 
statute signed into law by President Obama in 2010 to overhaul the healthcare system. Public 
outcry centered on the effects the shutdown would have on former service members, specifically 
the freeze on compensation checks to 5.1 million veterans as well as delays in G.I Bill tuition 
and stipend payments (Vogel 2013; Samuel 2013). On the CSI campus, the fear of what would 
materialize if the shutdown continued into November led Marie, the Director of the Veterans 
Office, to email all student veterans to outline all the community resources and points of contact 
to help with the economic effects of the shutdown. Additionally, Marie discussed the negative 
economic repercussions of the shutdown with the college administration and as a result, the 
college assured Marie that an existing short-term financial emergency grant would be available 
to student veterans. Nationally, the Military Coalition, a group made up of 33 military and 
veteran organizations, held a rally at the National World War II Memorial in order to publicize 
the negative effects of the government shutdown on former service members (CSPAN 2013; 
Southhall 2013; Samuel 2013). Herb Rosenbleeth, the president of the Military Coalition, stated, 
“Our veterans served this country; we need the country to serve our veterans” (Jordan 2013: 2). 
CSI student veterans agreed with the Military Coalition that the shutdown served to highlight the 
U.S. federal government’s often fragile and unreliable commitment to veterans. 
Yet, the “pernicious myth that there was, or is, any such thing as the American soldier—a 
prototypical American in uniform—or that our military forces, either as institutions or as 
collections of individuals, reflect our true character as a people and as a nation” is alive and well 
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(Kohn 1987: 53). The idea of the supercitizen persists due to the effects of soldiering and 
militarization despite the realities of military service, reintegration, and readjustment. What are 
the effects of having a supercitizen construct that is full of contradictions and inconsistencies? 
Veteran identity is socially constructed throughout the individual’s lifetime in military and non-
military institutional and social contexts. Without being immersed in the military, an institution 
that creates and reproduces the notion that (both current and former) service members are 
supercitizens, CSI veterans began to navigate a world they defined as civilian, which they 
viewed as confusing and unwelcoming. Without the military’s institutional framework to provide 
daily structure and meaning, they sought veteran friendly organizations to provide reintegration 
and readjustment services and support while engaging with civilians who praised as well as 
questioned the supercitizen and the military.  
 
Living in a Civilian World 
 The U.S. civilian-military divide is not a new phenomenon; social scientists have 
extensively researched this gap. In the last thirty years, researchers have focused on military 
professionalism and civilian oversight of the military as well as differences in “civilian culture” 
and “military culture” with the goal of improving policies and institutional structures to maintain 
and improve national security (see Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960; Feaver 1996). In the post 
9/11 era, veterans confront a significant civilian-military divide; only one half of 1% of the U.S. 
population has served active duty since September 11th, 2001. This low rate is comparable only 
to the rate of service during the peacetime period between World War I and World War II (Pew 
2011). This gap is due to a shift in the nature of military service in the United States (see Chapter 
1). 24 Like with previous generations of returning service members, post-9/11 veterans view the 
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civilian population as detached from and ignorant of military life, specifically what service 
members experience as well as what they must confront upon returning home. For example, the 
2011 Pew Research Center’s The Military-Civilian Gap: War and Sacrifice in the Post-9/11 Era 
reported that 84% of post-9/11 veterans and 71% of civilians polled stated that the public does 
not understand the problems faced by those in the military and their families (Pew 2011: 2).  
Among CSI veterans, their family, friends, fellow students, and members of the 
community were viewed as civilians, lacking the experiences but also the values and qualities 
that come with military service. This boundary between military citizens and civilians is a result 
of supercitizenship. Service members and veterans are “excluded from the category of ‘regular’ 
citizen at the same time as they exemplify it to an extreme by their mortal exposure on behalf of 
the nation,” creating a hierarchy among citizens (MacLeish 2013: 189). This hierarchy is not 
surprising since citizenship entails valuing certain citizens above others due to differences in 
civil, political, social, and cultural rights based on social identities and categories, such as 
gender, sexuality, race, class, ethnicity etc. (Marshall 1950; Verdery 1998). Yet, the hierarchy 
created with supercitizenship “is not just simple opposition or categorical difference but an 
exception” (MacLeish  2013: 188). Service members and veterans are marked as supercitizens: 
framed as being a part of and above the nation since they exist to protect the nation while 
surpassing civilians, both individuals and institutions, in moral authority, virtue, and discipline 
(Lutz 2001; MacLeish 2013). Thus, civilian is the unmarked and unexceptional majority. As 
explained by Hautzinger and Scandlyn (2014: 215), “If ‘America is the land of the free because 
of the brave,’… then for many military folks civilians become the un-brave, lazy couch potatoes, 
the feminized in need of protection. Military community members (for this often includes family 
members not themselves officially serving) may use their views about ‘the rest of America’ to 
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define themselves, and military culture (collective characteristics and values), by contrast. This 
othering of civilians, which can include outright stigmatization, is a vehicle through which 
service members and veterans voice an often despairing critique about the broader American 
society and culture.” For CSI veterans, the differences between supercitizens and civilians were 
confirmed upon returning home after completing their military service.  
By definition, a service member becomes a veteran upon discharge.25 The men and 
women I met during my fieldwork described their final days in the service as tying up loose ends 
and finalizing paperwork, including receiving a final medical and dental exam, scheduling 
moving or storage of personal items, and attending the Pre-separation counseling and Transition 
Assistance Program (TAP), to return to one’s “normal” life. Ed, a veteran of the Marines Corps, 
described his last day: “If you don’t retire, it’s pretty unceremonious. They’re like, ‘Here you 
go.’ Piece of paper and you’re done. The first day is all crazy. It’s wild. Your heart’s pumping. 
And when you get out, you’re kind of driving away… ‘I don’t have to go back?” In other words, 
the ending of one’s military service is simply a series of administrative steps, which is in stark 
contrast to basic training, a rite of passage that occurs at the beginning of military service. Only 
those who have committed their entire working adult lives to the military will receive a 
ceremony to commemorate the end of their service, ushering in a post-military life. For non-
retirees, the institution that transformed the citizen into a soldier through basic training and 
dictates the timing and pacing of day-to-day life ends abruptly, without fanfare or closure.  
Following the unceremonious end of military service, veterans settle back into the lives 
they had left upon enlistment. The first obstacle they encounter involves making sense of their 
service while attempting to convey to civilians the complexities of military life. Like other CSI 
veterans, Will described his service in the Marine Corps as a transformative experience but it led 
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him back to a life he sought to escape through enlistment. He stated, “[The end of my military 
service was] depressing as fuck! I felt like everything was a dream. I went back and this life of 
being in the military, shooting guns and all that stuff, [ended and] now back to the projects. And 
it was like, ‘Shit, this sucks.’” His return to the projects after completing military service 
highlighted how much military service changed him. Will explained, “I feel so much more than I 
used to feel. Everybody else was feeling the same way as when I left. Nobody could keep up 
with that [I changed], so me and my mom fought a lot. I couldn’t tell her things because even if I 
did tell her some things, she still wouldn’t understand.” He had trouble explaining to others why 
readjustment and reintegration were difficult for him and all other veterans, which led to tense 
relationships upon returning home from military service. He explained: 
She [my mom] was like, ‘What’s going on? Shouldn’t you get a job? What’s 
hard?’ And I was trying to explain to her, ‘This isn’t me trying to be a bum. 
Everybody goes through this.’ She couldn’t understand that, so we got in a lot of 
fights. She’s like, ‘Well, you can leave.’ I left… I was just thinking about this last 
week—I thought I could finish transitioning by a year. It’s still hard for me. 
 
CSI veterans were struggling to understand for themselves and to convey to others their 
experience in the service and how it was affecting them upon returning home. They felt 
misunderstood and isolated from their civilian family members and friends since military 
service and its lasting effects were said to be inconceivable unless experienced firsthand.  
CSI veterans claimed that civilian opinions and critiques about U.S. foreign 
policy, the military, and current and former service members were ill informed, as 
outlined in detail in the chapter two discussion of the faculty members who organized to 
block the ROTC. As a result, CSI veterans felt uncomfortable and guarded around 
civilians, who they believed held misguided views about service members and veterans. 
Annabel, an Army veteran, felt she had to be careful around civilians since “Civilians get 
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touchy. They think, 'You're a veteran. What’s going to happen? What’s going on in your 
head? Are you crazy?’” Brittany agreed with Annabel, stating: “I feel more comfortable 
(around veterans) than I do just civilians. Because vets have their own communication. I 
feel like I can talk about anything and another veteran will understand me better than a 
normal civilian.”  
Additionally, CSI veterans viewed civilians as lacking the virtues of supercitizens, 
such as structure and discipline. During a sensitivity training for student veterans working 
as VA Federal Work Study employees, a discussion arose around the differences between 
service members and civilians. Brian, a veteran of the Marine Corps, described an 
incident in class in which a student was nodding off while listening to music. Brian 
slapped the student to wake him up since he was distracting the class; the professor 
reprimanded Brian. Eleanor, the diversity compliance director at the college running the 
training, explained that professors are responsible for managing and correcting students. 
The veterans in attendance agreed with Brian, who argued that students should help 
manage classroom behavior. In the military, it doesn’t matter if one makes a mistake or 
purposefully breaks a rule (big or small), either way, it could result in a severe 
punishment for the entire group. As a result, every service member is responsible and 
accountable not just for their individual behavior but for keeping order, discipline, and 
structure within the group. When Eleanor pointed to how problematic policing among 
peers can be, specifically pointing to violent practices that may break other rules, 
veterans disagreed. They felt that by policing one another they avoided punishment from 




Navigating Veteran and Civilian Institutions  
The Veterans Office staff members agreed with CSI veterans that military service is a life 
altering experience that differentiates former service members from civilians. Marie, the 
Veterans Office director, was acutely aware of veterans struggling to socially, academically, and 
professionally understand and acclimate to a civilian world they no longer felt a part of. She 
argued that veterans struggle since they spent most of their adult lives in the military. Among 
CUNY student veterans, the majority enlisted at a young age and served at least 6 years, 
returning home in their late twenties or early thirties. Accustomed to living in an all-
encompassing structure provided by the chain of command, former service members struggled to 
create their own routine in school and in their personal lives. To help veterans become civilians, 
Marie created a military cultural competency training for CSI faculty, staff, and administrators, 
providing an overview of military culture, such as organizational structure, rank, service 
branches, and demographics, to improve understanding and communication between civilians 
and veterans on campus. Further, Marie argued that student veterans needed to take ownership of 
reintegration and readjustment inside and outside of school. She proposed creating a civilian 
cultural competency training to highlight what civilian institutions expect from students and 
employees. As noted by Hautzinger and Scandlyn (2014), the emphasis on reciprocity among 
civilians and veterans is often a plea among providers and educators working with veterans: “To 
be of relevance to veterans, civilians need to become better educated about their lives and 
experiences; in return, veterans need to be receptive to civilian engagement with them and with 
the nation’s wider circumstances” (227). Unfortunately, a civilian cultural competency program 
did not gain traction within CUNY Veteran Affairs, leading Marie to implement aspects of 
civilian cultural competency within the New Student Veteran Orientation program.  
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Given this climate, it is reasonable that CSI veterans would seek out and engage with 
institutions that are extensions of the military in the civilian world. For example, the Department 
of Veteran Affairs (DVA) is a federal department that administers benefits and services to 
qualified and registered veterans, including eligibility determination, health care, burial and 
memorial benefits, home loans, life insurance, vocational rehabilitation, educational benefits, 
disability compensation, and pensions. Most notably, post-9/11 veterans are less likely to be 
enrolled for healthcare benefits, and those who are enrolled have low utilization rates; of the 
roughly 34% enrolled, only 17.8% of post-9/11 veterans use the service (NCVAS 2015). 
Confidence in the VA healthcare system is shaped by ongoing problems with scheduling, 
specifically lengthy waiting times that result in negative patient care outcomes. Since 2005, the 
VA’s systemic scheduling problems have been investigated in over 18 reports issued by the 
Veterans Health Administration's (VHA) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) as well as an 
ongoing inquiry by the VHA OIG and the Justice Department concerning the February 2014 
reports alleging that 40 veterans died while waiting for their VA health care appointments (VHA 
OIG May 2014; VHA OIG August 2014; Obama 2014).  
Brian, a veteran of the Marines Corps, described his ordeal with arranging VA 
appointments for his service-connected26 health issues, which include an injured shoulder and a 
Traumatic Brain Injury. He stated, “I only have to wait 21 days for my [doctor’s] appointment. 
And then on the 18th day, they’re like, ‘We’re going to have to schedule it for next week.’ And 
then the only three available times they have for an MRI is during some kind of class or when 
I’m working. It’s impossible to coordinate a time.” Tim explained that unlike other veterans, 
who may be retired or disabled, he did not have a flexible schedule that would accommodate the 
VA system. He explained, “I’m not 100% disabled. I’m not 90-something years old where all I 
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do is sit on my fucking recliner watching Wheel of Fortune. I’m a 30-year-old man who’s trying 
to get an education, provide for his children, and actually be able to live – feed himself, shelter 
himself, and be healthy.”  Whether CSI veterans had a disability or simply needed antibiotics to 
treat strep throat, they were so deeply frustrated with the VA’s scheduling process that they did 
not receive medical and mental healthcare from the VA, which often meant not receiving care at 
all given the high cost of health insurance in the U.S. 
In addition to their limited participation in the DVA, very few CSI veterans joined or 
participated in Veteran Service Organizations (VSOs), congressionally chartered corporations 
that provide services, support, civic and social activities for veterans and their families. VSOs are 
understood to be spaces in which “veteran status becomes a key component of identity and the 
role of intermediary between the two worlds — military and civilian — is an important 
touchstone of that identity” through the normalization of military service and valuing valor and 
sacrifice during military service (Gardiner 2013: 69). Yet, membership rates among post-9/11 
veterans are low since VSOs are perceived to be fraternities made up of retired veterans from 
previous conflicts. For example, within the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), the oldest VSO in 
the United States, the average member is around 70 years old and only 15 percent of eligible 
post-9/11 veterans are members of the VFW (Klimas 2014: 3). Will discussed wanting to make 
more friends after military service, but VSOs were not the right place to socialize since “It 
wouldn’t fit with my lifestyle. They’re like older men, you know?” Greg argued that since 
Vietnam veterans were drafted into an unpopular war, “They are talking about a different type of 
war and a different type of experience than the kids are today.” Despite having served in 
unpopular conflicts, post-9/11 veterans often feel a deep disconnect between their generation and 
Vietnam War veterans given that they served in an all-volunteer military. Additionally, Will 
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argued that post-9/11 veterans have other priorities since “I just came back (from military 
service) and everything else is more pressing. I’m not going to pay dues, which are like fifty or 
more dollars, and then like go like three times a year.”  
Older veterans argue that VSOs are spaces for younger veterans to learn from the 
experiences of previous generations. Peter, a retired Army Colonel, argued that VSOs are really 
about mentoring younger veterans to build comradeship and involvement in the community, as 
well as “shake them [veterans] into awareness” about their veteran benefits and services offered 
by the Federal and State government. National membership rates show that post-9/11 veterans 
tend to join organizations that focus on activities and reintegration, such as Team Rubicon and 
Team Red, White and Blue, or those that provide advocacy on Capitol Hill on behalf of post-
9/11 veterans and offer engagement opportunities via social media, such as Iraq and Afghanistan 
Veterans of America (Klimas 2014: 6). Along with viewing VSOs as fraternities for older 
veterans, many felt uncomfortable given the lack of diversity within VSOs. Philip, a veteran of 
the Marine Corps, considered joining a local VSO but changed his mind during his first visit. He 
stated, “there’s a whole bunch of older white dudes and I felt really uncomfortable…they were 
really iffy. Like (I felt they were thinking), ‘Who was this young, black kid that was in here?’” 
Marie, the only post-9/11 veteran I spoke with who had joined a VSO, was only the second 
woman to join the Staten Island chapters of the American Legion and VFW. On her first visit, 
Marie, an Iraq War combat veteran, was asked if she had served in the Women’s Auxiliary 
Corps, a branch of the Army from 1942 to 1978 that placed women in non-combat roles. She 
joined local VSOs to fulfill her duty as the CSI Veterans Office director, but over time, she 
hoped that it would improve her understanding of women’s role in the military.  
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Feeling out of place among civilians and within veteran spaces like the DVA and VSOs, 
many post-9/11 veterans missed their time in the service because it was simpler compared to 
their post service life. Gwen stated, “Life is very simple when you’re deployed. It’s black and 
white. You have a job to do. Everything is so simplified for you because your choices are so 
simple. Like, ‘I have to go eat. This is the time I have to go eat. What am I going to eat? Well, 
this is all there is in front of me. There’s no choice.’” Gwen acknowledged that the lack of choice 
may sound terrible to those on the outside, but she argued that the lack of choice was comforting 
since “you have a mission to complete and it’s always the same.” Will also felt comforted by the 
lack of choice and clear mission:  
Those who deployed told me, ‘I wish I was back because the time was simpler.’ 
Not because we want to kill just because time’s simpler. I miss just sitting around 
all day, working out, eating food, and jerking off, let’s say. Even though we have 
to like risk our lives, in a funny way, we work and it’s not like now. I’m behind 
on my bills. I eat Ramen noodles because I don’t have money like that. 
 
Yet, Gwen highlighted that “the routine that you—or the comfort you had — was matched by 
these super-heightened, intense things, things you don’t want see, things you don’t want to do 
[during deployments].” She admitted that this sounds incongruous to a civilian but “it’s hard to 
relate because you never experienced that.” On the surface, their experiences upon returning 
home may sound like nostalgia. Yet, CSI veterans struggled with making ends meet despite 
robust federal funding (discussed in chapter 1) as well as identifying and finding a place in 
civilian institutions and in veteran serving organizations. As a result, Gwen, Will, and many 
other veterans expressed that they were left without a routine, a mission, and a sense of 
belonging and meaning.  
Fieldwork highlighted how veteran identity is a social process that builds on the 
experience of soldiering but also develops upon returning from war over time in military and 
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non-military institutional and social contexts. Lacking the structure and meaning provided by the 
military that espouses service members and veterans as supercitizens, CSI veterans must 
confront reintegration and readjustment while feeling misunderstood and out of place among 
civilians and in veteran serving institutions. Consequently, veterans’ supercitizen status in the 
U.S. homefront is unstable and incoherent. What were the effects of this instability and 
incoherence on CSI veterans’ understanding of veteran identity and citizenship after military 
service? In order to gain such insights, I analyzed how CSI veterans grappled with civilians who 
questioned the value of war, the military, and military service in the context of anti-militarization 
activism on campus during Veterans Day celebrations. By analyzing Flags for the Fallen, a 
Veterans Day event, I saw that veterans questioned not only their supercitizen status but also 
their place in a civilian society where they existed neither as civilian nor supercitizen. In other 
words, CSI veterans navigated a liminal space despite living in a militarized United States. 
 
Betwixt and Between: CSI Veterans as Liminal Figures 
Stemming from Van Gennep’s triadic model of ritual passages, Victor Turner applied the 
concept of liminality within small-scale societies to understand agency and societal structures 
(Van Gennep 1960; Turner 1969). Turner began to see a wider application of liminality outside 
of ritual passages and in large-scale societies. Despite its separation from ritual passages, 
liminality retains the following features: namelessness, spatial and temporal dislocation, and 
social instability (Turner 1969; Thomassen 2009). As discussed above, CSI veterans inhabit a 
liminal space, experiencing instability and incoherence since the DVA and VSOs, programs in 
place to assist with readjustment and reintegration, fail to address the complex needs of veterans. 
Additionally, this instability and incoherence extends to civilian institutions, resulting in CSI 
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veterans experiencing military and non-military institutional and social contexts as outsiders. 
Thus, CSI veterans are neither supercitizens nor civilians, feeling nameless, spatially and 
temporally dislocated, and socially insecure. This was strikingly clear during the Flags for the 
Fallen event, which on the surface, as described in the opening of chapter three, appeared to be a 
pro-military, pro-veteran event. I asked how veterans grappled with the questioning of military 
service during Veterans Day celebrations despite living in a militarized United States. 
Gaining approval for the Flags for the Fallen event was simple given the college 
administration’s efforts to establish CSI as a “military friendly” campus. By providing a strong 
support system and centralized “vet-friendly” services, CSI strived to aid veterans with the 
transition from military to student life. Veterans enrolled at CSI could take full advantage of the 
services and programs offered by the Veterans Office and the support of the Registrar to process 
veteran educational benefits and transfer credits. Additionally, the college offered the most 
transferred college credits within CUNY, up to 90 credits, allowing veterans to maximize their 
G.I. Bill benefits and graduate in a timely manner. Given such extensive services and resources, 
CSI was nationally ranked in the top 20 percent of military-friendly universities since 2008 by 
G.I. Jobs magazine.  
After securing the college administration’s approval in the summer of 2013, Marie 
reached out to various organizations on campus and within the local community to co-sponsor 
the event, including the Residence Halls, Student Government, the VFW, the American Legion, 
and Fort Wadsworth, the U.S. Coast Guard base located in Staten Island. Additionally, Flags for 
the Fallen would be included in the Student Experience Program (SEP), requiring freshmen to 
attend college sponsored activities held outside the classroom designed to promote intellectual, 
cultural, and social activities. Students would be asked to assist with flag placement or removal, 
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attend the retreat ceremony, and complete a one-minute reflection on “How has this event 
impacted me?” It seemed that without hesitation, the college administration was on board and in 
support of Flags for the Fallen. 
Yet, despite the appearance of a militarized campus, Marie’s projected programming for 
Flags for the Fallen began to fall apart as the semester began on the last week of August. 
Inspired and modeled after Pennsylvania’s Marywood University’s Flags for the Fallen event, 
Marie planned an eight-day-long program. Without explanation, the college administration 
limited the program to a two-day event, taking place on November 7th and 8th, four days before 
Veterans Day. By limiting the event to two days, there would be less visibility for Flags for the 
Fallen, limiting discussion and reflection around veterans’ issues on campus and within the 
wider community. Additionally, the college refused to donate the flags despite agreeing to a 
preliminary budget of $800. Marie reached out to the Borough President’s Office, local VSOs, 
and Marywood University for donations, but these organizations were holding their own 
Veterans Day events and/or had limited budgets and resources. After a month of fundraising 
efforts at the Staten Island Ferry, local supermarkets, and veteran events to purchase flags, Marie 
worried that Flags for the Fallen would have to be either cancelled or drastically changed. Relief 
came when the Student Government’s Disabilities and Veterans Affairs Commission agreed to 
provide $2,500 to purchase the flags. 
The almost immediate administration approval for the event did not include the necessary 
support to organize and fundraise for such a large event. Instead of critiquing the college, student 
veterans working in the office praised Marie for her hard work, stating that she worked too hard 
on their behalf. Despite a lack of logistical and financial support, the college administration 
widely publicized the event, reinforcing the college’s reputation as a “military friendly” 
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institution as well as helping Marie with her goal of increased visibility. The administration 
alerted the local and city press, including NY1, the Staten Island Advance, the New York Post, 
and Staten Island Public Access Cable, to cover the event, and it invited public officials, such as 
the Borough President, Staten Island Council members, and State Senators. Additionally, five 
college administrators were scheduled to give speeches despite Marie’s desire to limit the 
number of speakers. She believed it would detract from the retreat ceremony, the somber 
highlight of the event.  
Two weeks before Flags for the Fallen, the Veterans Office engaged in the extremely 
labor intensive event preparation (Figure 4): ironing, labeling, and alphabetizing over 6,000 
flags. Quickly, the number of volunteers dwindled given the dull and lengthy process, leaving 
veterans and the office staff to finish up preparing the flags. Along with the stress around 
organizing and executing such a large event, post-9/11 veterans began to acknowledge the 
elephant in the room: while ironing, labeling, and alphabetizing the flags, they would come 
across the names of their fellow service members who did not survive the war. Brittany, a 
veteran of the Navy and Coast Guard, mentioned that seeing her friends’ names made her feel 
sad, but she had no interest in publicly honoring them by planting flags for the event. She 
compared it to how some like to visit the cemetery to pay respect to the deceased while others 
find those visits too painful. Other student veterans requested the Veterans Office set aside the 
flags with their fellow service members’ names, acknowledging feelings of loss by remembering 
those who have passed. Gwen, an Army veteran, acknowledged it would be a difficult 
experience but said she often reflects on her fallen brothers and sisters, conducting internet 
searches for their obituaries when she is feeling down. 
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Along with planning such a large event while managing the emotions of student veterans, 
Marie had to respond to push back against the messaging and intent of Flags for the Fallen. 
Earlier in the semester, faculty members raised concerns with the college administration, asking 
why not acknowledge the Iraqi and Afghan nationals who died since 9/11 during Flags for the 
Fallen? The Veterans Office worried attention would be deflected from Veterans Day, the only 
federal holiday established to honor all former service members, by introducing a space to also 
reflect on foreign national casualties. Additionally, Flags for the Fallen could be interpreted as a 
statement against the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan if they incorporated a space for Iraqi and 
Afghani deaths during a Veterans Day event. Marie worried this would politicize the event while 
potentially isolating members of the veteran community. Given the tense debates around the 
possible implementation of an ROTC program on campus (see Chapter 2) earlier in the semester, 
Marie refused to have others shape the event, insisting that the Veterans Office, its programing 
and services, must serve as a safe space for all veterans, regardless of their political or 
ideological views. As discussed in Chapter 2, Marie’s goal was to keep the focus on veterans’ 
issues and veteran-civilian dialogue, not create a space to debate the role of the United States and 
its Armed Forces in expanding and maintaining empire or functioning as a global protector of 
peace, security, and democracy. By ignoring the realities of U.S. foreign policy during Flags for 
the Fallen, Marie failed to understand that she was in fact making a political statement. The 
college’s communications office reassured Marie that the administration would address the 
faculty’s concerns, helping the Veterans Office keep the event on message.  
Despite the administration’s efforts, three days before the start of Flags for the Fallen, 
the college notified Marie of a possible peaceful anti-war protest centered on the high rates of 
civilian Iraqi and Afghan casualties. Campus security explained they would be unable to stop the 
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planned protest but would set up a space for individuals to peacefully demonstrate. If the 
protesters were to disrupt Flags for the Fallen in any way, they would be removed and, 
depending on the nature of the disruption, could be arrested by the college’s peace officers. 
However, campus security made it very clear that if veterans became confrontational with 
protestors, they too would be removed and possibly arrested. Instead of attempting to find out 
which faculty members were involved in the protest to discuss how they could work together, 
Marie focused her time and energy on the potential fallout a protest would have on student 
veterans.  Consequently, the day before the start of Flags for the Fallen, Marie emailed veterans 
to highlight that the purpose of the event was to reflect, appreciate, and honor those service 
members who have sacrificed their lives as well as warn veterans that there was a possibility of a 
peaceful protest against war to take place during the event. Evoking the role of veterans as 
supercitizens who must protect the nation while surpassing civilians in moral authority, virtue, 
and discipline, Marie asked veterans “to remember that part of the oath of service is to protect 
and defend the constitution, which guarantees the freedom of speech” and to “not engage the 
protesters in any way.” She argued, “Let’s keep the focus where it should be, on getting those 
flags into the ground and honoring what they stand for.  Not just for the men and women who 
have died in service to our country but for all men and women who have served in the Armed 
Forces.” Once word spread, student veterans’ reactions varied. Some were disgusted at the idea 
that anyone would protest an event honoring U.S. service members who have died, their brothers 
and sisters in arms. Along with bringing attention to anti-war and anti-militarization viewpoints, 
some veterans argued that the protest could also shed light on veterans’ issues and the Veterans 
Office’s efforts to help veterans and their families. Others argued they had earned the right to 
respond to protesters given their service to the nation on behalf of all U.S. citizens.   
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In spite of the specter of protest looming over the event, on the rainy morning of 
November 7th, Veterans Office staff, student veterans, and volunteers, including service members 
from the Coast Guard and the Air Force, as well as members of the student government and CSI 
staff, arrived to begin placing over 6,000 flags for Flags for the Fallen. The goal of the event 
was to foster reflection and appreciation for the ultimate sacrifice of service men and women on 
campus and the wider community. As a civilian, I was focused on the rigorous task at hand 
(Figure 5 and 6): five hours of repetitively driving screwdrivers into the near frozen and damp 
ground to plant thousands of flags before the forecast afternoon downpours. For post-9/11 
veterans, the flag placement was a time for reflection and mourning. The Great Lawn that day 
turned into a cemetery, American flags serving as tombstones. Manny, a normally anxious and 
opinionated Army veteran, arrived dressed in his Class A Dress Uniform, which is traditionally 
worn at military funerals. He said very little, politely asking for his battle buddy’s flag27, which 
he requested days ahead of time. With his head down, he kneeled, planting the flag in the soaked 
grass amongst the others labeled with the names of fallen men and women (Figure 7). As the 
minutes passed, veterans watched in comforting silence. Soon after, a family arrived, asking for 
Staff Sergeant Michael H. Ollis’s flag. Barely three months prior, Ollis, a 24-year-old native 
Staten Islander, died during his second tour in Afghanistan while protecting a Polish soldier from 
a suicide bomber attack. I looked on in silence, while those around me reflected on how a family 
can bear the loss of a son, brother, friend.  
Along with the fear of witnessing a protest during the memorial and mourning the loss of 
their battle buddies, veterans expressed concern over the lack of support from the college 
administration. Gwen noticed that many of the administrators who initially supported the event 
did not visit the site, asking if the possible protest and the tense debates that took place earlier in 
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the semester around the ROTC program led to their lack of involvement. Their worries were 
confirmed later that day and less than 24 hours before the retreat ceremony. Despite the support 
of a couple of college administrators, Marie was notified that both the President and the Provost 
had cancelled their speeches scheduled for the retreat ceremony, since members of the CSI 
faculty were against the event. For Marie, the news was a serious blow, since her focus and 
energy as the director was to support veterans and their families as well as aid in integrating and 
establishing understanding between veterans and the wider community.  
Over 150 people, including the Veterans Office staff, student veterans, CSI students and 
staff, and community members, attended the closing of the Flags of the Fallen event. Following 
the Star-Spangled Banner, Marie gave a speech in which she quoted the proclamation that 
created Armistice Day, the precursor to Veterans Day, to call for thanksgiving, good will, and 
mutual understanding within the campus and wider community by honoring the fallen while not 
forgetting those who survived the war. The U.S. Coast Guard Color Guard performed a retreat 
ceremony, lowering and folding the American flag (Figure 8). This is a rite traditionally 
performed at military bases to signal the end of official duty and to pay respect to the flag, the 
visual representation of the nation as well as of military funerals. Along with the lowering and 
folding of the flag, a bugler played Taps, a musical piece played during retreat ceremonies and 
military funerals: Day is done, gone the sun. From the lakes, from the hills, from the sky. All is 
well, safely rest, God is nigh.28 Following the event, the majority of those in attendance 
volunteered their time, working together to respectfully remove the flags (Figure 9), ending 
Flags for the Fallen. The scheduled protest never took place. The only campus activity that took 
place during Flags for the Fallen was Contemplate Peace…Contemplate Healing: A Day of 
Reflection in Honor of Veterans’ Day (Figure 10). Sponsored by the Counseling, Grief, and Loss 
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class and the Mental Health Counseling Club, it was held under the campus Bodhi tree beside the 
9/11 memorial and featured an interfaith presentation led by local religious leaders. The event 
also featured senbazuru (‘1,000 cranes’), a Japanese tradition popularly associated with WWII 
memorials dedicated to the victims of the U.S. atomic bombings of Japan. The Veterans Office 
learned of the event while it was in progress. Given the overlap in audience and interest due to 
the diversity of veterans’ politics and experiences, Marie did not understand why the Veterans 
Office was not asked to participate or co-sponsor, especially given the office’s consistent track 
record of co-sponsoring and participating in a wide array of campus events.  
Despite the appearance of a military friendly campus community that values 
supercitizens and military values, CSI veterans experienced a divide between themselves and 
civilians on the CSI campus. Veterans Day events, like Flags for the Fallen, highlight the 
important ideological role of veterans in the reproduction of the nation, military citizenship, and 
the valuing of the supercitizen construct. Yet, public visibility of military citizens’ 
supercitizenship is limited to federal holidays that occur during specific spatial and temporal 
moments, featuring ceremonies and events celebrating military service. CSI veterans questioned 
their supercitizenship as well as their role and value in a militarized society given their limited 
visibility, the anti-militarization climate on campus that highlighted the contradictions, 
inconsistencies, and abuses of American foreign policy, as well as experiences with poor 
separation, readjustment, and reintegration services within the military, veteran-serving 
institutions, and civilian institutions. In other words, lacking the structure and meaning provided 
by the military, CSI veterans were confronting reintegration and readjustment within a civilian 




Given this context, Flags for the Fallen highlighted CSI veterans’ liminal status. What is 
the effect of liminality? Along with the instability and incoherence of their identities, as 
discussed earlier in the chapter, CSI veterans felt invisible despite the visually striking and well 
attended Flags for the Fallen event. Marie described the rationale for organizing an event like 
Flags for the Fallen: “We are doing this to remind everyone of the ultimate sacrifice some of our 
service men and women have made as well as a reminder to our current vets that no one is 
forgotten.” But how can one feel forgotten with public rituals venerating your supercitizenship? 
Often rituals can create communitas or a feeling of unity and belonging among the wider 
community — such as with celebrating the New Year or Thanksgiving — serving to strengthen 
the community (Turner 1967). Yet, rituals can also serve to set parts of the community apart 
from the wider collective. Whether a veteran believes in the valuing of former members as 
supercitizens, Veterans Day events, like Flags for the Fallen, served to set the veteran 
community apart from the wider community. It marks veterans as separate or as the “other” by 
bringing to the fore the tension between nationalist ideology and the lived experiences of former 
service members. In other words, depending on the social context, veteran-ness marks either a 
privileged other or a marginalized other. Yet, given the limited spatial and temporal occurrences 
that frame veterans as a privileged other, events like Flags for the Fallen exacerbate their 
differences with civilians. This experience was perfectly summed up by Bill, a highly decorated 
combat veteran and multiple amputee who only frequented veteran events and spaces in order to 
acquire services for his disabilities; he described the ideal soldiers as those who do not survive 
the war since they are unable to speak the truth of war and do not suffer the aftermath of military 
service on the homefront.   
In chapter 4, I analyze how liminality varies within the CSI veteran population, 
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specifically focusing on the erasure of women veterans among veterans and civilians. As 
discussed in this chapter, veteran identity builds on the experience of soldiering but is socially 
constituted throughout the individual’s lifetime in military and non-military institutional and 
social contexts. Veteran identity is also shaped by the gendered hierarchy produced in the 
military and reproduced in veteran and civilian contexts, naturalizing an ideology that 
subordinates women veterans through a gendered hierarchy of valor and a fraternity of service. 
By analyzing the university’s “empowerment” initiatives and women veterans’ attempts to 
participate in veteran and civilian spaces, we will see that CSI women veterans lack the ability to 
shape the norms, values, and practices around supercitizenship within and outside the veteran 





The Erasure of Women Veterans on the Homefront 
In 2013, the New York City Veterans Day Parade, the largest in the United States, 
honored women in the Armed Forces for the first time in its history. In order to celebrate the 
contributions of service women and women veterans, the United War Veterans Council (UWVC) 
selected retired Army general Ann E. Dunwoody, the first service woman to achieve a four-star 
officer rank, as the parade’s grand marshal. The UWVC featured women throughout the 
televised broadcast, inviting Marie, the director of CSI’s Veterans Office, to appear in an 
interview with Good Day New York, a morning television newscast airing on Fox Broadcasting 
Company’s New York City station. To prepare all VIPs and interviewees for the parade, the 
UWVC hosted a brunch and a pre-parade grand marshal and dignitaries briefing. Upon arriving 
at the General Society of Mechanics and Tradesmen Building, Marie and I attended the brunch 
and watched the entertainment, an all-girl singing group dressed in 1940s and 1950s pin-up style: 
red lips, military inspired dresses and pin curled hair. Their high, young voices sang out: 
Isn't there a white knight upon a fiery steed? 
Late at night I toss and I turn 
And I dream of what I need 
I need a hero  
I'm holding out for a hero 'til the end of the night 
 
After their rendition of Holding Out for a Hero, the all-girl group sang the iconic World 
War II song, Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy, referencing a bygone era in which millions of American 
men were deployed to fight Fascism while the majority of American women supported the war 
effort at home. Marie and I were puzzled. How did this entertainment honor the 
accomplishments of service women and women veterans? I looked around the crowd filled with 
smiling older men; they seemed unfazed by the choice of entertainment and the irony of this 
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tone-deaf selection. Our discomfort increased as organizers repeatedly referred to General 
Dunwoody as sir and discussed the beauty and grace of Ms. Veteran America, the winner of an 
annual pageant created to highlight that service women are also mothers, wives, daughters, and 
sisters.  
By invoking the past, parade organizers displayed nostalgia for an era in which the nation 
adhered to a gendered hierarchy that frames men and women in opposite roles that complement 
each other. Specifically, men are active citizens while women complement men's efforts in 
shaping armies, uprisings, and governments to create and defend the nation (Enloe 1983, 2004; 
Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989; McClintock 1991, 1993). Feminist scholars have documented 
and analyzed the gendering of nationalism, exploring the gendering of national territory, icons, 
symbols, and movements (Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989; McClintock 1991, 1993; McClintock, 
Mufti, and Shohat 1997; Yuval-Davis 1997; Mayer 2000). In the last decade, researchers have 
begun to interrogate how gendered nationalism shapes subjectivities (Gresch 2006).  
The present chapter explores how militarized masculinity shapes women veterans’ 
experiences on the homefront. As discussed in chapter 3, veteran identity is socially constructed 
throughout the individual’s lifetime in military and non-military institutional and social contexts. 
Due to the effects of soldiering and militarization, the idea of the supercitizen persists despite the 
realities of military service, reintegration, and readjustment. In this chapter, I highlight how the 
military’s ideology of the hyper-masculine supercitizen is reproduced in veteran and civilian 
contexts, naturalizing this construct while subordinating women veterans through a gendered 
hierarchy of valor and a fraternity of service. CSI women veterans attempted to participate in 
veteran spaces, celebrate the contributions of service women, shine a light on the difficulties of 
military service, and reshape the veteran community on the CSI campus. Yet, it became clear 
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during my fieldwork that CSI women veterans were unable to define and police the hierarchy of 
valor and fraternity of service within and outside the veteran community despites their strategies 
or the university initiatives to “empower” women veterans. Lacking the ability to shape civilian 
and veteran norms, values, and practices around military service, veteran status, and citizenship, 
CSI women veterans lacked a sense of belonging and community.  
 
Gendered Hierarchy in the Armed Forces 
As I argued in chapter two, the foundation of military citizenship is rooted in a belief in 
American exceptionalism and in the moral and symbolic relationship within the nation-state that 
distinguishes military citizens from civilians. The nationalist rhetoric that presents all citizens as 
kin and thus committed to one another highlights those citizens willing to kill and possibly die to 
defend the nation as supercitizens. The ubiquity of the supercitizen construct relies on the 
processes of soldiering and militarization despite the realities of military service, reintegration, 
and readjustment. Furthermore, central to supercitizenship is the construction of a gendered 
hierarchy around a historically sanctioned institutionalization of gender difference and 
heterosexuality, framing men and women as opposite while having complementary identities 
(McClintock 1993; Prividera and Howard 2006). As argued by McClintock (1991, 1993), men 
are characterized as active citizens; they are seen as the founders, leaders, and protectors of the 
nation. On the other hand, women are excluded from direct action as citizens and are instead 
portrayed as the biological reproducers of the nation’s citizens, the transmitters and producers of 
national culture, and the symbolic signifiers of national difference (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 
1989; McClintock 1991, 1993). For example, the representation of women as mother figures 
relegates them to the passive role of emotionally supporting and protecting the soldier while the 
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soldier is put in the active role of physically protecting the nation (McClintock 1991). During the 
World Wars, women who wanted to play an active role in the war effort could only serve in 
ways that complemented men's efforts on the battlefield. Propaganda posters from WWI (Figure 
11) and WWII (Figure 12) showed nursing and administrative roles as acceptable for women 
since these military occupational specialties were seen as a natural biological extension of 
motherhood that freed as well as motivated men to fight, and were thus an acceptable form of 
citizenship. After the war, women returned to the home, in their “natural” role. While women are 
necessary in creating and reproducing the nation, men create and shape the armies, uprisings, and 
governments.  
Cultural representations of the supercitizen are also highly gendered. The framing of men 
as supercitizens is prominent in entertainment, through fictional characters like Captain America 
(Figure 13), and in politics, which values the military service of its government officials (Figure 
14). Additionally, the role of the media in creating popular narratives about service members 
deployed in war zones serves to reinforce the military’s gendered hierarchy on the homefront. 
For example, the most well-known service women are not those who earned decorations for acts 
of valor, such as Silver Star recipients Sergeant Leigh Ann Hester and Specialist Monica Lin 
Brown, but those who fit into patriarchal notions of femininity, highlighting how women are ill-
equipped for military service. For example, Navy Seals and Army Rangers famously “rescued” 
Private Jessica Lynch from an Iraqi hospital. Reports alleged she was captured during an ambush 
and was subsequently abused under the care of Iraqi doctors. Investigative reporters questioned 
the accuracy of the military’s account, finding Lynch’s rescue was staged, filmed, edited, and 
released widely as support for the war at home waned. As a work of war propaganda, this rescue 
presented Lynch as a victim, a persona that fits into patriarchal notions of white femininity, 
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while simultaneously depicting her as a hero, symbolizing the West’s “enlightened” views on 
gender equality in the face of a racialized “enemy” that will deliberately target service women 
(Kumar 2004). 
The institutionalization of gender difference is clear in the military’s soldiering process, 
shaping the types of masculinities and femininities that are normative within the military. The 
supercitizen is defined as he who is responsible for physically protecting his mother, the mother 
of his children, and therefore the nation and its future. Despite the integration of women into the 
military in 194829 and the opening of career opportunities with the establishment of an all-
volunteer force in 1973, practices that predate the integration of women in the military continue, 
reinforcing a hyper-masculine supercitizen. Social scientists have documented that basic training 
is “intended to vest each participant with a clear notion of what it means to be a soldier… [which 
is] characteristically male,” framing women as weak, infantile, and a polluting influence on men 
(Herbert 1998: 9). For over 40 years, DOD officials and members of the House and Senate have 
justified the exclusion of women by arguing they are physically and mentally weak, making 
them vulnerable to our “enemies,” and that they are a sexual distraction to our service men, 
damaging their mission readiness. Officials also argued that “masculine pride, brotherly bonding, 
and a range of other ‘intangibles’ are among the qualities that might be fractured if the military 
ceased to be the exclusive province of heterosexual men,” and that the inclusion of women 
would damage national security and “traditional” American values (Allen 2000: 316). Up until 
the lifting of the Combat Exclusion Policy in January of 2013 and the approval of 
implementation plans30 to open all combat jobs to women in March of 2016, the exclusion of 
service women from combat roles highlighted how the military institutionally defined the 
supercitizen as a man engaged in combat. DOD policy barred women from “assignment to units 
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below the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground” as 
well as assignments based upon collocation or proximity to direct combat (DOD 1994: 1). Yet, 
DOD policy did not clarify if physical proximity of units, unit interdependence, or both were 
used to evaluate if women were engaged in combat, revealing the difficulty of establishing a 
definitive line between combat and non-combat assignments.  
During Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation New Dawn, and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, women were engaged in direct combat regardless of their formally assigned roles 
(MLDC 2011). Between 2003 and 2016, 166 women lost their lives and 1,033 were wounded in 
action while engaging in combat operations (Kamarck 2016: 8). Characterized by urban warfare 
and guerrilla tactics, 21st-century battlefields are no longer limited to frontlines and battle zones, 
exposing all service members to the possibility of combat31 (Feitz and Nagel 2008). For 
example, Marie was in a combat engineers platoon.  Due to the combat exclusion ban, her 
military occupational specialty was a “carpentry and masonry specialist,” a non-combat role. 
Despite the difference in title, she and other women in her platoon were doing the same job and 
exposed to the same level of danger as the men. Additionally, despite the ban, branches of the 
U.S. military created all-female teams, such as the Army’s Lioness Team and the Marines’ 
Female Engagement Teams, assigned to all-male combat units to assist with raids, checkpoints, 
and other situations that may lead to Iraqi and Afghan women interacting with American troops 
(Farmer and Bessa 2011). Due to the nature of the missions, these all female teams engaged in 
combat but were not assigned, meaning service women were not officially recognized as 
combatants despite fulfilling essential operational needs (Farmer and Bessa 2011). Consequently, 
combat exclusion serves as a structural barrier that keeps women from entering the tactical career 
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fields associated with promotion to flag/general officer grades and serving in career-enhancing 
assignments (MLDC 2011).  
During my fieldwork, both former service men and women highlighted the effects of 
conforming to the military’s gendered hierarchy. Marie and Eleanor, the diversity compliance 
director at the college, held a sensitivity training for student veterans working as VA Federal 
Work Study employees to discuss misogynist and sexist language and behavior in the Veterans 
Office. Plans were underway to expand the Veterans Office to include a lounge area with student 
workstations, free printing, TV, and videogames, etc., increasing the number of veterans utilizing 
the space and interacting with staff and work study students. During the sensitivity training, both 
Marie and Eleanor discussed the importance of avoiding behaviors and speech that marginalizes 
others, particularly women veterans, given that a “boys will be boys” culture pervades the 
military and is reproduced in the veteran community. To exemplify how this “boys will be boys” 
logic is deeply rooted in the military, Marie explained during the sensitivity training that a 
service woman could only be a slut, bitch or lesbian. The student veterans agreed but argued that 
men are also labeled. Brian explained that a Marine can be an overly confident leader, a “hot-
shit,” or follower called a “shit-bag.”  This pressure to be a leader, who is brave and unafraid, is 
also expected by civilians. Upon returning home from deployments, his friends expected Brian to 
be the first to defend anyone in the group during confrontations at bars and clubs. Yet, he did 
acknowledge that the labels for women are based solely on a woman’s perceived sexual 
behavior, not their worth as a soldier, highlighting the belief that only men can be supercitizens. 
Within these limited and sexualized categories, Eleanor explained that women service 
members are always viewed through the lens of gender, they are always women soldiers, never 
just soldiers, and as a result they feel undervalued. Agreeing with Eleanor, Gwen, an army 
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veteran, argued that service women are not given the same opportunities to prove themselves as 
men in the Armed Forces. During her deployment in Iraq, Gwen’s platoon sergeant asked her to 
speak to an incoming service woman about avoiding sexual relationships. Despite being 
offended by his assumption that the new service woman would sleep around, Gwen did speak to 
her, advising her to focus on the job and to mind appearances. As a closeted lesbian serving 
during Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell32, Gwen was hyperaware of keeping up appearances. During her 
service, she dated a woman but ended the relationship due to her partner’s indiscretion (she 
posted photos of the couple on MySpace, a social networking website). Such “evidence” was 
enough to trigger an investigation by command that could end with a military discharge, 
meaning Gwen could have been released from her military contract and lost her hard-earned 
military benefits. Throughout her time in the service, Gwen avoided dating women and would 
periodically go on dates with men to “keep up appearances.”  
Despite placing great pressure on service women not to be a “slut,” “bitch,” or lesbian, 
service men often objectified the women in their units. Marie detailed how someone in her unit 
forgot to bring a pallet of water to their sweltering job site in Iraq. Her fellow unit members 
“asked” Marie to go to the nearby infantry unit stationed down the road to ask for water. She 
explained: “I’m like, ‘Why don’t I go ask them for water? I’m a girl. It’s been like five months 
since they saw one probably.’ You know? (But) It didn’t matter what you looked like. I’m still a 
girl. I walked down the road and not only did I get the water, they carried it back for me. And 
they gave me cold water out of the fridge.” She explained that after the water incident, her fellow 
service members knew that having Marie could be an asset, getting men – both American and 
Iraqis –to get what they wanted while in a war zone. She further explained: “There was a point 
where the guys in my squad were talking to security and local nationals and they were pointing 
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at me and laughing. A green-eyed blonde, you know? They kept on pointing at me and were 
jokingly selling me for candy. One of the Iraqis was trying to buy me.”  
Throughout my fieldwork, former service women described military service as walking a 
tightrope. A service woman’s actions, real or perceived, could determine whether she socially, 
emotionally, and physically survived. This often led to a lot of self-monitoring, as well as 
policing other women’s behavior, with the hopes of avoiding being labeled, isolated, 
discriminated against, harassed, and /or assaulted. Consequently, women, as well as LGBTQ 
service members were attempting to integrate and survive within an institution that (re)produces 
and reinforces a gendered hierarchy that only values those soldiers who align with the hyper-
masculine (and heteronormative) supercitizen ideal. Despite the repeal of Don’t Ask Don’t Tell in 
2011 and the lifting of combat exclusion for service women in 2013, the military’s gender 
hierarchy will have lifelong repercussions for the Post 9/11 generation of service members who 
served under these policies.  
What are the effects of this gendered hierarchy on women veterans’ subjectivities? As 
discussed in Chapter 3, veteran identity is a complex social process, and both former service men 
and women feel unstable and forgotten despite living in a militarized society. The gendered 
hierarchy produced in the military continues in veteran spaces, subordinating women veterans 
through a hierarchy of valor and a fraternity of service that naturalizes the hyper-masculine 
supercitizen. Consequently, women veterans experience an acute sense of marginalization and 






Erasure of Women in Veteran Spaces 
 Within veteran spaces, social scientists have documented a hierarchy of valor, shaping 
social relationships among veterans. Within this hierarchy, “real” veterans are those who have 
specific military operational specialties, times and places of service, and levels of sacrifice; those 
veterans who did not deploy to a war zone, served in non-combat roles, were not drafted, and/or 
did not experience loss and injury are devalued (Lomsky-Feder 2004; Gardiner 2013). In other 
words, certain military experiences are normalized and valued. As discussed by Gardiner (2013), 
a Post-9/11 combat marine would defer to the “octogenarian vet who parachuted behind enemy 
lines on D-Day as part of the nearly suicidal effort to secure a beachhead” and to “the ‘honored 
dead’ — those buried at Arlington, or whose names have been chiseled into the black marble of 
the Vietnam Memorial” — since that Marine was not drafted and survived the war (74). Yet, this 
hierarchy of valor is in tension with the fraternity of service amongst veterans and serves to set 
veterans apart from civilians as supercitizens. 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, those who serve in the military are considered supercitizens, 
they risk life and limb to protect the nation, and as a result, they are viewed as surpassing 
civilians in moral authority, virtue, and discipline. Through the soldiering process and combat 
policies that exclude women, the military’s gendered hierarchy presents the supercitizen as a 
heterosexual male, protecting his mother, wife, children, and fellow citizens by commanding and 
inflicting violence on behalf of the nation (Weinstein and D’Amico 1999; Sjoberg and Via 2010; 
Allen 2000). As the phrasing implies, the “fraternity” of service that exists among former service 
men is shaped by the military’s gendered supercitizenship, setting the foundation of veterans’ 
social relationships. Consequently, women are not able to define and police the hierarchy of 
valor and fraternity of service within veteran spaces. As argued by Enloe, “women may serve the 
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military, but they can never be permitted to be the military. They must remain “camp followers” 
(1983: 15). Without the ability to shape the norms, values, and practices, women’s participation 
and status within the veteran community is that of camp follower. Consequently, CSI women 
veterans employed strategies to bring visibility to their particular veteran experiences and needs.  
Given that militarized masculinity is the foundation of participation and status within the 
veteran community, I witnessed former service women defending their military service 
throughout my fieldwork. Since returning home, Brittany had countless experiences in which her 
veteran status was questioned or denied simply because of her gender. During a scholarship 
fundraiser for CSI student veterans, a woman invalidated Brittany’s military service, stating “you 
did not serve like my husband served.” She described “the first time it happened [that I was told I 
was not a veteran], I was extremely offended. It was Marc [her now husband who is a veteran as 
well].” Brittany looked to make her military service visible to all by wearing her dog tags and 
representing the Veterans Office on and off campus. By making herself visible, Brittany opened 
herself up to scrutiny. Most assumed she was wearing her husband’s dog tags, leaving Brittany 
with two choices: keep silent or engage in an awkward and possibly tense defense of her service. 
In spite of her negative experiences, Brittany identified not only as a veteran but as a combat 
veteran, claiming status within the hierarchy of valor. Brittany explained: “A lot of people don’t 
[consider me a combat veteran] because I wasn’t on land. But I actually had a few traumatic 
experiences even just being on the ship. Aircraft carrier bombs have cameras and part of my job 
was to watch those cameras. If something were to happen or [if the bombs] didn’t go off, then I 
had to pick up a phone and let somebody know.” To prove that she was a combat veteran, 
Brittany highlighted the combat medals she earned during her deployment in Iraq. Unfortunately, 
Brittany’s experiences are not unique; men questioning and outright denying women’s entry into 
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the hierarchy of valor and fraternity of service drastically shapes veterans’ social relationships, 
leading to women veterans’ invisibility. 
Marie experienced firsthand the marginalization of women veterans. Before serving as 
the director of the Veterans Office, Marie lacked an interest in joining veteran service 
organizations (VSO), expecting to see and experience the military’s gendered hierarchy. Upon 
becoming director, Marie joined several organizations, including the American Legion and 
Veterans of Foreign Wars, hoping to establish a community-wide network for CSI student 
veterans. Unfortunately, her concerns proved to be well-founded. Members often commented on 
her looks, stating they would not have kicked her out of their foxhole. They also asked if she was 
there to join the auxiliary, a service organization made up mostly of veterans’ wives that work 
alongside VSOs, or if she served in the Women's Army Corps (WAC), the women's branch of 
the United States Army from 1942 until the integration of women in the military in 1978. By 
commenting on her looks and asking if Marie was a WAC or a military spouse, they gave a clear 
message: women are outside the fraternity of service and the hierarchy of valor. Marie believed 
that in order to make these spaces women friendly, someone would have to be the first woman 
member to join and educate others, changing these organizations from the inside while 
increasing women veterans’ visibility.  
In response to experiences of invisibility, Marie, as the director of the Veterans Office, 
looked to educate and redefine relations among veterans as well as to improve veteran-civilian 
relations on the CSI campus. She began a month-long celebration of service women and women 
veterans in March, nationally recognized as Women’s History Month. Why did Marie feel 
compelled to celebrate women’s military service for an entire month, on par with the 
programming she organized throughout November in honor of Veterans Day? She hoped to 
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celebrate the contributions of service women, shine a light on the difficulties facing women in 
the military, and ultimately attempt to change how the veterans’ community and the wider public 
understands and treats women veterans. For example, the Veterans Office created a poster 
campaign entitled “She Served,” featuring a CSI woman veteran, her picture, deployment 
history, and military occupational specialty. The goals of this poster campaign were to increase 
women veterans’ visibility, publicly recognize their contributions to the Armed Forces, and 
dispel the stereotype that only men are veterans. Along with the poster campaign, Marie planned 
a campus viewing of the documentary “The Invisible War” for Women’s History Month, 
bringing awareness to the epidemic of military sexual assault that disproportionately affects 
women. The majority of military sexual assault survivors are service women from junior enlisted 
ranks who are under the age of 25 (SAPRO 2011; Torreon 2013; USCCR 2013; Darehshori and 
Rhoad 2015; Darehshori 2016). The documentary filmmakers argue that sexual assault occurs at 
alarming rates given an ineffective two tier reporting system33 that gives military commanders, 
not legally trained military prosecutors, the responsibility of investigating and deciding whether 
or not to pursue sexual assault cases. Although command structure is operationally effective, it 
has serious limitations, resulting in a culture of impunity and injustice around sexual violence.  
Marie expected push back against the viewing of “The Invisible War” given the sensitive 
subject matter. Yet, the only stakeholders on campus to object to the screening were members of 
the veterans’ community. Specifically, the veterans’ section of CORE 100, a required general 
education course that introduces students to contemporary America’s constitutional democracy, 
multiracial society, and market economy via the social sciences, looked to boycott the event 
since they felt the documentary demonized the military and overstated the military’s problem 
with sexual assault. Their CORE 100 professor agreed to allow those students uncomfortable 
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with the documentary to be excused from attending the screening without penalty. Marie reached 
out to the professor, stating that the film was on a sensitive topic but the film itself was not 
controversial. Through first person testimonies and interviews with advocates, journalists, mental 
health professionals, and high-ranking members of the military and the Department of Defense, 
the film addresses the sexual assault of both men and women in the military. While the rate is 
much higher among service women, Marie emphasized that there are more men who are sexually 
assaulted in the military. By taking a stance without having engaged with the material presented 
in the film, Marie argued, veterans were removing themselves from a discussion within their 
course section and with the wider community to critically reflect on the strengths and limits of 
the military. In other words, they were avoiding one of the goals of CORE 100, discussing issues 
that affect the civil and political rights of Americans. Ultimately, the event was a success, 
providing CSI students with the opportunity to openly discuss sexual assault in the military as a 
symptom of a national epidemic of violence, specifically violence against women. Still, the 
boycott served to reaffirm Marie’s concern about the pushback generated when women veterans’ 
challenge the normative gender roles within the military’s gendered hierarchy.  
Despite negative experiences common to former service women, those who utilized 
services offered by the Veterans Office had positive experiences, primarily due to Marie’s 
exhaustive efforts to assist all veterans with acquiring benefits and accessing housing, health, and 
employment opportunities. Rachel, a Navy veteran who served in the 1980s, described how her 
time at CSI was her first positive experience as a veteran. She explained: 
They asked me here on campus if I was a veteran. I hesitated. They explained I 
wouldn’t have to pay the $200 application fee. I was unemployed and that is why 
I was going back to school. So, I checked off (on the admissions application) that 
I was a veteran. [In the past,] when I had mentioned I was a veteran it was always 
a negative experience. And if it was positive, they'd ask me so many questions it 
would just bring back horrible memories. When I checked the veteran box off (on 
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the application), I didn't realize it was going to become this whole thing. I went 
straight to veteran services and they worked with me. From there, all my 
experiences on campus regarding veteran services were positive. I've actually 
written a couple of letters to the people in charge that my experiences have been 
phenomenal. The support I've received and the help I've gotten from Marie and 
the Registrar were really impressive. 
CSI women employed various strategies in veteran spaces to make visible their 
experiences and needs, attempting to reshape the norms, values, and practices that stem from the 
military’s gendered hierarchy. CSI women veterans wore and discussed signifiers of military 
service, joined and represented veteran organizations, and created programs and events to 
educate others to celebrate the contributions of service women and shine a light on the 
difficulties of military service. Yet, their strategies to be included in the hierarchy of valor and 
fraternity of service were met with attempts to silence women veterans. When wearing or 
discussing signifiers of military service or joining and representing veteran organizations, CSI 
women veterans were questioned: Did you really serve? Are you a real veteran? Isn’t your 
husband the veteran? Furthermore, they were often sexualized in veteran spaces. When women 
veterans expressed the difficulties they experienced in the service and as veterans, former service 
men felt that these critiques demonized the military and/or were exaggerations, and pushed back 
against a critical discussion of the military’s gendered hierarchy. 
In spite of women veterans’ strategies, the military’s gendered hierarchy was reproduced 
in veteran spaces by former service men who enforced militarized masculinity via the hierarchy 
of valor and a fraternity of service. At the university level, there were concerns about the 
marginalization of women veterans.  This led to the collection of data in order to identify trends 
in needs and services, assess what CUNY resources are already available to women veterans, and 
create CUNY-wide initiatives that responded to women veterans’ experiences and needs. While 
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the university looked to empower women veterans, CSI women veterans employed strategies of 
self-erasure, distancing themselves from civilians. 
 
Strategies of Self-Erasure in the face of Institutional “Empowerment” Policies 
The CUNY Office of Veterans Affairs (COVA) looked to assess the needs of a growing 
student veteran population that had tripled in size from 2008 to 2012 (CUNY April 2013). 
Despite comprising 25% of the CUNY student veteran population, there was evidence that 
women veterans were less likely to seek campus resources and services than men.  The logical 
step for the university was to create an initiative to recruit, retain, and graduate women veterans. 
At the start of my fieldwork, Marie looked to conduct research to gauge women veterans’ 
interest and need but lacked the resources to conduct an effective outreach initiative. She 
explained that identifying and tracking how many CUNY students are veterans was a challenge 
since CUNY lacked a university-wide definition of “veteran” or a single coding system to track 
whether a student is utilizing veteran benefits (CUNY April 2013). Given these tracking issues, 
Marie conducted outreach to those CSI students who identified as having served in the Armed 
Forces on the CUNY admissions application and contacted all CSI students receiving veteran 
benefits. Marie utilized this incomplete data to conduct surveys each semester. Though women 
veterans made up at least 27% of the CSI student veteran population, less than 5% participated in 
surveys, which limited the data on women veterans’ interests and needs. Marie joined the 
CUNY-wide initiative for women veterans led by COVA and the Project for Return and 
Opportunity in Veterans Education (PROVE), a NY based non-profit funded by the Robin Hood 
Foundation34 that works with existing campus professionals to assist veterans with their 
transition from military service to college life and beyond. In an effort to assess the needs of 
142 
 
women veterans, COVA and PROVE would conduct focus groups on all CUNY campuses to 
establish a strong foundation for the women veterans’ initiative. Nancy, a social work intern with 
PROVE, was charged with spearheading the COVA initiative to identify trends in needs and 
services as well as assess what CUNY resources are already available to women veterans.  
Marie and I were surprised that this initiative would be Nancy’s responsibility since she 
had little experience with military issues, was a social work Masters student, and was not a full-
time COVA staff member. Was COVA committed to creating a successful women veterans’ 
initiative? COVA staff members were also concerned with Nancy’s inexperience. Given that 
Marie was a combat veteran and the director of the CSI Veterans Office, and given my policy 
and research experience with women veterans, COVA asked us to assist Nancy with learning 
about women veterans. We held a conference call to discuss current issues and trends, and 
provided Nancy with a list of books, articles, and documentaries that addressed the experiences 
of women in the military and the obstacles they experience upon returning home. Upon 
reviewing the potential focus group questions, Marie agreed to hold a focus group with CSI 
women veterans but concluded she needed to conduct the recruitment. Given difficulties with 
outreach and fearing a negative experience for women veterans who have rarely or never 
engaged with veterans services on campus, Marie decided to only reach out to women veterans 
who often visited the office and attended events. The focus group was described as an “excellent 
opportunity for all of you to share your experiences as well as provide valuable insights on what 
CUNY and CSI can improve.” As an incentive to participate, Marie offered lunch and a raffle at 
the end of the session for a Barnes and Noble $50 gift card. To ensure a positive experience, 
Marie asked that I sit in on the focus group. It was important for Marie to have a non-staff 
member who could help Nancy manage the focus group and reassure the participants that it 
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would be a positive experience. 
The day of the focus group, five out of the nine participants canceled at the last minute or 
did not attend. Those who participated either worked as CSI student veteran work-study students 
or had developed a close relationship with Marie after receiving veteran services on campus. 
Given the participants’ positive experiences with the Veterans Office, CSI women veterans 
during the focus group emphasized feeling disconnected from other veterans and therefore 
lacking a sense of comradery and community. Nancy asked participants what they would like to 
see on campus tailored for women veterans. They explained there was a need for social activities 
to meet other women veterans. For some of the women, the focus group was the first time they’d 
met despite being part of a small group who regularly participated in veteran events and services 
or visited the Veterans Office. Several participants described struggling to meet both men and 
women veterans. When they did, it was often accidentally in class. They found the exchange of 
numbers and email addresses comforting, since they now knew there were fellow former service 
members on campus.  
As a member of the CSI student veteran club, Brittany pointed out that there were plenty 
of opportunities to meet veterans on and off campus through the club’s social activities and 
community service events. But she explained that very few women participated since “so many 
women don't recognize themselves as veterans. They want nothing to do with it, or be part of 
that. Mainly the members of the club are men.”  Despite feeling more comfortable around former 
service men compared to civilians, women veterans did not feel like “one of the boys.” Annabel 
explained,  
I feel like I have to censor what I have to say around civilians. With veterans, I 
can be more open. Naturally, I'm a curser and I am loud. So being around other 
veterans it’s easier to be more carefree. Civilians get touchy. They think, 'You're a 
veteran. What’s going to happen? What’s going on in your head? Are you crazy?’ 
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But do I feel like one of the guys when I am around male veterans? I wouldn't say 
that. 
 
Brittany agreed with Annabel, stating: “I feel more comfortable (around veterans) than I do just 
civilians. Because vets have their own communication. I feel like I can talk about anything and 
another veteran will understand me better than a normal civilian. I don’t feel like one of the guys. 
(But) I don’t get offended by any of their jokes, which can be pretty bad and sexist.” As 
discussed in previous chapters veterans develop militarized identities that reinforce the military-
civilian divide, causing them to feel misunderstood and out of place in a world they define as 
civilian. Additionally, as outlined earlier in this chapter, the hierarchy of valor and fraternity of 
service that dominates veteran social relationships limits women veterans’ ability to shape the 
norms, values, and practices within the veteran community, resulting in a feeling of invisibility 
and a lack of community. CSI women veterans who participated in the focus group revealed that 
they did not employ strategies to gain visibility among civilians. Instead, they employed 
strategies of self-erasure in civilian spaces.  
The focus group participants described their interactions with civilians on campus as 
unwelcoming and at times contentious. Throughout her time at CSI, Annabel described 
experiencing insensitivity towards those who served, particularly against service women. During 
one of her sociology classes, the professor discussed the role of women in the military. She 
described how a woman in the class explained women shouldn’t have “certain jobs because they 
can't do certain things like men can.” Annabel described her internal dialogue during the class 
discussion: “Are you in the military? How can you speak on women not being able to do certain 
jobs when you are not in the military yourself?” Annabel became so upset that she could not 
respond to the student. She explained to the focus group that “I can do certain things that men 
145 
 
can't do. There were plenty of times during training that I outshined and another female 
outshined men.” By the student’s claiming that women cannot do what men can do, Annabel felt 
that her efforts in the service were being erased. She explained: “Don't discredit my work and 
don't discredit other women's work that has outshined men in the military.” When civilians argue 
that women should not be in the service since “they can't do certain things like men can,” it is 
clear that militarized masculinity is not only a military construct but is widely accepted among 
civilians. Thus, current and former service women are marginalized not only by fellow former 
service men but also by civilians, who also understand that the supercitizen can only be male. 
Annabel’s experience in her sociology class resonated with the other focus group 
participants, who described class debates on the role of service women as uncomfortable and 
sometimes hostile. Yet, Rachel argued that such debates are an opportunity for women veterans 
to educate others. She explained that discussing her experiences led to “some intelligent people 
coming up to me afterwards and say[ing] ‘Wow that was cool’ while other kids just hated my 
guts.” Despite the mixed results, Rachel felt it was important for women veterans to take those 
opportunities to “speak up” and “set them straight.” Yet, earlier in the focus group discussion, 
Rachel did acknowledge having negative experiences when identifying as a veteran, with both 
other veterans and civilians. Annabel argued that ultimately as a woman veteran she could not 
always serve as a defender or representative of all women veterans. She argued, “I wasn't there to 
change people's minds or their opinions.” During this particular incident, another veteran began 
to dialogue with the student, which encouraged Annabel to speak up and discuss her experiences 
in the military. Yet, the student “was so adamant that women can't do certain jobs. Even after I 
said something and the other veteran said something. I was just like, really?”  
Given the prevalence of gendered supercitizenship, both Annabel and Rachel point to the 
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marginalization of women veterans in veteran and civilian spaces. Women veterans employ 
differing strategies to navigate their veteran identity depending on whether they are dealing with 
civilians or veterans. Generally, CSI women veterans felt pressure to represent and to defend not 
only their service but the military service of all women. Yet, this feeling was particularly 
heightened when civilians questioned their veteran-ness since civilians are the unexceptional 
majority who lack the training, virtues, and experiences of supercitizens. 
Ultimately, the focus group revealed one major finding relevant to COVA’s goal to create 
an initiative to recruit, retain, and graduate women veterans: women veterans were longing for a 
sense of belonging and community. Despite this need, COVA initiatives did not create tailored 
services and programming to assist with building a sense of belonging and community but 
instead focused on employment opportunities. COVA partnered with New York City businesses 
to focus on women veterans’ preparation for internships and full-time professional opportunities. 
In partnership with JPMorgan Chase, COVA and John Jay College of Criminal Justice hosted the 
2014 Women Veterans Empowerment Symposium. The stated goal of this symposium was to 
introduce women veterans to corporate leaders and human resources professionals to explore 
civilian employment, entrepreneurship, health care, wellness, and housing (CUNY July 2014). 
Mindy Bockstein (CUNY July 2014: 1), John Jay’s Executive Director of External Affairs, 
described the obstacles women veterans face:  
Too many women have experienced trauma on top of trauma in the military—
they are facing all the challenges of war and then they face additional trauma in 
the form of harassment and sexual assault by superiors and colleagues who 
allegedly ‘have your back.’ They are coming home with a lot of experiences that 
they have to process and, as a result, they don’t always take advantage of 
activities and programs, and they don’t self-identify. 
 
Given such challenges, the sessions “focused on capacity-building, increasing access to 
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information, and developing personal presentation” (CUNY July 2014: 1). Session topics were 
wide-ranging, including translating military skills to civilian employment opportunities, how to 
transition from the military into the business world, internship and fellowship opportunities, and 
legal representation, housing rights and eviction support. Several of the sessions featured women 
veterans as presenters, discussing their transition into the business world, particularly in finance. 
The symposium served a dual purpose. It looked to assist women veterans with 
preparation for internships and full-time professional opportunities while serving as an 
opportunity for corporations to gain “a greater understanding of their [women veterans] needs 
and concerns as they transition to civilian life and prepare for civilian professional opportunities” 
and “…valuable insights on ways to foster their reputations as an organization of choice for 
veterans” (CUNY June 2014: 1). To this end, the symposium held a second track of sessions to 
improve understanding and awareness about the concerns of women veterans regarding the 
business sector, covering topics such as Military Sexual Trauma (MST) and mental health as 
well as strategies for recruiting and retaining women veterans. Marie was invited to speak for the 
business sector track but was unable to present due to a scheduling conflict. She asked if I could 
fill in and create a presentation on the pivotal role of women in the service, which I accepted 
given my interest in understanding how CUNY was defining women veterans’ empowerment. I 
presented on the policies that shaped women’s military service from the Revolution to present 
day conflicts, highlighting the obstacles to equal treatment for women in the military and on the 
homefront. 
This secondary track for businesses was not surprising given the CUNY Task Force on 
Veterans Affairs recommendations to improve CUNY student veterans’ experience (discussed in 
Chapter 1). In April 2013, the Task Force on Veterans Affairs published a report identifying five 
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areas to improve CUNY veterans’ services, including the need to forge relationships with the 
corporate sector in order to provide career opportunities to veterans upon graduation (CUNY 
April 2013). By establishing relationships with the corporate sector, the task force argued that 
veterans, like all CUNY students, are concerned with being successful in the classroom and 
attracting career opportunities upon graduation. Yet, unlike other CUNY students, veterans 
experience extremely high unemployment rates and may contend with “the prospect of 
significant cuts in the federal budget in the coming years, with the Pentagon carrying a share of 
those cuts,” limiting employment opportunities where they could utilize military skills sets, 
including working as military contractors and with security firms (CUNY April 2013: 20). This 
report explained that CUNY could provide veterans with “a smooth bridge between college and 
career” or “a credible pipeline for veterans from military service, to student, to professional” by 
establishing relationships with businesses that have “committed to hiring veterans to design 
internship programs, recruitment opportunities, and career counseling services that will create 
smooth transitions between college and career for the student veterans” (CUNY April 2013: 21). 
The task force described how “many American businesses have established special employment 
programs that set aside a number of jobs in the corporation specifically for veterans” (CUNY 
April 2013: 20). For example, the report describes “a group called Veterans on Wall Street is 
dedicated to hiring veterans in the financial services industry” and “a group of companies, 
including Pepsi, Travelers and Xerox, among many others, have created the 10,000 Jobs 
Challenge in which they will hire 10,000 veterans before the end of 2013” (CUNY April 2013: 
20). 
However, the task force report failed to put corporate hiring programs into context. The 
corporate sector began to openly recruit veterans due to the tax incentive programs established 
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by the Obama administration to combat the high unemployment rate among post-9/11 veterans, 
which reached 11.5% at the end of 2010 as a consequence of the withdrawal of troops and the 
effects of the Great Recession (Pew 2011: 4). On November 21, 2011, President Obama signed 
the Veterans Opportunity to Work to Hire Heroes (VOW) Act of 2011 into law, establishing two 
tax credits. The Returning Heroes Tax Credit created a hiring tax credit to provide an incentive 
for businesses to hire unemployed veterans, providing employers a credit of up to 40 percent of 
the first $14,000 of wages (up to $5,600) per employee, while the Wounded Warrior Tax Credit 
doubled the existing tax credit for long-term unemployed veterans with service-connected 
disabilities, giving companies a credit of 40 percent of the first $24,000 of wages (up to $9,600) 
per employee (Cloud 2012). Similarly, the Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC) established 
tax incentives for employers who hired and retained veterans, reducing the employer’s federal 
income tax liability by as much as $9,600 per employee hired (DOL 2017). JPMorgan Chase, the 
sponsor of CUNY’s Women Veterans Empowerment Symposium, launched the 100,000 Jobs 
Mission in 2011 with ten other companies, with the goal of hiring 100,000 veterans by 2020 
(JPMorgan Chase 2014). In less than three years, they reached their goal, hiring about 140,832 
veterans and saving millions of dollars through generous federal tax credits (JPMorgan Chase 
2014). By providing corporations access to women veterans, the fastest growing demographic 
within the veteran population and 25% of the CUNY veterans’ population, the university looked 
to “create incentives for current and future students to complete their studies” and ultimately, to 
“enhance CUNY’s competitive appeal in the eyes of veterans,” ensuring that millions in federal 
veterans benefits and financial aid would continue to enter the CUNY system (CUNY April 
2013: 20).  
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By partnering with corporations to provide women veterans’ access to potential 
employers and “empowering” how-to and skills seminars, the Women Veterans Empowerment 
Symposium did not fulfill its stated goal of providing women veterans with a concrete path to 
employment. Without establishing an employment pipeline program or a series of yearly 
employment symposia, CUNY looked to ensure its own fiscal interests above the employment 
opportunities it could offer women veterans. When policies shape programming and services to 
“empower” stakeholders, risk is shifted away from institutions to the individual while reducing 
substantive welfare functions and services (Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Sharma 2006). By 
analyzing why events like CUNY’s Women Veterans Empowerment Symposium are created, we 
see that the federal government’s tax incentives for hiring veterans and the restructuring of 
veteran benefits serve to enrich corporations and “non-profit” universities without providing a 
robust and effective safety net of reintegration and readjustment services for returning GIs. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, universities across the United States have engaged in erroneous, 
deceptive or misleading advertising, sales and enrollment practices, misrepresented job prospects 
as well as transferability of credits and accreditation status, and assumed a greater role in 
providing veteran reintegration and readjustment services and programming in order to collect 
millions from veterans’ Post 9/11 G.I. Bill benefits (Baldwin, Meyer, and Tuchman 2016; 
Hefling 2016; U.S. Senate July 2016). When focusing on women within the veteran population, 
we see that the university not only failed to provide a formal employment bridge but also ignored 
women veterans’ requests for tailored services and programming. By ignoring the needs of 
women veterans, the university failed to assist with building a sense of belonging and 





This dissertation asks: how are post-9/11 veterans defining, (re)creating, and contesting 
citizenship in the contemporary U.S.? By studying a localized community of post-9/11 veterans, 
I look to understand dilemmas of U.S. citizenship at a time when the U.S. is engaged in a global 
War on Terror using less than 1% of the U.S. population as paid volunteers. Soldiers and 
veterans occupy states and spaces of exception, marking military citizens as distinct from 
civilians. Service members sacrifice their rights and in return receive privileges and benefits 
upon becoming veterans that are not offered to civilians. This serves to create a distinct 
experience of citizenship called “military citizenship” (Trundle 2012, 2015).  Military citizenship 
benefits the nation by creating a pool of potential citizens willing to serve the nation-state, and it 
serves service members by allowing them to demand social rights, inclusion and recognition they 
believe are owed to them as a result of their service. Yet, military citizenship is unstable. Not all 
veterans can access the benefits and privileges of military service, including its social rights, 
inclusion and recognition. Veterans often encounter obstacles to receiving privileges and benefits 
that infringe on the “rights” they earned through military service.  
My ethnographic project illustrates how military citizenship is defined, (re)created, and 
contested. A college campus was the ideal field site to conduct my ethnography. By documenting 
veterans accessing entitlements and services, like the Post-9/11 G.I. Bill, while they reintegrate 
and readjust to “civilian” life, my research highlights how military citizenship is constructed.  I 
was able to explore veteran interactions with institutions and individuals on the college campus 
and consider the ways that interests, access, and needs differ between veterans and civilians. 
Through accessing their educational benefits, veterans and civilians were brought together, 
revealing how members of a local community understand and experience the military-civilian 
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divide and shape notions of post-9/11 era citizenship. By analyzing the tension between military 
citizenship and the lived experiences of U.S. veterans, I highlight how military citizens 
experience effaced social rights, inclusion and recognition on the post-9/11 homefront.  
 
Findings and Implications 
Through my fieldwork at the College of Staten Island, it became clear that aspects of 
veteran reintegration and readjustment are funded by the federal government via the Post 9/11 
G.I. Bill. With this funding, educational institutions across the country experienced a surge in the 
student veteran population and in federal dollars. To comply with federal policies and 
recommendations around veterans’ benefits, educational institutions not only offered tailored 
educational and career services but also assisted with the complex process of reintegration and 
readjustment. As a result, educational institutions utilized extensive veteran programming and 
services in order to recruit and retain student veterans and ensure a steady stream of federal 
dollars. By continuing a costly veteran entitlement program that is supplemented by other federal 
and state veteran programs, the federal government looked not only to offset the cost of military 
service but also to maintain the manpower needs of an all-volunteer military in the post-Cold 
War and post-9/11 eras.  
Material benefits and privileges granted to CSI student veterans through the Post 9/11 
G.I. Bill, Principles of Excellence, and the recommendations of the CUNY Task Force on 
Veterans Affairs highlight how veterans are an exception to the neoliberal status quo experienced 
by other college students. In other words, veteran exceptionalism is built into military 
citizenship. Thus, when compared to their civilian counterparts, veterans appear to be less 
affected by neoliberalism; they have greater choice over their education, finances, and ultimately 
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their future, reinforcing veterans’ military citizenship. Yet, unlike their civilian counterparts, 
student veterans remain financially constrained in spite of their access to ample federal funding, 
due to their socioeconomic status. As my fieldwork progressed, it became clear that the material 
benefits and privileges of military citizenship on their own would not be sufficient to help 
veterans acclimate to civilian life. I witnessed veterans struggle in spite of their exceptional 
access to social rights (when compared to their civilian peers) because they felt excluded and 
unrecognized. By analyzing veterans’ effaced social inclusion and recognition during the ROTC 
Town Hall and the Flags for the Fallen event at the CSI campus, I showed that veteran identity 
is socially constituted throughout the individual’s lifetime in military and non-military 
institutional and social contexts. When lacking the structure and meaning provided by the 
military that espouses military citizens as supercitizens, CSI student veterans were confronting 
reintegration and readjustment while feeling misunderstood and out of place in a civilian world. 
Thus, they were navigating a liminal space despite living in a militarized United States that 
predominately upholds military citizens as supercitizens. 
The debates around the establishment of the Army Reserve Officers' Training Corps 
(ROTC) on the CSI campus made clear that CSI student veterans did not want to share, either 
privately or publicly, their experiences of U.S. foreign intervention and its complex and 
problematic effects abroad and on the homefront. In seeking to better understand why faculty 
members’ critique of the U.S. military was understood and experienced as an attack on current 
and former service members, I conducted one-on-one confidential interviews with CSI students.  
During these interviews, CSI student veterans agreed with faculty members and scholars 
studying U.S. militarization that nationalist rhetoric is the foundation of military training, 
shaping how service members think and behave to ensure they follow orders established by the 
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chain of command and defend the military, the nation, and its citizens. CSI veterans often 
described how the imposing command structure created a lack of agency and often made them 
feel disposable and at the mercy of the commanders’ whims. They also described soldiering as 
unpredictable, intense, and traumatic, highlighting the long-term effects of fear, violence, 
mourning, and death that comes with military deployments. Despite discussing how the military, 
the government, and the media manipulate Americans to believe in the value of war-making to 
justify U.S. empire, CSI veterans ultimately defend the U.S. military’s adventurism in the post-
9/11 era. As hyper-militarized citizens, CSI veterans used tropes of American exceptionalism to 
defend U.S. foreign policy, a problematic consensus view among CSI veterans that also served 
as a defense of their military service. By believing the United States is worth defending because 
of its founding principles and institutions, CSI veterans were also defending their military 
service; their service not only provided personal benefits and opportunities but also preserved 
national and global freedom, security, peace, and democracy. Thus, they affirmed the view that 
the nation-state is worth defending: its founding principles, institutions, and its citizens, 
particularly military citizens, are exceptional. By representing themselves as hyper militarized 
citizens, CSI veterans made visible the differences they believed existed between themselves and 
civilians.  
CSI’s Flags for the Fallen event appeared to frame the college as a military-friendly 
community, celebrating supercitizens and military values as well as highlighting the ideological 
role of veterans in the reproduction of the nation, military citizenship, and the supercitizen 
construct. Yet, events like Flags for the Fallen exemplify the ways that public visibility of 
military citizens’ supercitizenship is limited to ceremonies and celebratory events: military 
citizens are honored and remembered only during specific spatial and temporal moments.  CSI 
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veterans questioned their role and value in a militarized society due to their limited visibility, the 
anti-militarization climate on campus that highlighted the negative aspects of American foreign 
policy, and experiences with poor separation, readjustment, and reintegration services. In other 
words, lacking the structure and meaning provided by the military, CSI veterans were 
confronting reintegration and readjustment within a civilian world whose institutions and 
ideologies did not uphold the special status of veterans as supercitizens. Rituals can 
create communitas, resulting in feelings of belonging that serve to strengthen communities. Yet, 
rituals can also serve to set parts of the community apart from the wider collective. Whether a 
veteran or a civilian believes in the valuing of former members as supercitizens, Veterans Day 
events set veterans apart from the wider community, marking veterans as liminal. Depending on 
the social context, veteran-ness marks either a privileged other or a marginalized other. Yet, 
given the limited spatial and temporal occurrences that frame veterans as a privileged other, 
events like Flags for the Fallen exacerbate their differences with civilians, highlighting the 
tension between nationalist ideology and the lived experiences of former service members. 
By analyzing women veterans’ strategies in veteran and civilian spaces, I highlighted 
how liminality varies among veterans. Veteran identity builds on the experience of soldiering but 
is socially constituted throughout the individual’s lifetime in military and non-military 
institutional and social contexts. It is also shaped by the gendered hierarchy produced in the 
military and reproduced in veteran and civilian contexts, which naturalizes the hyper-masculine 
supercitizen while subordinating women veterans through a hierarchy of valor and a fraternity of 
service. As a result, women veterans experience an acute sense of marginalization, employing 
strategies to make visible their experiences and needs and attempting to reshape the norms, 
values, and practices that stem from the military’s gendered hierarchy. CSI women veterans 
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wore and discussed signifiers of military service, joined and represented veteran organizations, 
and created programs and events to educate others to celebrate the contributions of service 
women and shine a light on the difficulties of military service. Yet, their strategies to be included 
were silenced by former service men who enforced militarized masculinity via the hierarchy of 
valor and a fraternity of service, reproducing the military’s gendered hierarchy in veteran spaces. 
In civilian spaces, the military’s gendered hierarchy was also reproduced, and the CSI women 
veterans felt pressured to represent and defend not only their service but the military service of 
all women. Their feelings of marginalization among civilians were particularly heightened; as 
supercitizens, they understood civilians as the unexceptional majority. As a result, CSI women 
veterans employed strategies of self-erasure, distancing themselves further from civilians.  
At the university level, there were concerns about the marginalization of women 
veterans.  This led to the collection of data in order to access current CUNY resources and to 
identify trends in needs and services for women veterans. The university held focus groups to 
help shape recruitment, improve retention and increase graduation rates among women veterans. 
The CSI focus group revealed one major finding relevant to CUNY’s goal: women veterans were 
longing for a sense of belonging and community. Despite this need, CUNY initiatives did not 
create tailored services and programming to assist with building community but instead focused 
on employment opportunities. By partnering with corporations to provide women veterans’ 
access to potential employers and “empowering” how-to and skills seminars, CUNY’s Women 
Veterans Empowerment Symposium did not fulfill its stated goal of providing women veterans 
with a concrete path to employment. Without establishing an employment pipeline program or a 
series of yearly employment symposia, CUNY ultimately looked to ensure its own fiscal 
interests above the employment opportunities it could offer women veterans. The university not 
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only failed to provide a formal employment bridge but also ignored women veterans’ requests 
for tailored services and programming. By ignoring the needs of women veterans, the university 
failed to assist with building a sense of belonging and community among women veterans, 
further marginalizing them.  
By contributing to the growing body of ethnographic accounts of veteran experiences 
(Finley 2011; MacLeish 2013; Hautzinger and Scandlyn 2014; Wool 2015), this dissertation 
offers a detailed policy analysis of the Post-9/11 G.I. Bill to underscore the limits of belonging 
for military citizens in the United States. Specifically, I highlight the central contradiction of 
veterans in the neoliberal era nationally and locally by analyzing how veterans utilize a federal 
entitlement on a college campus. Veterans are one of the few social categories of citizen 
receiving entitlements in an era characterized by the retreat of the welfare state. As my 
dissertation shows, veteran entitlements have expanded. This is particularly true in the current 
administration. The Harry W. Colmery Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2017 (Public 
Law 115-48), known as the Forever G.I. Bill, was signed into law by President Trump on August 
16, 2017. One of its notable provisions expands Post-9/11 veteran educational benefits by 
terminating the 15-year time limitation to use Post-9/11 G.I. Bill benefits for veterans who left 
active duty on or after January 1, 2013. As neoliberal supercitizens, Post-9/11 veterans’ 
experiences of military citizenship are unique. Historically, the status of veterans was less 
exceptional and often contested, as discussed in detail in chapter three.  
Yet, as my interlocutors’ experiences indicate, Post-9/11 veterans’ neoliberal 
supercitizenship is unsteady and often times partial, highlighting the instability of veteran 
identity. The precariousness of veteran identity as well as their limited access to economic 
opportunities persists in the face of attempts to ensure veterans of their special status as military 
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citizens at the level of policy and in their daily lives. For example, this precariousness is clear 
among women veterans on the College of Staten Island campus, whose attempts at being 
recognized as veterans “in the right way” and the university’s initiatives to include and empower 
women veterans fail given the gendered hierarchy within supercitizenship, shaping veteran 
sociality. The instances of misrecognition and exclusion among veterans present in this 
ethnography point to the impossibility of satisfactory recognition due differences between 
veterans and the ways in which veterans are raced, classed, gendered, etc. As a result, attempts to 
establish a veteran ‘identity’ tied to military citizenship deny the heterogeneity among veterans.  
 
Future Research 
With the election of President Donald Trump, I look to recontextualize my research on 
military citizenship under this new administration in order to understand the hierarchy of 
citizenship, in which certain citizens are valued above others given differences in civil, political, 
social, and cultural rights based on gender, sexuality, race, class, ethnicity, etc. (Marshall 1950; 
Verdery 1998). The Trump administration has created sweeping immigration policy reforms and 
proposals, including the creation of a U.S.–Mexico border wall, mass deportation of illegal 
immigrants, a ban on Muslim immigration, tougher restrictions for asylum-seekers and refugees, 
limits on legal immigration, guest-worker visas and the granting of green cards, and the creation 
of the Victims of Immigration Crime Engagement (VOICE). These policies and proposals ignore 
the realities of contemporary immigration as well as demonize immigrants and those who are 
perceived to be immigrants. As a result, various racial and ethnic groups have experienced 
exclusions and limits imposed on their rights. By further exploring military citizenship, my 
future research will study the effects of U.S. militarized nationalism and citizenship among 
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Latino veterans, a racially and ethnically diverse group, during an administration that looks to 
reshape citizenship not only through policies that reflect white nationalism, xenophobia, and 
American exceptionalism but also through a foreign policy that promotes military adventurism in 
the Middle East and elsewhere. 
Given that Latinos have varying legal statuses (i.e., native born, naturalized citizens, 
green card holders, undocumented, refugees, etc.) that shape their relationship to national and 
state governments as well as non-governmental organizations within local communities, 
fieldwork with Latino veterans will further reveal the complexities of military citizenship. 
Furthermore, a study of Latino veterans would also shed light on U.S. Empire: How does empire 
shape citizenship given that Latino veterans experience empire through soldiering as well as 
personal and family histories rooted in Latin America, a region destabilized socially, politically, 
and economically by U.S. administrations for generations (Harvey 2005; Gill 2007; Maskovsky 
and Susser 2009)? My ethnographic study would seek to answer the following questions: Are the 
motivations for Latino enlistment different from those for other ethnic and racial groups? Where 
do Latinos hear about the military and the details for enlistment? Are there specific benefits to 
being in the military that may appeal to Latinos? If so, are these benefits packaged in a way to 
purposely increase the number of Latinos in the military? Was it worth enlisting for these 
benefits, such as citizenship? Do Latino veterans believe they have an experience that is distinct 
from others who have served in the military? If so, what are these distinct experiences? What are 
Latino veterans’ experiences with national and state governments as well as non-governmental 
organizations within local communities? With other veterans and civilians?  
Since World War II, the United States has been consistently under a process of 
militarization, resulting in an American society made by war and preparations for war (Lutz 
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2002). This process of militarization is largely invisible, leading anthropologists to study the 
visible events of war as well as the invisible processes of war preparation and their implications 
(Ben-Ari 2004). Part of this research has focused on the military's use of the media to 
successfully create the ideal American. For example, President Roosevelt founded the Office of 
War Information (OWI), which consolidated, coordinated, and organized government and 
military information services. It released war news domestically and abroad and promoted 
patriotism through posters, radio broadcasts, and movies (Price 2008). OWI’s war posters lauded 
the soldier as the ideal American who risked his life selflessly and courageously for the freedoms 
of those back home. These images depicted the American soldier as a strong, muscular, stoic 
white American-born male (Prividera and Howard 2006). The notion of the ideal citizen also 
called on older men, women, and children to fight tirelessly, like the brave soldiers, but in 
factories and in their homes in order to boost production (Prividera and Howard 2006). Once the 
war was over, the U.S. government continued to espouse the soldier as the ideal American 
through the creation of the G.I. Bill (discussed in chapter 1), a federal entitlement program that 
offered veterans the possibility of home ownership and higher education. This bill redefined 
citizenship since it included not only where one was born but also what one had done for the 
nation, glorifying the soldier and the warring nation (Lutz 2001).  
 Much as during World War II, a redefinition of citizenship has emerged with the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan to strengthen the association of the ideal American citizen with the rhetoric 
surrounding the soldier. Instead of war posters, today we have TV and radio commercials, 
targeting potential military recruits. The slogans continue to echo WWII sentiments of valor, 
strength, and sacrifice. For instance, the U.S. Army's slogan is “Be All You Can Be,” telling 
potential recruits that the Army can help develop your untapped strength and courage.  The 
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images presented continue to predominately contain strong, stoic American men but now, to a 
lesser degree, the images also include women and people of all races. The current redefinition of 
citizenship is a result of the low number of enlistees into the armed forces. In order to boost 
enlistment numbers, President Bush issued Executive Order 13269 in 2002 to accelerate 
naturalization for non-citizen legal residents serving in the military. This program was a 
powerful recruitment tool at a time when the military experienced difficulty reaching enlistment 
quotas and resorted to policies that both extended service members’ contracts and over-utilized 
reserve components. Additionally, the Department of Defense created the Military Accessions 
Vital to the National Interest in 2008 to recruit legal non-citizens (i.e., permanent residents, visa 
holders) and undocumented immigrants (i.e., individuals who have been granted deferred action 
by the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals process) with critical skills in health care and 
language, allowing them to bypass the green card process and become U.S. citizens (DOD 2016). 
Since September 11, 2001, over 100,000 members of the Armed Forces have attained their 
citizenship through military service (UCIS 2016). 
 With low enlistment numbers, fast track naturalization, and the growth of the Latino 
population, the U.S. armed forces invested 55 million dollars in recruitment and marketing 
campaigns to tap into the Latino population (Alvarez 2006). As a result, from 2001 to 2005, “the 
number of Latino enlistments in the Army rose 26 percent, and in the military as a whole, the 
increase was 18 percent” (Alvarez 2006: 1). Latinos are the fastest-growing pool of military age 
people and are more likely than any other group to finish their military service; their re-
enlistment rates are the highest among any group (Alvarez 2006). According to the Pew Hispanic 
Center (2003), Latinos are overrepresented among enlisted personnel that experience combat 
while they are underrepresented in the officer corps. As of 2014, Latinos make up over 6% of the 
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U.S. veteran population (NCVAS 2016). By 2043, the Latino veteran population will experience 
a growth of 3.3 percentage points, second only to a Black veteran population that will grow by 
7.4 percentage points (NCVAS 2017). With the aforesaid statistics, it is clear that the Latino 
community and its veterans will experience the effects of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan for 
years to come. How are Post-9/11 Latino veterans’ experiences defining, (re)creating, and 
contesting citizenship in the contemporary U.S. after completing military service?  Future 
research will seek to answer this question, expanding and nuancing the conclusions about 





























































   










Figure 6. Planting of American Flags for the Flags for the Fallen Event (DePrimo 2013) 




   















































                                                 
 
1 The Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S. Code § 2674) is a 1948 federal statute that permits 
private parties to sue the United States in a federal court for most torts committed by persons 
acting on behalf of the United States.  
 
2 While developing my ethographic research as a doctoral student at the Graduate Center, City 
University of New York, I served as an intern with Iraq Veterans Against the War (IVAW), an 
advocacy group of active-duty U.S. military personnel and veterans who have served since the 
September 11, 2001 attacks. My time with IVAW’s members and employees offered an 
opportunity to work with service men and service women’s experiences of war, as well as their 
struggles upon their return to the U.S. — particularly their readjustment and inadequate access to 
health and mental healthcare. I also worked for Service Women's Action Network (SWAN), 
performing in-depth research and writing on policy issues as well as developing and presenting 
research at national conferences centered on women and LGBTQ issues within the military and 
the veteran community.   
 
3 The names of my interlocutors are pseudonyms. 
 
4 The CSI Veterans Office survey in 2013 revealed the following student veteran population 
statistics: over 80% of CSI student veterans were between the ages of 21 and 30, 80% were male 
while 16% were female, 40% identified as white, over 40% served in the Army, roughly 75% 
served active duty, 45% served in Iraq while 35% served in Afghanistan, and roughly 40% 
served at least two deployments oversees.  
 
5 Veterans were also given living allowances: $50 per month for single veterans and $75 for 
those who were married; this was later increased to $75 monthly for single veterans, $105 
monthly for veterans with one dependent, and $120 monthly for veterans with more than one 
dependent (Dortch 2012). 
  
6 President Truman issued Executive Order 9981 to desegregate the military in 1948, yet 
complete integration did not occur until 1956 (Katznelson 2005).  
 
7 Kickers were granted to service members who agreed to continue their active duty service for at 
least an additional five years or to an individual in the Selected Reserve who agreed to continue 
their service at least 2 more years on active duty and at least 4 more years in the Selected 
Reserve (Dortch 2012). Often Kickers were used to recruit or retain existing personnel with 
critical skills, meaning an individual’s skill set or specialty is in critical shortage or requires 
years of training (Dortch 2012). MGIB extended educational benefits to individuals serving in 
the Selected Reserves if they agreed to re-enlist or extend enlistment for six years; for officers 
they had to agree to serve an additional six years above any existing obligation (Dortch 2012). 
 
8 Along with the Post-9/11 G.I. Bill, other federal benefits include the Montgomery G.I. Bill, the 
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Montgomery G.I. Bill Selective Reserve, and Vocational Rehab and Employment. For 
individuals who qualify for several programs, selection of the Post-9/11 G.I. Bill is irrevocable 
(Dortch 2014). Along with federal benefits, states often provide financial assistance to veterans. 
In New York State, the Veterans Tuition Award is offered to eligible veterans matriculated in an 
approved program at an undergraduate or graduate degree-granting institution or in an approved 
vocational training program in New York. For example, a veteran attending a program full-time 
(at least twelve credits per semester in a degree-granting institution or at least twenty hours per 
week in a vocational training program) would receive an award of up to the full cost of 
undergraduate tuition for New York state residents at the State University of New York, or actual 
tuition charged, whichever is less (NY HESC 2016b). 
 
9 In the Fall of 2013, the profile of CUNY undergraduates: 54.3% receive the Pell grant, a federal 
grant program for students with financial need who have not earned their first bachelor's degree 
or who are enrolled in certain post-baccalaureate programs; 39.4% of students live in a 
household in which the income is below $20,000; 44.8% of students are first-generation college 
students (CUNY May 2014). 
 
10 A person who is active duty is in the military full time, meaning they can be deployed at any 
time (DVA 2012). Persons in the Reserve or National Guard are not full-time active duty 
military personnel, although they can be deployed at any time should the need arise (DVA 2012).  
 
11 The Yellow Ribbon G.I. Education Enhancement Program (2008) helps veterans offset the 
cost of pursuing a degree at private universities. Under this program, universities enter into an 
agreement with the VA to pay a portion of the unpaid tuition and fees, excluding room and board 
and penalty fees, which is then matched by the VA (Dortch 2012). Yet, the maximum 
contribution per student per academic year varies by school, meaning the contributions by the 
school and VA along with the Post-9/11 G.I. Bill tuition benefit may not cover the cost of 
attendance. Since an institution must agree to participate in the Yellow Ribbon Program and only 
veterans at the 100% benefit level qualify, this is not an option for all post-9/11 veterans (Dortch 
2012). Veterans attending a Yellow Ribbon school are not automatically enrolled in the program; 
each school has an application process with varied eligibility requirements, notifying a veteran of 
their acceptance into the program (Dortch 2012). Additionally, universities can limit what degree 
programs qualify under the Yellow Ribbon program, limiting veterans’ options (Dortch 2012).  
 
12 MHA is created by using the Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) rates for an E-5 non-
commissioned officer with dependents (Dortch 2014). Runzheimer International, a company 
under contract with the Department of Defense, adjusts the MHA annually in January based on 
changes in the cost of renting a two-bedroom townhouse in the private market, utilities, and 
renters insurance in the location of the educational institution (Philpott 2010; Dortch 2014; DVA 
July 2015). If the rate decreases, a veteran will continue to receive the previous year’s rate unless 
they changed schools or had more than a six-month break in attendance (DVA July 2015).   
 
13 Along with bank loans, the U.S. Department of Education has two federal student loan 
programs. With the Federal Direct Loan Program, the U.S. Department of Education is the 
lender, offering both subsidized and unsubsidized loans (DOE 2017). Under the Federal Perkins 
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Loan Program, the educational institution is the lender, offering loans to students with 
exceptional financial need (DOE 2017). Unlike a loan, the Pell Grant is a federal subsidy 
awarded to undergraduate students who have not earned a bachelor's or a professional degree. 
Pell award amounts vary given a student’s financial need, the cost of attendance, whether the 
student is a full-time or part-time student, and if attendance is for a full academic year or less 
(DOE 2016). The amount of any other student aid for which a student may qualify does not 
affect the amount of their Federal Pell Grant (DOE 2016). As of July 2012, a student cannot 
receive the Federal Pell Grant for more than 12 semesters or six years. For the 2013-2014 
academic year, the maximum Pell award was $5,645 (DOE January 2013). For New York State 
residents, the New York State Tuition Assistance Program (TAP) is a financial aid program for 
students who are New York State residents and are attending approved schools in New York 
State (HESC 2016a). Eligible students must be New York State residents for at least 12 
consecutive months, be U.S. citizens or eligible noncitizens, meet income eligibility 
requirements, and file a Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) application as well 
as a TAP application (HESC 2016a). For the 2013-2014 academic year, TAP awards ranged 
from $500 to $5,000 (CUNY November 2016).  
 
14 For example, Corinthian Colleges, a for-profit post-secondary education company in North 
America, were accused of fraud by the Department of Education, California’s Attorney General, 
and California’s State Approving Agency. Yet, the VA only stopped new enrollments at 
Corinthian Colleges; it did not notify current Corinthian student veterans, flag the college in the 
Comparison Tool, or stop current G.I. Bill tuition payments (Hefling 2015, 2016). After 
receiving $186 million in G.I. Bill funding, Corinthian Colleges closed in April of 2015, leaving 
many veterans without a degree, transfer credits, and living allowance (Hefling 2015, 2016). 
 
15 For example, California’s SSA stopped G.I. Bill funding for Corinthian College’s California 
campuses as a result of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s suit alleging fiscal 
instability (Hefling 2016). Despite the SEC and SSA actions, the VA allowed veterans to 
continue to attend Corinthian College campuses in other states (Hefling 2016). 
 
16 Established by Congress in 1979 and administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs, the 
Vet Center Program looked to address the readjustment needs of Vietnam era vets within their 
local communities, providing counseling, outreach, and referral services (DVA June 2015). 
Since the 1990s, the Department of Veterans Affairs extended eligibility for Vet Center to 
veterans of the conflicts in Lebanon, Grenada, Panama, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, and 
Kosovo/Bosnia as well as WWII, the Korean War, and Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation 
Iraqi Freedom, and operations within the Global War on Terror (DVA June 2015). 
 
17 The pro-ROTC panelists included Colonel Scott Heintzelman, Brigade Commander U.S. 
Army Cadet Command, Professor Donna Chirico, interim dean for Arts and Sciences at York 
College CUNY, and Professor Rishi S. Raj, Chair of the Faculty Senate and Faculty in the 
Mechanical Engineering City College CUNY. The anti-ROTC panelists included Jennifer 
Pacanowski, Army Veteran, Javier Ocasio, Army Veteran, and Sharmin Hossain, Youth 




                                                                                                                                                             
18 Academic freedom is understood through two frameworks, constitutional academic freedom 
and professional academic freedom, given that they have differing legal roots. Constitutional 
academic freedom is based on the first and fourteenth amendments and “prohibits government 
attempts to control or direct the university or those affiliated with it regarding either (1) the 
content of their speech or discourse or (2) the determination of who may teach” (Hamilton 1995, 
191). Professional academic freedom is “an employment law concept developed by the 
American Association of University Professors rooted in concerns over lay interference by 
boards of trustees and administrators in professors' research, teaching, intramural and extramural 
utterances” (Hamilton 1995, 193). 
 
19 The American Association of University Professors is an organization of professors and other 
academics whose mission is “to advance academic freedom and shared governance, to define 
fundamental professional values and standards for higher education, and to ensure higher 
education's contribution to the common good” (AAUP 2016).  
 
20 As of Fall 2013, all CUNY students pursuing a bachelor's degree must complete 30 credits of 
Common Core along with the College Option, six to twelve additional general education credits 
determined by each CUNY College. Additionally, Pathways includes Gateway Courses, a 
minimum of three courses leading into each of CUNY’s most popular majors, such as business, 
psychology, and nursing (CUNY 2017).  
 
21 Those against Pathways argued it threatened academic freedom by ignoring faculty 
governance in favor of a corporatized university education, which was in alignment with national 
reforms in university education funded by foundations, such as the Gates and Lumina 
Foundations  These reforms stressed cost saving measures for the university, an increase in 
bureaucratic efficiency, college completion, and a homogenized general education (Bowen 
2012). By promoting a standardized and compressed curriculum, these reforms meant that 
CUNY students had fewer opportunities to explore a wide range of academic interests and ideas 
due to reduction in specialized coursework and departments, such as anthropology, history, 
foreign languages, etc. (Bowen 2012). Those against Pathways argued that to ensure student 
graduation while maintaining high academic standards the university must invest in students, 
providing extensive academic advisement, reducing class sizes, maintaining coursework 
standards to ease transfers, and hiring more full-time faculty (Bowen 2012). Along with a 
petition to repeal Pathways and a lawsuit filed against CUNY by the PSC and CUNY’s 
University Faculty Senate, the majority of CUNY colleges called for a moratorium or outright 
rejected Pathways (Hogness 2012). The College of Staten Island Faculty Senate passed a 
resolution stating that the “majority of full time faculty, department chairs, and members of the 
faculty governance and related committees continue to oppose Pathways” and called for a 
“moratorium on all matters related to Pathways implementation” (CSI 2012, 1). Despite changes 
to Pathways starting in the fall of 2014 as a result of a review required by the Board of Trustees, 
CUNY faculty and the PSC continued to argue that Pathways was a “usurpation of faculty 
power, and the 30-credit limit on core curriculum still threatens the quality and breadth of a 




                                                                                                                                                             
22 All individuals enlisting in one of the armed forces take an oath of enlistment required by 
federal statute in 10 U.S.C. § 502. In this oath, the individual swears that he/she “will support 
and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic,” 
“bear true faith and allegiance to the same,” and “obey the orders of the President of the United 
States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice” (U.S.C. 2016).  
 
23 Chickenshit refers to behavior that makes military service worse than it needs to be, including 
petty harassment of the weak by the strong, inflicting pain, suffering, or humiliation disguised as 
necessary discipline, insistence on the letter rather than the spirit of directives, etc. 
 
24 The war in Afghanistan lasted 13 years (Operation Enduring Freedom [OEF]), October 2001 
to December 2014) and the Iraq War lasted 8 years (Operation Iraqi Freedom [OIF] and 
Operation New Dawn [OND]), March 2003 to December 2011), making them the longest 
conflicts in U.S. history. Despite having formally ended operations, the U.S. military continues 
to be involved in the current Iraqi Civil War as well as the Afghani conflict against the Taliban 
and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Given the length and scale of the post-9/11 wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, the military relied on activating reservist and National Guard units as 
well as employing redeployments and stop losses instead of enacting a draft to fulfill personnel 
needs. Consequently, a limited number of U.S. citizens personally experienced the war either 
directly or through their family and friends and have a limited understanding of post-9/11 
military service. 
 
25 A discharge completely relieves the veteran of any unfulfilled military service obligation. 
Generally, service members receive an honorable or a general (under honorable conditions) 
discharge. If misconduct is involved the service member may receive an ‘other than honorable’ 
(OTH) discharge. Other than a discharge, service members may be formally separated, or retire 
from the military. For more information, see USDA 2011. 
 
26 According to 38 U.S.C. §101, “the term ‘service-connected’ means, with respect to 
disability or death, that such disability was incurred or aggravated, or that the death 
resulted from a disability incurred or aggravated, in line of duty in the active military, 
naval, or air service.” In order to establish that a disability is service-connected, a veteran 
must prove that a particular injury or disease was 1. incurred while in service; 2. 
aggravated while in service; 3.  due to or the result of a service-connected disease or 
injury which is itself considered to be service-connected; or 4. caused by medical care or 
vocational rehabilitation provided by the VA (Panangala, Shedd, and Moulta-Ali 2014, 
3). Additionally, certain diseases, including chronic, tropical, prisoner-of-war related, or 
herbicide exposure related, as outlined in Veterans Benefits Administration’s Statute 
3.307, are considered service-connected even though there is a lack of in-service 
documentation.  
 
27 Battle buddy is “a cultural support mechanism in the Army in which two people operate 
together as a single unit, both for improved functioning and increased safety. Each may be able 
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to prevent the other from becoming a casualty or rescue the other in a crisis” (USDA 2015). This 
term is also widely used by service members within the U.S. military.  
 
28 There are no official words to the original score for Taps but popular verses have been created 
(Keyes 2011).  
 
29 Congress made women a permanent part of the military through the Women’s Armed Services 
Integration Act of 1948. This legislation limited the proportion of women in the military to 2% 
of the enlisted force and 10% of officers (Kamarck 2016). Additionally, it included two 
exclusionary statutes prohibiting assignment of female members to aircraft and vessels engaged 
in combat missions (Kamarck 2016).  
 
30 Based on the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta 
lifted the Combat Exclusion Policy in January of 2013, directing military departments and 
services to review their occupational standards and assignment policies and to make 
recommendations for opening all combat roles to women no later than January 1, 2016 (Kamarck 
2016). Following this, military departments and Special Operations Command conducted studies 
on gender-neutral occupational standards for combat roles, unit cohesion, women’s health, 
equipment, facilities modifications, propensity to serve, and international experiences with 
women in combat; Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter approved on March 10, 2016 the 
implementation of plans to open all combat jobs to women who meet the occupational standards 
(Kamarck 2016). Yet, it is unclear how Congress will provide oversight over the number of 
women assigned to various combat specialties, their retention and promotion rates, and other 
talent management issues (Kamarck 2016). 
 
31 In 2003, the Army revised its basic training protocol so that all service members would 
undergo combat training (i.e., weapons training and learning to fight in urban areas where 
enemies were indistinguishable from civilians) (Chapman 2008). Additionally, the revision 
acknowledged “women were working alongside war fighters, taking hostile fire – even in the 
role of designated support forces” (Chapman 2008). Consequently, no gender distinction was 
made on who would receive combat training (Chapman 2008). Additionally, in 2005, the 
Defense Department’s Women in the Army Point Paper removed “several land combat units, 
including multiple launch rocket systems and reconnaissance, surveillance target acquisition 
squadrons in the Army from the list of those coded to be all-male” (Herbst 2005, 314). 
 
32 Don't Ask, Don't Tell (1993) was the official United States policy on gays serving in the 
military from December 21, 1993 to September 20, 2011. This policy prohibited military 
personnel from discriminating against or harassing closeted homosexual or bisexual service 
members or applicants, while barring openly gay, lesbian, or bisexual persons from military 
service. It was argued that gay service members would affect military capability by harming 
morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion. If homosexual conduct was suspected and 
subsequently investigated, service members were discharged from the military (Allen 2000; 




                                                                                                                                                             
33 Service members can file an unrestricted report, triggering a formal investigation conducted by 
the unit commander, who has discretion in deciding whether to pursue criminal charges in 
response to allegations of sexual misconduct (DOD 2012). An alternative reporting option is a 
restricted report, which allows a service member to make an informal complaint in order to 
receive medical treatment and counseling without initiating an investigation (DOD 2012). This 
reporting option allows the service member to later switch to an unrestricted report if desired 
(DOD 2012). Unfortunately, this reporting option allows alleged assailants to continue in the 
military unpunished and possibly assaulting other service members.  
 
34 The Robin Hood Foundation is a charitable organization that attempts to alleviate problems 
caused by poverty in New York by supporting and developing organizations that provide direct 
services to poor New Yorkers as well as improving their earning power and long-term prospects 
(Robin Hood 2017). Robin Hood also provides program grants, general operating support, 
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